THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

# MEANING AND REFERENCE: THE INTERPRETATION OF VERISIMILITUDE IN *THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO MARK*

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# PREFACE

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# INTRODUCTION

## Verisimilitude

How is it that written narratives[1] record truth, the way things are or might be? When we encounter a particular written narrative and experience it as true or at least as something that might be true, how do we explain that judgment? The answer to these questions is known in the history of literary criticism as the doctrine of verisimilitude.[2] The doctrine of verisimilitude has a long and varied history which for the purposes of this inquiry begins with Aristotle.[3] His proposal was the first among the Greeks to account for verisimilitude in both history and fiction.[4] His theory of verisimilitude owed much to the rhetorical

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[1] A narrative is distinguished by two characteristics: "the presence of a story and a story-teller . . . For writing to be narrative no more and no less than a teller and a tale are required." Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, The Nature of Narrative (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 4; hereafter, Nature of Narrative.

[2] Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics ed. Alex Preminger, Frank J. Warnke, and O. B. Hardison, Jr. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 883-84.

[3] Ibid.

[4] James M. Redfield, Nature and Culture in the Iliad (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 56, where Redfield says, "The problematic of narrative fiction can for the first time be explicitly stated by Aristotle because in Aristotle's time it had for the first time become clear that the meaning of a story need not have anything to do with the actuality of the events narrated." He also notes that "[i]n Plato there are still traces of a view of the heroic stories as quasi history; Socrates says that one kind of permissible lying is that which takes place 'in the storytelling we were just speaking of; because we do not know how things truly were in the ancient times, we liken the falsehood to the truth as much as we can and thus make it useful' (Republic 382c-d," n.41, pp. 234-35; hereafter, Nature and Culture).

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tradition[5] and established the topic for much of subsequent theoretical conversation.[6]

For Aristotle a text's verisimilitude lay in its "probable" (_eikos_) character. Tragedy, to take a specific example,

> . . . is the imitation of a complete and whole action having some magnitude. . . .
>
> To give a simple definition: it is of such magnitude that when things happen in sequence according to probability or necessity it turns out that there is a change from good fortune to ill fortune or from ill fortune to good fortune.[7]

The truth of a narrative, in this sense, lay in its success at describing what is likely to happen given the circumstances of the story. With this doctrine of verisimilitude it is not necessary for the events described in the narrative to have actually happened.

Aristotle's doctrine of verisimilitude was in part a response to the notion of history which "comes to full self-consciousness in Thucydides' Introduction (I.20-22), where he firmly turns his back on the storytellers and the legends which have 'won their way into the world of myth'."[8] Likewise, Aristotle was responding to criticism of Homer by Plato in Book Ten of the _Republic_ where Socrates condemns fiction as "an imitation of the experience [_pathos_] of others" (604e) and an appeal to the less-rational part of ourselves.[9] In both cases Aristotle wishes to provide the possibility for gaining knowledge from the poet and appreciating the truth of fictional narratives.

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[5] Ibid., p. 57.

[6] _Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics_, pp. 883-84.

[7] Aristotle, _Poetics_, 1450b24-25 and 1451a11-15.

[8] Redfield, _Nature and Culture_, p. 56.

[9] Ibid., p. 51.

In the history of literary criticism, Aristotle's argument is a touchstone for further discussion. Cicero, Quintilian, Plutarch, and Horace accept his idea of verisimilitude but tend to restrict it more in the direction of the ordinary and the commonly probable.[10] Dr. Johnson defended Shakespearian characterization against the accusation of impropriety by observing that there is always an appeal open from art to life.[11] In doing so, Johnson placed himself within the limits of Aristotle's original proposal. This inquiry does not reduce verisimilitude in the biblical narrative to Dr. Johnson's commitment to realism since it wishes to include the possibility of historical referentiality. Aristotle took this possibility into account as well:

> Even if he [the poet] turns out to make a poem of what happened, he is nonetheless a poet. Nothing prevents some of the things that happened from being such things as probably happen and possibly happen; according to that, he is their poet.[12]

More recent students of narrative have proposed other ways of explaining the tie between the written text and the real world. Robert Scholes and Robert Kellog in their book The Nature of Narrative consider the "connection between real and fictional worlds as a spectrum dominated by three hues--the recording of specific fact, the representation of what resembles specific fact, and the representation of generalized types of actuality."[13] Each of these is an empirical mode of verisimilitude. To these three "hues" Scholes and Kellogg add the various illustrative methods of relating the text and reality. In the illustrative methods a particular character or setting illustrates an ethical or metaphysical truth.[14] The notion of the illustrative mode is a contemporary extension of Aristotle's notion of verisimilitude.

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[10] Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, pp. 883-884.

[11] Scholes and Kellogg, Nature of Narrative, p. 87.

[12] Aristotle, Poetics, 1451b29-33.

[13] Scholes and Kellogg, Nature of Narrative, p. 87.

Parallel to contemporary literary critical discussion, hermeneutical philosophy has clarified the relationship between language and reality. It has seen that words in and of themselves do not have any particular sense or meaning;[15] they must be joined in a proposition, and that proposition itself must have a particular setting. Following the work of Gottlob Frege, one can distinguish the sense and the reference of any proposition.[16] The sense or meaning is the ideal object that is intended. The reference is "the truth value of the proposition" or to what extent its understanding and reality correspond: "its claim to reach reality."[17] To illustrate: Two persons are sitting at a table on which there is a pencil. One of the persons picks the pencil up and says, "This is a pencil." In such a conversation between two people the relation between ideal meaning and reference is available immediately. This is the case since the referents of their conversation are ostensively present. However, a set of words within a dictionary refer only to each other, quite separate from the external reference they might have in any particular discourse.[18]

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[14] Ibid.

[15] Robert P. Scharlemann, "Biblical Tradition and Liberal Learning," Dialog: A Journal of Theology 19 (Spring 1980): 100.

[16] Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference," trans. Max Black, in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), pp. 56-78.

[17] Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, Texas: The Texas Christian University Press, 1976), p. 20; hereafter, Interpretation Theory.

When an interpreter of a text experiences it as true, the sense of the text and the interpreter's reality become related in a particular manner: The interpreter has experienced truth when he/she sees the identity in the difference between meaning and reality.[19] To say, for example, "This is a pencil" is different from the pencil itself. However, when we say, "This is a pencil," we say it is "the same as" what is so and "seeing this equivalence in the difference" is the experience of truth.

Truth, in this discussion, is a reflective object and not an object of sensation since we distinguish between understanding the sense of the words, their meaning (this is a pencil), and the perception of the reality to which they refer. "If we could not distinguish between the two (difference) and if we could not see that how we think of something is the same as how that thing shows itself to be (identity), we could not experience truth as such."[20] Truth is experienced not through sensation or thought alone, but "through an act in which a meaning understood is compared with a datum perceived."[21]

The medium of the experience of truth is language. Discourse, or logos, "makes the projection of reality possible by its sign-character."[22] Once again, "This is a pencil" bears a sense or meaning, since we can imagine what it is saying. This meaning, in turn, has a significance since we know that a pencil belongs to the realm of physically perceptible objects rather than, say, tonal relations. The sense and significance, in turn, point to a referent, a datum that can be given either in accord or in discord with how the reality is projected. Discourse also shows reality. For example, the word "tree" is not a tree, but it is of the tree since it shows the object to which it refers as a tree. "Language is, in short, the medium in which the experience of truth takes place, a role it can play because it is itself an identity in difference."[23]

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[18] Ibid. Also see: Paul Ricoeur, "The Task of Hermeneutics," Philosophy Today 17 (Summer 1973): 139; hereafter "The Task."

[19] Robert P. Scharlemann, The Being of God: Theology and the Experience of Truth (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), p. 4; hereafter, The Being of God.

[20] Ibid. [21] Ibid. [22] Ibid., p. 22.

As Robert P. Scharlemann so rightly argues, "[t]he synthesis of understanding and reality, of meaning and being, which is implicit in the experience of truth is, on closer analysis, a synthesis of two syntheses. Meaning (sense) is the synthesis of singular and universal, subject and predicate, that makes up the concept of the whole assertion."[24] The meaning of an assertion is neither the subject/predicate alone or added together but "precisely the unity of the two that is their synthesis."[25] In the case of a text, a series of such subject/object syntheses are joined together by the interpreter. The interpreter builds a consistent sense or meaning of the text. This "consistency building" is the first general task of establishing textual meaning.[26]

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[23] Ibid., p. 23.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] The notion of "consistency building" as the first major task of interpretation has been developed most extensively by Wolfgang Iser, in The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); hereafter, Implied Reader and The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); hereafter, Act of Reading.

Reality is a similar synthesis of singular and universal in the object to which the meaning refers. It is the connection of the singular perception of an object and the abstract thought that is the reality of the object. It is the unity we ascertain in how a thing presents itself to us.[27] "Meaning and reality are coordinate; the one is a synthesis of understanding which either coincides with or conflicts with the other as a synthesis of the object."[28]

## Markan Verisimilitude

To this point this study has discussed texts and language in general. In order to focus the discussion and make it more useful for theological purposes this study limits most of its examples to The Gospel According to Mark (hereafter, Mark). Although the inquiry is decidedly theoretical, it is committed to keeping the Markan narrative center stage. Reflection on the interpretation of verisimilitude is its special concern and Mark is peculiarly suited to this inquiry. Among the Christian gospels it has the most complex mixture of narrative forms. Its form and structure have led to great interest among scholars of various fields, including literary critics. Furthermore, proponents of most contemporary theories of interpretation have addressed the Markan narrative, which keeps it controversial among biblical critics.

For example, Erich Auerbach notes how Mark interweaves random fishermen, publicans, and other common folk and their thoughts and deeds in an apparently crude and immediate narrative style. The narrative uses few of the classical conventions for representing reality in literature.[29] For example, in Peter's denial the narrative does not use the rhetorical conventions of dialogue but portrays in plainspoken discourse the conversation between Peter, a fisherman, and the common folk gathered in the high priest's courtyard.[30] The direct, descriptive air is characteristic of Mark and is a major component in Markan verisimilitude. "Without any effort on his [the author's] part, as it were, and purely through the inner movement of what he relates, the story [of Mark] becomes visually concrete. And the story speaks to everyone. . ."[31]

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[27] Scharlemann, The Being of God, p. 24.

[28] Ibid.

With this discussion of Markan verisimilitude, Auerbach develops his investigation of the representation of reality in Western literature. Mark is an illustration of Auerbach's general opinion of the biblical narrators: they are oriented toward truth rather than, as Homer, toward "realism," the appearance of reality.[32] They believed what they wrote to be the truth about reality.[33] Homer, though he sought to speak the truth,[34] also sought to "bewitch the senses."[35] In Homer, all events are in the foreground, uniformly illumined, fully externalized, with unmistakable meanings.[36] In the biblical narrative, certain parts are in high relief, others left obscure. The narrative's abruptness and unexpressed influences reflect a concern with historical development and universal-historical claims and create a background quality to the narrative which necessitates interpretation.[37] Homer and the Bible illustrate two distinct kinds of styles for representing reality in antiquity.

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[29] Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 44; hereafter, Mimesis.

[30] Auerbach draws a contrast between Mark's use of direct dialogue and its stylized version in tragedy. He argues that "[a] scene like Peter's denial fits into no antique genre. It is too serious for comedy, too contemporary and everyday for tragedy, politically too insignificant for history--and the form which was given it is one of such immediacy that its like does not exist in the literature of antiquity." Mimesis, pp. 45-46; for a contemporary discussion of dialogue in ancient historiography see Mimesis, pp. 39f.

[31] Ibid., p. 48.

[32] Ibid., p. 14. It is important to distinguish the project of this inquiry from Auerbach's. Mimesis reads the entire development of literature in the West as a struggle to achieve realism. This conception of the development of narrative is too confining. Rather, this inquiry prefers the broader and more complex viewpoint of Scholes and Kellogg; cf. Nature of Narrative, p. 85.

[33] Auerbach, Mimesis, p. 14.

John Frank Kermode offers a substantially different interpretation of Markan verisimilitude. He, too, notes that a "remarkable degree of realism was achieved," but argues that "[t]he gospels sound like history" but are in fact opaque to events behind the text.[38] The fact that they have avoided detection only gives witness to

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[34] Redfield, *Nature and Culture*, p. xxii. Redfield addresses the question of truth in the Homeric way of seeing the world. "Then there is truth in the story. Insofar as it unfolds 'in accordance with probability or necessity', it is--however unfamiliar its premises and exotic its locale--true to life. In order to speak of this kind of truth, I have found myself saying that fiction is the outcome of an inquiry into the causes of action and that we learn from fiction something about the conditions of action. Of course it must be understood that the result of the inquiry is a story, not a report, and that what we learn (one could almost say 'appreciate') is the probability of this particular story, not some general propositional truth." Redfield's characterization owes much to Aristotle's definition of verisimilitude; cf., *Poetics*, 1451b5-11.

[35] Auerbach, *Mimesis*, p. 15

[36] Ibid., p. 23.

[37] Ibid.

[38] John Frank Kermode, *The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of Narrative* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 112-113; hereafter, *Genesis of Secrecy*.

> the power of the institution which undertook to uphold the absolute veracity of the reports, and to enforce it not only by dogma but by the use of vast resources of liturgy, sacrament, and art.[39]

In the end, Kermode attributes much of the willingness of people to accept the veracity of Mark to a "desire for comfort."[40] Mark is an artfully crafted narrative designed to appear or sound like history but not to be true. It is at best, like all fiction, part of a basic human need to order the "disorder, chaos, a discordant temporality without beginning or end" that is reality.[41] That Mark is such fiction is in itself not bad and only harmful if we fail "to distinguish between myths and fictions. Fictions can degenerate into myth whenever they are not consciously held to be fictive."[42] Though effective fiction and perhaps high art, Mark is not true; Markan verisimilitude is purposive appearance but, nonetheless, not true.

The history of modern interpretation of Markan verisimilitude by biblical critics illustrates the same variety and disparity on the relationship between meaning and reference as Auerbach's and Kermode's interpretations do. What follows is an abridged history of modern Markan interpretation by biblical critics which describes their interpretation in the terms of the inquiry: meaning, reference and verisimilitude.

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[39] Ibid., p. 113.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 35, where Lentricchia discusses Kermode's notion of "necessary fiction."

[42] John Frank Kermode, The Sense of An Ending: Studies on Reality and the Imagination (London: Faber and Faber, 1951), p. 39; hereafter, The Sense of An Ending.

## History of interpretation

Throughout the modern period Mark has impressed its hearers and readers as believable or "as true." Even in the traditional opinion that Mark was an abridgment of Matthew, the interpreters noted a crude, empirically descriptive air peculiar to Mark.[43] Once Markan priority was generally accepted, Mark became a primary source for the search for the historical Jesus movement.[44] This was to no small extent due to Markan verisimilitude. As James M. Robinson interpreted it, "the illusion of a Markan simplicity, neutrality, and objective historicity arose."[45] In terms of our present inquiry, this interpretation of Markan verisimilitude understood the referential claims of Mark to point at events behind the text. The meaning of the text was taken as a series of propositions (subject and predicate) which individually made reference to particular events behind the text. The identity in difference was a matter of these individual propositions. Thus the experience of truth depended upon the text's dissection.

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[43] The first evidence that Matthew uses Mark was supplied by Christian Gottlieb Wilke in 1826 in the article "Uber die Parabel von den Arbeitern im Weinberge Matth.20:1-16," *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie* 1 (January): 73-88. The basic argument from order, to the effect that Matthew and Luke follow the same order only when parallel to Mark, was provided by Carl Lachmann, "De ordine narrationum in evangeliis synopticic," *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* 8 (1835): 570-590. Further proof from a detailed analysis of form was provided by Wilke in *Der Urevangelist*; James M. Robinson, *The Problem of History in Mark*, *Studies in Biblical Theology*, no. 21 (London: SCM Press, 1957), p. 7; hereafter, Robinson, *The Problem of History*. Donald Juel, *Messiah and Temple: The Trial of Jesus in the Gospel of Mark*, Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series, no. 31 (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press for the Society of Biblical Literature, 1977), p. 41; hereafter, *Messiah and Temple*.

[44] As James M. Robinson notes, this "pattern was initiated by Christian Hermann Weisse, *Die Evangelische Geschichte kritisch und philosophisch bearbeitet*, 1838, and dominated the interpretation of Mark down to Heinrich Julius Holtzmann. Holtzmann provided in *Die synoptischen Evangelien*, 1863, both the most masterly proof of the priority of Mark and the most successful presentation of the historical Jesus, thus apparently proving the case for the objective historical accuracy of Mark," Robinson, *Problem of History*, p. 7.

[45] Ibid.

In the subsequent historical Jesus movement this conception of the text's verisimilitude led to a search for the events in the life of Jesus. The work of David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874), especially his Leben Jesu in 1835, only intensified this searching behind the text for the historical Jesus. Markan priority and Markan objective historicity became generally accepted.[46] It was generally agreed that despite a certain "critical sifting and purification of the record" of Mark "the truth of history" was not eliminated but was still present in Mark's history.[47] The "critical sifting" implied a further dissection of the text and removal of those parts which were thought unreliable and, therefore, untrue. In short, only part of the text was true.

At the turn of the century William Wrede's (1859-1906) Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien (1901, 2nd., 1913) took a significantly new direction in Markan interpretation.[48] Wrede rejected the supposition that the Markan text was readily transparent to the historian's eye. In the terms of the inquiry, Wrede became sensitive to the role of the author in creating the sense or meaning of the text. He held that one must discount the author's point of view and prejudice to ascertain the real facts of

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[46] Ibid., p. 8.

[47] Ibid.

[48] W. Wrede, Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1901). Among the major nineteenth-century contributors to this discussion here omitted is Martin Kähler; however, he will be the subject of the introduction at a later point.

Jesus' life which lie behind the Markan narrative.[49] The author created a sense of the text which could not be equated immediately with the events behind the text. Sense, reference, and referents were not the same. Wrede unified part of the text's meaning by projecting it onto the intentionality of the author. The text remained dissected but not atomized as in earlier interpretations.

Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) recognized further complications in equating the meaning of the narrative with events behind the text in the life of Jesus. He, nonetheless, added to the interpretation of those references in the text that were true about the life of Jesus. Schweitzer quite agreed that "the Markan narrative is not built upon historical considerations of a psychological, pragmatic nature."[50] He complicated the discussion by isolating a historical viewpoint, the thoroughgoing eschatology in Mark, and attributing it, not to the author of Mark, but to Jesus himself.

Julius Wellhausen (1844-1918) went considerably further in recognizing the complex relationship between meaning and reference in the text of Mark. He questioned the historiographic value of Mark by arguing that "the characteristics of real historiography [_Historie_] are lacking. Mark does not write '_de vita et moribus Jesu_ . . . [r]ather Jesus' person has been taken up and dissolved (_aufgegangen_) in his divine calling, for Mark desires to present Jesus as the Christ."[51] Subsequent interpretation of

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[49] Ibid.

[50] Robinson, _Problem of History_, p. 9; Albert Schweitzer, _The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of Its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede_, trans. W. Montgomery (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968).

[51] Julius Wellhausen, _Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien_, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1905), p. 44.

Mark developed this non-historical theory to the extreme of interpreting Mark as completely myth.[52] Mythological interpretation of Mark, in effect, limited the range of referentiality present in Mark; it lead to the conclusion that Mark was, in the terms of this inquiry, an artfully crafted narrative bearing no direct reference to historical events. The text as a whole was gained but a full range of referentiality was lost.

Despite the turn to explain Mark primarily as myth, later interpretation was more temperate. Some interpreters concluded that Mark "was not an objective historian, but rather wrote from the point of view of Christian faith."[53] This viewpoint received a subtle and classical formulation earlier in this century in the form critical discussion between Martin Dibelius (1883-1947) and Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976). Their disagreement was highlighted by their agreement on many other questions regarding Mark. They both might have characterized Mark as a "kerygmatic history" in many significant ways, unlike other hellenistic literature. They further agreed with the basic outline of Karl Ludwig Schmidt's (1891-1956) work on Mark, Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu (1919). This work and Martin Kähler's (1835-1912) study of the gospels, Der sogenannte historische Jesu und der geschichtliche biblische Christus (1892), represent two of the more important antecedents to the works of both Dibelius and Bultmann. Sharing as they did many of the same assumptions and working principles, these latter two interpreters of Mark nonetheless disagreed in a fundamental manner on the character of the gospel.

Dibelius would place his emphasis on "history" in the description of Mark as "kerygmatic history." He concurred with K. L. Schmidt's observations that the text had been compiled from tradition units preserved by and transmitted in the church. This did not, in his mind, lead to the conclusion that they were primarily the inventions of the author or community who recorded and transmitted the tradition units. On the contrary, they clearly represented the words and deeds of Jesus.[54] To be sure, the transmission of the tradition units was for purposes and situations quite different from the original events. However, this could not change the probability that the author was actually a very conservative compiler (Bearbeiter): a "historicizer" of the oral tradition.[55] The text, therefore, seemed quite transparent to the historian who could look through it to the events, words, and deeds that lie behind the text. The text remained primarily a window to what lies behind the text, though it clearly had within it the marks of the purposes and concerns of those who transmitted the tradition units.

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[52] Robinson, Problem of History, p. 11.

[53] Ibid.

Bultmann, in contrast, might be said to have placed the emphasis on "kerygmatic" in the phrase description of Mark as "kerygmatic history." He, too, followed K. L. Schmidt's lead in recognizing the transmission of tradition units. However, he described the role of the redactor/author quite differently. Mark, he argued, has one purpose in mind: "the union of the Hellenistic kerygma about Christ, whose essential content consists of the Christ myth as we learn of it in Paul (especially, Phil. 2:6ff; Rom. 3:24) with the tradition of the story of Jesus" (emphasis Bultmann's).[56] Bultmann agreed with Dibelius that it is important to emphasize Mark's use of the dominical sayings as well as other tradition units.[57] But, unlike Dibelius, Bultmann understood Mark's overriding concern to be for the Christ myth and kerygma. He went so far as to say that Mark is on the whole more concerned with the Christ myth than are Matthew and Luke, who--in Bultmann's opinion--included more Jesus history.[58] Once again in agreement with K. L. Schmidt, Bultmann suggested that the order of events in Mark does not represent the order of events in the life of Jesus.[59] It is the product of the tradition and Mark. However, "Mark is not sufficiently master of his material to be able to venture on a systematic construction himself."[60]

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[54] Martin Dibelius, Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums, 3rd ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Siebeck), 1959), p. 3, hereafter, Formgeschichte; English translation by Bertram Lee Woolf and the author, From Tradition to Gospel (New York: Scribner, 1965 reprinted), p. 3.

[55] Ibid., pp. 223-225.

Bultmann's emphasis on kerygma reflects the thinking of Martin Kähler, one of his teachers. Kähler gave eloquent expression to the argument that the New Testament documents were insufficient sources not only for reconstructing the life of Jesus; indeed, they could not be used to reconstruct any development in Jesus' thought or messianic consciousness. Quite to the contrary, the result of such searches would not be the real Christ:

> The real, that is the actual Christ, who strides through the history of his people, with whom millions have had

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[56] Rudolf Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition, trans. John Marsh (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 347-48, hereafter Synoptic Tradition.

[57] Dibelius, Formgeschichte, p. 77.

[58] Bultmann, Synoptic Tradition, p. 348.

[59] Ibid. In stark contrast to this conclusion, V. Taylor, who will be a major figure in this study, follows his mentor C. H. Dodd in claiming a discernable outline of Jesus' ministry.

[60] Ibid., p. 350.

> communion in childlike faith, with whom the great witnesses of faith have communed as they struggled, accepted, conquered and surrendered--the real Christ is the preached Christ.[61]

The attempt to look behind the biblical record at "what really happened" is not only unwarranted by the nature of the evidence, but idle:

> Is there any real loss if the origin of the picture remains dark for us? No one saw the loaves prepared and grow, but in response to Jesus' word of thanks they satisfied thousands. The loaves were simply there and they were quite genuine bread. So it is with all the wonder-working of our God: what we see and possess belongs to this world; but its origin we do not know at all; all that we can detect is that it comes from beyond.[62]

Kähler added complexity to the relationship between the text and the range of truth claims that the text makes. He did not limit these referential claims to events that lie behind the text. Bultmann reflected this complexity insofar as he emphasized the kerygmatic in his appraisal of Mark's kerygmatic history. When he argued and acted as a historical critic, he was in conflict with Kähler's sentiments. Bultmann's central concern was to understand the process of tradition history available in the New Testament texts and the Hellenistic materials contemporary to them. The gospels have only a strictly limited use as historical documents: they are primarily testimonies of faith. Bultmann unified the text's meaning around the notion of primitive Christian faith. As a result, the truth claims which Dibelius was willing to make on the basis of the text, Bultmann discounted. The referential character of the narrative was limited.[63]

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[61] Martin Kähler, Der sogenannte historische Jesus und der geschichtliche biblische Christus, 3rd ed., ed. E. Wolf from the 1st and 2nd eds. (Munich: Kaiser Verlag, 1953), p. 44; hereafter, Jesus und Christus; English translation by Carl Braaten, The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964), p. 91.

[62] Kähler, Jesus und Christus, p. 74.

When Dibelius and Bultmann disagreed on the appropriate emphasis in their characterizations of Mark's verisimilitude, they were, among other things, disagreeing over the ability and appropriateness of the interpreter to go through the text to something that lies behind it. In effect, they joined the discussion of the relationship between language and reality. The terminology of meaning, reference, and verisimilitude provides the ingredients for describing several possible modes of thinking about the relationship between language and reality. This terminology takes the discussion of Markan interpretation out of a merely intradisciplinary discussion and places it into the public discourse of general hermeneutical theory. In this context the history of Markan interpretation can be understood as a series of attempts to clarify the relationship between meaning and reference in Mark. What Dibelius and Bultmann were arguing about in the instance of Markan verisimilitude is what happens to the reference, the claim to reach reality, when the original discourse becomes a text. They discovered a certain strangeness about this text, which both interpreters attributed, to one degree or another, to the historical distance amongst the author and the original audience, his sources, and the contemporary audience. The issue according to Bultmann and Dibelius is primarily one of historical distance.

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[63] The emphases of both Bultmann and Dibelius have been intensified in the work of their contemporaries and successors. Two of these intellectual successors will figure significantly in the development of my inquiry: Vincent Taylor (1887-1968) and Willi Marxsen (1919- ). Marxsen develops Bultmann's emphasis on the kerygma by focusing on the intention of the author of Mark. Taylor reacts to what he perceives to be Bultmann's skepticism. He attempts to make even a stronger case than Dibelius was willing to make on behalf of the transparency and historical reliability of the Markan text.

Subsequent hermeneutical theory has begun to appreciate the peculiarities of written discourse as opposed to oral discourse and the distanciation created by the inscription of the original discourse. Language mediates truth, and different forms of language mediate truth differently. The original discourse, complete with its assumed references, is no longer immediate but mediated by a text--to be sure, a very old text. The common situation between the author and reader has dissolved and "at the same time, the concrete conditions for the act of pointing something out no longer exist."[64] Thus two forms of distanciation exist, the primary distanciation created by the writing of the discourse and the secondary distanciation created by the reader's historical distance. When Bultmann developed Kähler's concern for the historic biblical Christ, he pointed to this first distanciation. Bultmann was also greatly concerned about the second form of distanciation. The extension of this distanciation of the text from the original discourse is the birth and development of literature--in particular fictional literature, but it is the case of all literature. By implication, Mark can and should be understood within the category of literature. This is not to suggest that literature, the written text, even fictional literature, is without reference or a claim to reach reality. On the contrary, literature does indeed have a referential system. And much of the debate between Dibelius and Bultmann along with the topic of this inquiry tries to discern the various possible theories of reference available for the interpretation of Mark's verisimilitude.[65]

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[64] Ricoeur, "The Task," p. 140.

[65] I have not used the term "historical reference" as a major category of the inquiry. This is done to avoid prejudicing the case in

## Four Models

The inquiry will explore four possible options for interpreting Markan verisimilitude. A model, in this study, is "an image employed reflectively and critically to deepen one's theoretical understanding of a reality."[66] These models combine the terms of the inquiry (verisimilitude, meaning, and reference) in four different configurations. Each configuration will have a separate understanding of text, interpreter, and the purpose and goal of interpretation. The components of one model may be present in another but significantly reordered. For example, each model takes into account the role of the author in writing Mark. However, only the second model controls interpretation, meaning, and truth claims by appeals to the consciousness of the author. Similarly, each model will include a role for historical context, audience, and internal structure of the text, but will relate them in significantly different manners.

Each model is developed around the goal the interpreter sets for

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Dibelius' direction. Rather, I have distinguished between meaning and reference for the purpose of exploring the range of possible modes of interpreting Markan verisimilitude.

[66] By the term "model" I am referring to the use of "an image employed reflectively and critically to deepen one's theoretical understanding of a reality." Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1978), p. 27; also pp. 19-37. Some models are readily imagined, for example, my Maestro and Player-Coach models in "Mind Reader and Maestro: Models for Understanding Biblical Interpreters," Word and World I (Spring 1981):153-168. Other models are more abstract. The term "model" has for some time been in use in the physical and social sciences. I. T. Ramsey, among others, has shown its fruitfulness for theology. I. T. Ramsey, Religious Language (New York: Macmillan Co., 1963); Models and Mystery (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Max Black, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962). In their use in theology, however, models renew the attempt to relate language and the ultimate mystery of reality. In this attempt, one must recognize that "religious experience has a depth that has no correlation in our experience of the physical universe." Dulles, Models, p. 30.

the interpretive process. E. D. Hirsch, Jr. writes, "Any normative principle in interpretation implies a choice that is required not by the nature of written texts but rather by the goal that the interpreter sets himself."[67] Reflection on the vast variety of interpretations of any classical text and on the nature of written texts will, I believe, find agreement with this basic tenet of contemporary hermeneutics. Written texts consist of a series of mute signs which a given reader can construe in any number of ways. Therefore, it is the will of the interpreter which determines what goal has normative status in the reading of a text. To take a wellknown example: the normative principle for most medieval biblical exegetes was the principle of the fourfold sense. For these interpreters each scriptural text "contained" four senses whose discovery constituted the goal of biblical interpretation.[68] In contrast, the normative principle of much contemporary biblical interpretation is that of authorial or communal intention.[69] Each of the four models in this investigation proposes a significantly different normative principle for interpreting Markan verisimilitude.

Each model is developed and evaluated in a similar manner to one another. One general theorist of contemporary (post Second World War) hermeneutics and one exegete are paired to reflect on each model for interpreting verisimilitude. A particular Markan interpretation illustrates and is a basis for reflection on the model. The interpreter's goal, the interpreter's self-understanding, and the model's initial question organize each model. In addition, each model has a primary dipolar axis along which the interpretation takes place. In the first model, the relationship between the text's corruption intersects the events behind the text; in the second model, the author's intention fluctuates in relationship to the audience; in the third model, the text relates to the contemporary audience; in the fourth model the text relates to the deep structural constraints upon the text. Finally, the inquiry considers the model's ability to understand Mark as a whole without losing a full range of referentiality. The models can be summarized according to the descriptions on the following page.

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[67] E. D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 24; hereafter, Validity.

[68] Compare H. DeLubac, L'exegèse médiévale: les quatres sens de l'écriture, 4 vols. (Paris: Auber, 1959-1965).

[69] Norman Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom: Symbol and Metaphor in New Testament Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p. 4.

## Two Paradigms

The four models are developed within two paradigms, two models for each paradigm. A paradigm, in this inquiry, is a theory of interpretation that has received general acceptance and encompasses various models and types of interpretation within it.[70] The basic characteristics of a historical and a linguistic paradigm for textual interpretation are described in two prologues. The historical paradigm can include more than one type of interpretive method; for example, source, form, redaction, or sociological criticism. The linguistic paradigm includes traditional literary types of interpretation, structuralist, and deconstructionist criticism.

The inquiry is divided into three parts: The first part begins

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[70] Compare Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 2, no. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

| | Historical Paradigm | | Linguistic Paradigm | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MODEL ONE | MODEL TWO | MODEL THREE | MODEL FOUR |
| GOAL | Determine the relationship between text and events "behind the text." | Determine the author's intention. | Seek to merge the horizons of the text and contemporary audience. | Determine the deep structural convictions of the text |
| DIPOLAR AXIS | text's corruption and events behind the text | author's intention and audience | world "in front of the text" and contemporary audience | text and deep structural constraints |
| SELF-UNDERSTANDING | HISTORIAN | MIND-READER | RHETOR | DECODER |
| INITIAL QUESTION | What was happening that the author reports? | Are there discernible redactional patterns in the text? | How does the world "in front of the text" fit together? | What are the systems of transformations and states in the narrative? |
| EXEGETE | Vincent Taylor | Willi Marxsen | Donald Juel | Daniel and Aline Patte |
| THEORIST | Maurice Mandelbaum | E.D. Hirsch, Jr. | Hans-Georg Gadamer | A.J. Greimas |

Figure 1.--Models of Interpretation

with a prologue to the historical paradigm; chapters one and two investigate two models of construing and explaining Markan verisimilitude when the historical paradigm is used. The second part begins with another prologue and then, in chapters three and four, develops two models within the linguistic paradigm. The third part, chapter five, discusses narrative theology in light of the first two parts.

The models in no way exhaust the possible ways of construing the text under these paradigms. They each develop one way of interpreting the text of Mark as a whole without losing a full range of referentiality. Each model, then, explores and furthers the basis of the inquiry regarding the interpretation of Markan verisimilitude: that a relatively adequate general theory of hermeneutics will interpret Mark as a whole without losing a full range of referentiality.

Each model could be understood to exclude all other possible models, if it were taken as a standpoint.[71] It is entirely possible that each model could so encapsulate an interpreter that the interpreter would consider all other models illegitimate. However, these models are developed as points of view which can be shared cumulatively with other models. The spectrum of possibilities for relating the terms of the inquiry is considerable. A description of this spectrum and the place of the four models within the spectrum follows.

## The Spectrum

The four models for ordering the interpretation of Markan verisimilitude generate a spectrum.[72] The spectrum represents the various interpretations of verisimilitude by relating meaning (the wholistic sense of the text that results from the reader's act of consistency building) and reference (the claim to reach reality). The spectrum encompasses the various stages of skepticism about textual transparency (including both Bultmann and Dibelius) and the ultimate skepticism available among contemporary hermeneutics and deconstructionist hermeneutics that finally even denies the stability of meaning itself.

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[71] Scharlemann, The Being of God, p. 35.

[72] This spectrum might be thought to result from an intensification of the quite subtle difference between Dibelius and Bultmann.

Four perspectives are explicated. A perspective includes two or more points of view that share the same normative principle for ordering interpretation. Each perspective includes one of the four models the inquiry develops. The perspectives are pictured as four groups of points on the spectrum moving from left to right. (See figure 2.)


Degrees of skepticism:
complete transparency------------complete opacity
1
2
3
4
Normative Principle:
historical events-context
author
reader
text

Figure 2.--Perspectives

These perspectives relate the terms of the inquiry--meaning, reference, and verisimilitude--under these general principles of interpretation: (1) the text in relation to its context, (2) the text in relation to its author, (3) the text in relation to its reader, and (4) the text in relation to itself. The argument moves from left to right, with varying degrees of movement within each perspective. Though close relationships exist between perspectives bordering on one another, they are clearly distinguishable on the basis of the characterizations made in the inquiry. On other issues theorists and exegetes may be more closely aligned with their counterparts (as in the other three positions noted above), but, the normative pattern for interpretation of the text which they share creates the theoretical perspective.[73]

## Perspective One

The first perspective embraces four possible relationships between what advocates of this perspective speak of as the text and the events "behind-the-text." The historical context is the normative referent for groups within this perspective.

The first group considers the text primarily informational about the historical facts. This group is exemplified by what James Barr calls the fundamentalist position. Narrative represents for them the accurate description of the events.[74] The text is completely transparent to the events which lie behind the text. Meaning is equated with, though clearly differentiated from, those events to which the text refers. Thus, while there is a clear separation of meaning and reference, there is a complete confidence that the text's meaning is quite congruent with those events to which it refers. The text is a window with clear glass which allows uninhibited vision through the window.

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[73] For example, Dibelius would be in the first perspective, Bultmann in the second.

[74] James Barr, The Bible and the Modern World (London: SCM Press, 1973), pp. 76-77; Fundamentalism (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), p. 12.

The second group admits that the events behind the text are not entirely congruent with the description of the text, but that certain analogies between the two terms can be made. The glass in the window is either tinted or warped. The text describes something that happened. There still remains a great deal of congruency with the events behind the text. The interpreter outlines various procedures for determining the degree of congruency between narrative and actual event, though certain disparity will remain. This relatively conservative group does not, however, equate textual meaning with historical events behind the text as did group one.

The third group admits that the event behind the text is not entirely congruent with the description of the text but goes further: the analogies between text and event have less congruency than in group two. The window's glass is very dirty and quite distorted. Something happened that the text describes. But considerable demythologization must take place, given the great variance between modern historiography and the notions of historiography exemplified by the Gospel writers.

A fourth group understands the text to portray an existential "event." This event has affected the authors of the text and is communicated to the reader by way of the narrative. This in turn produces the effect of that existential event. This group borders very closely on the second perspective. However, it belongs in the first perspective because the text is still somewhat transparent to the actual existential event. The norm for interpreting the text is the event behind the text, not the event in the mind of the author.

## Perspective Two

The end of the range of points of view in the first perspective borders on the beginning of the second perspective: the historical referent is the author's intention. This theory of historical narrative argues that the text is transparent to a historical referent, but, unlike the first perspective, this historical referent is the event of the author's intention. Meaning is a matter of the author's consciousness. This theoretical perspective also has a range of possibilities. At the end of the range of this perspective, skepticism about textual transparency to entities "behind the text" has grown considerably. The construing of the author's intention ranges from the "consciousness" of a historical personage derived through the methods of historical criticism to the reconstructed "implied author" or "speaking subject" of the historical narrative. The second model will discuss in some detail the range within this perspective.

## Perspective Three

The third theoretical perspective holds that the historical narrative is completely opaque to events behind the text. Skepticism about textual transparency intensifies in this range of points of view. One does not search for some historical referent "behind the text." The "literary form," the values of the writer and reader--to differing degrees within this perspective--are the substance of the text's meaning. The window is painted on a wall; it only gives the appearance of transparency. All attempts to establish the "consciousness of the author" or some objective historical event behind the text suffer from what Frank

Kermode calls the "fallacy of transparency."[75] This perspective begins with the possibility of historical reconstruction of an intention of the implied author. This point of view is the closest to the second perspective. It culminates with the melding of the reader's world-view with the text's.

## Perspective Four

Even at the beginning of this perspective the intensity of skepticism about textual transparency is complete. Here the focus of all interpretation is on the text itself. This perspective is best illustrated by the development of structuralism from its roots in Russian Formalism.[76] The Russian Formalists stressed the poetics of language. Referential treatment, though never denied, was at best tertiary to the task of explaining the text's meaning.[77] As this movement developed, the interpretation of the text was seen to depend upon an ordering of the linguistic elements of the text with respect to one another. For example, the dominance of rhythm over other means and devices was analyzed.[78] Unlike the third perspective, which is concerned with the functions of the text in regard to the reader, this perspective analyzes function with respect to internal systematic considerations.

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[75] Kermode, Genesis of Secrecy, pp. 115ff.

[76] L. T. Lemon and M.J. Reis, eds., Russian Formalist Criticism (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), pp. 61-95.

[77] Roman Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," in Structuralists from Marx to Levi-Strauss, ed. Richard DeGeorge and Fernande DeGeorge (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1972), pp. 85-122.

[78] Boris Eichenbaum, "The Theory of the 'Formal Method'," in Russian Formalist Criticism, ed. L. T. Lemon and J. J. Reis (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), pp. 99-139, hereafter, "Formal Method."

A more intense skepticism develops within the fourth perspective: the text becomes a system of devices connected in various manners. Furthermore, the system is not closed, but through its "intrinsic dynamism" it engenders a series of transformations.[79] Literary history becomes a history of poetics when seen from the immanent evolution of these linguistic systems.[80] The text becomes a dynamic sign within a system of internal transformation. With this development, the process of moving from a historical paradigm to a linguistic paradigm of textual hermeneutics is complete.

In some cases the linguistic paradigm identifies isolated elements of language. These elements emerge as codes for the internal transformations of the sign system. Key binary contrasts (for example, marked and unmarked, paradigmatic and syntagmatic, metaphorical and metonymical, acts of selection and acts of combination) on various levels of the internal sign system (for example, phonetic) become the codes for the development of particular messages.[81] In short, in the extreme examples of this perspective, language--not reality--becomes the ordering point and starting point of explanation.

## The Mediation

Those points of view on the left half of the spectrum, the historical paradigm, tend to dissect the text. They reduce its meaning and truth claims to what they consider to be historically reproducible events: either the event in the mind of the author or the events behind the text. The linguistic paradigm tends to diminish a full range of referentiality, in particular to discrete ordinary empirical objects. In its extreme cases, the linguistic model denies referentiality altogether.

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[79] Noam Chomsky, "A Transformational Approach to Syntax," in The Structure of Language, ed. J. Fodor and J. Katz (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 211-45.

[80] Eichenbaum, "Formal Method," pp. 99-100.

[81] Roland Barthes, "The Structuralist Activity" and "To Write: An Intransitive Verb?," in The Structuralists from Marx to Levi-Strauss, ed. Richard DeGeorge and Fernande DeGeorge (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1972), pp. 147-54, 155-67.

The division between historical and linguistic paradigms is not so easily resolved, but it is not insurmountable. The recovery of the whole of the text without losing a full range of referentiality leads naturally to the appreciation of Markan narrative. The narrative quality of Mark holds both synchronic and diachronic meanings in tension with the historical and ontological references of the text.[82] An adequate hermeneutic must realize that a major function of a narrative in Mark is to mediate and make possible the relationship between the meaning of the text and its referential system.[83] Thus this inquiry seeks not only to recover the narrative as a whole but to discover the narrative's function in the phenomenon of verisimilitude and the relationship between the text's meaning and referentiality.

This concern for the narrative character of Mark is an extension of the inquiry's theological purpose to serve the images of the church by rendering explicit the conditions for understanding their meaning and truth claims. This purpose requires that I attempt "to teach myself and my readers the language of religious historical narrative." This process attempts to "invent a method of reading while investigating it."[84]

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[82] Paul Ricoeur, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), pp. 149-166; Georg Henrik von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971).

[83] See Scholes and Kellogg, Nature of Narrative, pp. 82, 87. The unspoken corollary to this inquiry's thesis is that all discourse that is meaningful is also referential. The necessity of referentiality follows from the decision of the interpreter to establish a purpose for a particular interpretation. Therefore, referentiality is a product of purpose. In offering four models this inquiry provides four purposes or uses to which the text can be put in order to gain referentiality.

The sense of historical reference to events behind the text and the reference to logical objects is joined to the itinerary of meaning through the text's subsequent effective history (Wirkungsgeschichte).[85] The role of intertextuality both previous and subsequent to Mark is crucial. Namely, it is crucial to understand the pattern of telling, interpreting and retelling the story. Kermode calls this pattern the "necessities of upspringing."[86] If we, as interpreters lose the force of the story, its conceptual wholistic meaning, we really have not interpreted it; and if all we retain is the story then we cannot find either truth or ourselves. The necessity of midrash, in the sense of new stories as a part of the retelling of the story, does not suspend the necessity of critical interpretation. As John Boswell Cobb notes: "Theology stands on the boundary between philosophy and literature . . . To achieve this [theologians] must pursue clarity with the philosophers, while recognizing that this clarity must serve the images rather than displace them with concepts."[87] For theological purposes, then, the biblical narrative must be clarified by philosophical conceptualities, but for the service of the images. The very character of Mark's narrative requires the upspringing of critics who explain the sense of verisimilitude. At the same time such explanations require the return to narrative. The result will be a movement in this inquiry from first naiveté of the experience of verisimilitude, through a moment of critical explanation, to a post-critical experience of verisimilitude.

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[84] It would be presumptuous, of course, to equate this investigation to the far reaching program of Claude Levi-Strauss whom I quote here. In a small way, however, my intention in this inquiry is analogous to his project regarding myth, since I wish to investigate the possible range of referentiality and meaning when the language of religious historical narrative is taken seriously. Claude Levi-Strauss, Le cru et le cuit (Paris: Plon, 1964), pp. 20-21; English trans. John Weightman and Doreen Weightman, The Raw and the Cooked (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

[85] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Garret Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 305.

[86] Kermode, Genesis of Secrecy, pp. 75-99.

Is Mark primarily mimetic information about the alleged historical events "behind the text," or is it an artfully crafted narrative bearing no direct reference to historical events? Those in the modern period who have argued that the text is primarily mimetic have tended to dissect the text and lose the narrative as a whole. Recent literary and linguistic analysis that has emphasized the narrative whole has generally lost the sense of historical reference. This inquiry attempts to mediate these two tendencies. It takes Mark seriously as historical narrative, recognizing that the clarification of the nature of historical narrative is central.[88] Mark does make truth claims, and these claims have pri-

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[87] John Boswell Cobb, Christ and a Pluralistic Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975).

[88] More is at stake in my use of various methods and perspectives, some developing from nonfictional disciplines and other from fictional, than simply an avoidance of the distinction between fiction and history. To a great extent I am in sympathy with Barbara Herrnstein Smith. On the Margins of Discourse: The Relation of Literature to Language (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), especially, pp. 45ff. She rejects the overt distinctions and categories of poetry versus history in recognition of the 'covert' categories, that is, "categories implicitly acknowledged and respected in the culture, and learned by its members, but cutting through and across the explicit distinction presumably reflected in traditional terms such as poetry, prose, literature, fiction, and nonfiction." I quite agree that it is a "thankless enterprise" to stalk definitions for such terms and instead join her in an attempt to

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ority, if not exclusionary force, over the other claims of the text. This study attempts to recover the narrative character of Mark as a whole without ignoring the question of truth. Neither the text's historical, referential claims nor its full range of other references available to the thoughtful interpreter are ignored. References to the original author and his community should be considered and in a qualified manner incorporated into the interpretation of Markan verisimilitude. The internal reference system of the narrative world wherein characters and narrator refer to entities within that world becomes crucial in this investigation's exploration of referentiality. This inquiry argues that the deep structural system of Mark is another set of truth claims, claims to touch reality. The text's references to a possible mode-of-being-in-the-world is also included. This later set of referential claims includes the text's claims upon the contemporary audience, especially their behavior in and perception of their world. None of these various claims to touch reality can be ignored, since as this inquiry argues--and this is the major warrant for the study--a relatively adequate,[89] general theory of hermeneutics[90] will interpret

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understand the functional shapes language takes in order to produce the various kinds of verbal events, experiences and compositions. Whether or not I can join her in her distinction between "natural" and "fictive" discourse is another matter. However as she notes this distinction "is not intended to serve as a solution to the problems of definition mentioned earlier, but, rather, as a diversion from them." In order to better understand Mark, I believe it necessary to follow her functional enterprise to uncover the covert categories that the text makes available.

[89] David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 64-71.

[90] Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 67. This inquiry understands general

Mark as a whole without losing a full range of referentiality.

This is not an exegetical study; it is an inquiry within the category of fundamental theology.[91] Fundamental theology articulates the possibilities and conditions for understanding the truth and meaning claims of a religious tradition. It addresses its arguments to all intelligent, reasonable, and responsible persons.[92] The inquiry will explore the possibilities and conditions for understanding the truth and meaning claims implied in Markan verisimilitude. It asks what interpretive methods will render explicit the truth and meaning claims of Mark. The answer to this question leads to part of the basis for and critique of a narrative theology. For this reason, the last part of the inquiry summarizes the findings in terms of an evaluation of the possi-

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hermeneutics as having two foci: "one on the theory of understanding in a general sense and the other on what is involved in the exegesis of linguistic texts." The inquiry is committed to the intention of Schleiermacher when he sought to join the special hermeneutics of philologists and biblical exegetes into one "systematic science." Compare F. D. E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, ed. Heinz Kimmerle, Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959), p. 79.

[91] David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), pp. 14-21, 54.

[92] In a fundamental theology, beliefs may not serve as either warrants or proofs in arguments. Here I follow Wayne C. Booth's conception of the "rhetoric of assent" for the character of the argument to be made in this inquiry. Wayne C. Booth, Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); especially, pp. 106, 184, 185.

To a large extent a fundamental theology follows the system that Schleiermacher designated "philosophical theology." F. D. E. Schleiermacher, Brief Outline of the Study of Theology, trans. Terrence N. Tice (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1966), pp. 29-41. Cf. B. A. Gerrish, "Continuity and Change: Friedrich Schleiermacher on the 'Task of Theology,'" in Tradition and the Modern World: Reformed Theology in the 19th Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 13-48; especially, pp. 31-34.

bilities for a narrative theology.[93]

A conflict of interpretations exists in the contemporary discussion of Mark and in general theories of hermeneutics.[94] These various theories of hermeneutics and text are explored as ways of explaining Markan verisimilitude. Semantic clarification does not resolve all of the conflict of interpretation present in Markan interpretation; nor does a reduction of options into simple and clear oppositions which "permit a choice of the one true view"[95] (monism); nor does a rigorous critique of the four options developed in the inquiry lead to the conclusion that all conflict about critical values is nonsense (skepticism); nor does a scissors-and-paste method create the perfect explanation for Markan verisimilitude (eclecticism). Differing interpretation of this phenomenon in Mark are not only possible but necessary since "critical truth can never be exhausted in any one mode."[96]

On the other hand, there is not an infinite number of satisfactory explanations for verisimilitude in Mark. This inquiry does not join those who believe that the major task of the reflective reader/critic is to vitalize criticism by deconstructing what they read and then offering it as their own creation, since, they reason, any reading inevitably will be a misreading. The options that the inquiry develops are relatively adequate interpretations of verisimilitude in Mark; the inquiry does not conclude that one is the only one. The options are, however, far more appropriate for the theological purposes of this inquiry than several other positions that could be taken within their respective perspectives. There are, in short, limits to pluralism of interpretation in this inquiry.[97]

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[93] Paul Ricoeur, *The Conflict of Interpretation: Essays in Hermeneutics*, ed. Don Ihde, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974); George W. Stroup, "A Bibliographical Critique," *Theology Today* 32 (July 1975): 133-43.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Wayne C. Booth, *Critical Understanding: The Power and Limits of Pluralism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 198; hereafter, *Critical Understanding*. For a complete critique of common sense eclecticism, Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London: Longman, Green & Col, 1957), pp. 416-21.

[96] Booth, *Critical Understanding*, p. 198.

The inquiry, therefore, makes a case for the place of narrative in theology. The pattern of the argument might best be laid out in a "candid" form, suggested by Stephen Toulmin,[98] that exhibits the different "functions of the different propositions invoked in the course of the argument and the relevance of different sorts of criticisms which can be directed against it."[99] In short, this proposal, for which a case is made, may be considered as a conclusion to the argument.

The conclusion is that the rhetorical model (chapter 3) orders, in a relatively adequate manner, the four moments (the first four chapters) of critical explanation of Markan verisimilitude for the use of the biblical narrative in theology.[100] As a result, narrative plays a necessary, but not sufficient, role in two moments in theology: the movement from narrative to an imaginative discrimen,[101] usually in the shape of doctrine, and the movement from the imaginative discrimen, to poesis and praxis. The data (D) the inquiry offers in support of this conclusion is argued in the first four chapters. The inquiry concludes (C) that each of the four models renders explicit Markan truth claims (verisimilitude) which are unified, ultimately, by the narrative world-in-front-of-the-text. The major warrant (W) for the inquiry is that a relatively adequate interpretation of a text understands the text as a whole without losing a full range of referentiality. Its implicit backing (B) is that interpreters ought to understand the whole text, including all of its meaning and truth claims. In candid form the macro-argument of the inquiry looks as follows: (See figure 3)

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[97] The question of limits to pluralism, of course, raises philosophical and theological questions beyond the scope of this study. Cf. Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, pp. 14, n.1; 92-94; Wayne C. Booth, Critical Understanding, p. 357, n.17.

[98] Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 97-102; hereafter, Toulmin, Uses.

[99] Toulmin, Uses, p. 9.

[100] Paul Ricoeur, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), pp. 149-166; Georg Henrik von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971).

The conclusion is substantially qualified (Q) in that the only text considered is Mark, so that each argument must be qualified by the phrase, "at least in the case of Mark." In chapter 5 the inquiry admits one major line of rebuttal (R): the possibility of one or more hermeneutics of suspicion[102] proving able to explain religious experience without remainder.

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[101] David Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), p. 160; hereafter, Kelsey, Uses.

[102] Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), especially pp. 20-36.

D(Each of the four models renders explicit Markan truth claims which are ultimately unified by the narrative world-in-front-of-the-text.) ------------ So, Q(at least in the case of Mark) -- C(the rhetorical model orders in a relatively adeqiate manner the four moments of critical explanation for the use of the biblical narrative in theology. As a result, narrative plays a necessary, but not sufficient, role in two moments in theology.)

Since W
(A relatively adequate general theory of hermeneutics will interpret Mark as a whole without losing a full range of referentiality.)

On account of B
(Interpreters ought to understand the whole text, including a full range of meaning and truth claims.)

Unless R
(Any one or combination of hermeneutics of suspicion sufficiently hinders the intelligibility and likelihood of any one of the referential claims.)

Figure 3.--Candid Argument

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# PROLOGUE PART ONE

# THE HISTORICAL PARADIGM

## The Predominance of the Historico-critical Method

The historical paradigm for hermeneutics has been so predominant that until quite recently most people in the modern period would have said it was the only paradigm. In his last major publication before his death in November, 1976, Norman Perrin wrote: "Biblical scholars tend to be primarily historical scholars, so much so that 'biblical criticism' almost always means 'historical criticism' of biblical texts. . . ."[1] Most people familiar with contemporary New Testament studies would agree with Perrin. Another well-known biblical scholar, James Barr, states that "within theology today, whatever theory may say, the dominant mode of reading and understanding the Bible today has come to be a historical mode."[2] This, Barr adds, "is not the sole approach, but it is certainly the dominant approach among professional experts in biblical studies."[3] Nor is fascination with and acceptance of this historical approach restricted to the professional experts. Indeed, as Edgar Krentz, writing in 1975, points out, the historico-critical method of biblical exegesis is generally accepted as a valid, indeed as a necessary approach to the biblical writings, not only in scholarly circles but also at the level of official pronouncements of various Christian churches.[4]

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[1] Norman Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom: Symbol and Metaphor in New Testament Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p. 5; hereafter, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom.

[2] James Barr, "Reading the Bible as Literature," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 56 (1973-74): 17, hereafter, "Reading."

[3] Ibid.

The very characterization, "historico-critical' indicates the centrality of history and historical studies in this approach to the biblical writings. Even a casual glance at this method bears out Perrin's observation that biblical scholars tend to be primarily historical scholars. Thus, for example, in leafing through some of the scholarly journals devoted to New Testament studies, one finds history playing a central role in the various subdisciplines associated with the historico-critical method: history of the language, of the words and of their use; history of social, political and religious institutions; history of the ways of life in a given period or redactional milieu; history of various influences, borrowings, and assimilations; history of forms, history of sources, history of redactions.[5] So that, to quote Barr once again:

> It is a characteristic experience of the student of theology that, having embarked on his subject with the aspiration to learn from the Bible more about the God whom he worships, he finds his biblical study directed insistently toward historical quantities: the sources used by the writers, the unity and integrity of the writings ascribed to them, the dating of them, the influences which worked on their minds.[6]

How has this situation come about? Why this predominance of history in the study of the biblical writings? There are several excellent works which trace the origin, growth, and development of the historico-critical method in biblical exegesis, and we need not go into them in detail here.[7] However, I believe that the enormous progress of historiography in the middle and late nineteenth century has promoted this paradigm for understanding the biblical text. Wilhelm Dilthey, (1833-1911), at the end of this period, believed that the time was right for a "critique of historical reason," which would do for the historical sciences what Kant's "Critique of pure reason" had done for the natural sciences: to provide for the historical sciences an adequate epistemological foundation.[8] This progress in historiography lead biblical scholars to extend the new historical methods to the critical study of the Bible. So that, as Krentz writes: "Biblical criticism, influenced by secular historical research, developed and refined its techniques." "They are still," Krentz adds, "part of the common coin of all interpretation today."[9]

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[4] Edgar Krentz, The Historical-Critical Method (London: SPCK, 1975), pp. 2-3; hereafter, Method.

[5] Paul Ricoeur, "Du conflit à la convergence des méthodes en exégèses biblique," Exégèse et hermeneutique, ed. Roland Barthes, Collection Parole de Dieu (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1971), p. 36; hereafter, "Du conflit."

[6] Barr, "Reading," p. 17. From a specifically catholic viewpoint, L. Alonso-Schökel makes a similar observation in "Hermeneutics in the Light of Language and Literature," Catholic Biblical Quarterly 25 (1963): 384; hereafter, "Hermeneutics."

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[7] See Krentz, Method, especially ch. 2; for studies that deal specifically with the history of the application of historico-critical methods to the New Testament see: H. S. Nash, The History of the Higher Criticism of the New Testament (New York: Macmillan Co., 1901); Stephen Neill, The Interpretation of the New Testament: 1861-1961 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); V. P. Furnish, "The Historical Criticism of the New Testament: A Survey of Origins," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 56 (1973-74); 336-70; Werner Georg Kümmel, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of its Problems, English Translation of Das Neue Testament: Geschichte der Forschung seiner Probleme (London: SCM Press, 1973).

[8] Cf. H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, English Translation of Wahrheit und Methode (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975), p. 193; cf. also Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 100.

[9] Krentz, Method, p. 24. Note that the fascination with history was so great that, as H. Hahn writes concerning Old Testament studies: "For

The Quest for the historical Jesus was a major theological factor which could and did justify and promote the rapid growth and popularity of this historical approach.[10] As I discussed above, interest in Mark was precipitated by this movement. The Quest itself arose from a preoccupation with the "real historical" Jesus and what he said, did, etc. This resulted largely from the fact that the person of Jesus of Nazareth is the center from which theological theses or dogmas ground the Christian faith in its various forms and manifestations.[11] It is true, of course, that in recent years, historical study of the Bible and in particular of the New Testament "is more and more being done in university departments of religion that are in no way related to the church" and that "the Bible is studied critically with the same methods used on all ancient literature."[12] In this case, Mark is studied perhaps more in

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about a generation after Wellhausen had substituted the study of Israel's religious history for the study of Old Testament religious doctrine, systematic theology practically disappeared from the field. The last important work of a systematic nature was A. B. Davidson's discussion of Old Testament theology published 1904. The works which came after it for a quarter of a century described the evolution of the historical religion rather than the content of its teaching." H. F. Hahn, The Old Testament in Modern Research (London: SCM Press, 1956), p. 226.

[10] This is not to say, of course, that the historico-critical approach to the biblical writings won easy acceptance from ecclesiastical authorities (see Nash, Higher Criticism, p. 113). Particularly in the Catholic church, as Refoulé points out: "L'exègese historico-critique eut à mener un long combat avant que fut reconnue sa légitimité." F. Refoulé, "Exégèse en question," Le Supplément, 27 (1974): 391. See also T. A. Collins and R. E. Brown, "Church Pronouncements," The Jerome Biblical Commentary, II: 624-32.

[11] Apart from this abiding theologically motivated interest in the historical Jesus, it must also be pointed out that the tremendous influence of German Idealism and Romanticism on nineteenth century historical and biblical studies did much to reinforce this search for the "real" Jesus and thus to give a very strongly historical orientation to New Testament studies.

[12] Krentz, Method, p. 4.

the context of the history of world religions than in a dogmatic, theological, or church context.[13]

Be that as it may, there were two primary thrusts to critical historical research. One was the attempt to reconstruct the "real historical" Jesus of Nazareth from a critical examination of the information contained in the gospels.[14] The other sought to understand the gospel texts as texts. This distinction between using the texts as historical sources and understanding the texts as texts is the concern of the first model to be explored and part of the crucial difference between the first and second models. Both models look behind the text in the interpretive process, although they do so with two different goals in mind.

Other factors contributed to the success and widespread popularity of history and of historical method in biblical, and in particular, Markan, studies. The final, most significant fact concerns the hermeneutical principle which identifies textual meaning with the meaning intended by the text's author(s). In his "Preface to Hermeneutics"[15] James Muilenburg writes:

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[13] This, however, is a comparatively recent development and there is no doubt that most of those scholars associated with what has come to be known as the "Quest of the Historical Jesus" and the "New Quest of the Historical Jesus" (to evoke the titles of two well-known books) have been theologically motivated or have operated within a theological context. So much so that on the first page of his "Quest," Schweitzer refers to the "critical investigation of the life of Jesus" as "the greatest achievement of German theology." And Stephen Neill, commenting on the theological significance of the "New Quest" writes that "it is possible gravely to underestimate the significance of the historical in Christian faith," that "theologically, history is important." So much, then, for this theologically grounded impetus for promoting the application of critical historical methods to the New Testament in theological circles. Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, English translation of *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* (Oxford: A. & C. Black, 1910); J. M. Robinson, *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus* (London: SCM Press, 1969); Neill, *New Testament*, pp. 198-200, 268-91.

[14] In "Das Problem der Hermeneutik" (*Glauben und Verstehen*, II, Tübingen: Mohr, 1952, 211-235, pp. 213-14), Bultmann cites H. Patzer's *Der Humanismus als Methodenproblem der klassische Philologie* which shows how, with the development of hermeneutics as a science of understanding (after Schleiermacher) "philology" considered as "die Wissenschaft, die Interpretation literarischer Texte zu ihrem Gegenstand hat und die sich dafür der Hermeneutik bedient," increasingly fell under the yoke of history and gradually became a mere sub-discipline of history.

> If there is a single emphasis that has characterized the study of the Bible during the past two centuries, more particularly since the publication of J. Ph. Gabler's well-known monograph in 1787, it is the necessity for a truly historical interpretation. That is, we must recover, so far as possible, what the original writer actually said in his particular historical situation and what his words actually meant in the context of his own situation in history.[16]

The concern here is with the recovery of the author and his intentions in his particular historical situation; the interpreter is to recover "what his [the author's] words actually meant in the context of his own situation in history" as an overriding hermeneutical principle in Markan studies.[17]

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[15] J. Muilenburg, "Preface to Hermeneutics," Journal of Biblical Literature, 77 (1958):18-26.

[16] Ibid., p. 19. On Muilenburg's reference to Gabler in this text see e.g. W. G. Kümmel, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of its Problems, English Translation of Das Neue Testament, Geschichte der Erforschung seiner Probleme (London: SCM Press, 1973), pp. 98ff. Note that underlying this recognition of the need for a truly historical interpretation is the conviction that, to use the words of Ernst Käsemann (in defending the legitimacy of historical criticism against certain forms of fundamentalism): "the Bible does not speak directly to our present situation as if two thousand years in between [the time of writing and the present time] did not exist. It speaks directly to the men of its own time." Quoted from E. Käsemann, "Thoughts on the Present Controversy on Scriptural Interpretation," in his New Testament Questions of Today (London: SCM Press, 1969), pp. 260-85, esp. p. 273.

[17] In treating of "historical criticism" as a stage in the hermeneutical process (as he envisages this process) Norman Perrin describes very well what this hermeneutical principle involves. He writes:

## Romantic Hermeneutics

This hermeneutical principle, whereby the major thrust of interpretation is centered on the author and his intentions in writing and/or on the original reader, has enjoyed widespread acceptance both among literary critics and among biblical scholars especially since the middle of the last century.[18] This was due in part, no doubt, to the currency of "romantic hermeneutics."[19] The romantic hermeneutic insisted that genuine understanding of a text involves and aims at "a 'congenial' coincidence with the 'genius' of the author."[20]

### Schleiermacher

"Romantic hermeneutics" or "romanticist hermeneutics" had its origin in Friedrich S. Schleiermacher (1768--1834), who is widely acknowledged as "the father of modern hermeneutics"[21] and the originator

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> We need to be able to understand the language in which a text is written, the nature of the text itself as a historical and literary artifact, the circumstances in which and for which it was written. We need, further, to understand as far as we can the intent of the author in writing the text and the meaning understood by those for whom the text was written. [In all this, what we are seeking is] to understand the text as the author intended it to be understood, or as it was understood by those who first read it.

Perrin, Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, p. 4.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Robert C. Johnson. Text and Text-Interpretation in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur, unpublished dissertation presented to the Higher Institute of Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, 1977, pp. 1-22.

[20] Paul Riceour, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), p. 92.

[21] Cf. e.g. F. Mussner, Geschichte der Hermeneutik von Schleiermacher

of the shift from regional to general hermeneutics. Before Schleiermacher, the two great fields of text interpretation (classical philology and biblical exegesis) each had its own rules based on the nature of the texts being dealt with in the particular field.[22] With Schleiermacher we see the effort both to discover what is essential to text interpretation as such, regardless of the nature of the text involved (general hermeneutics), and to raise exegesis and philology to the rank of a *Kunstlehre*.[23] In order to fulfill this task, Schleiermacher raised the fundamental question concerning the nature of understanding itself.[24] By determining the nature of understanding, one will be able to establish what must be involved in the understanding of written texts.

The discipline of hermeneutics as he found it was in crisis which severely threatened its disciplinary status.[25] Schleiermacher asked

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*bis zur Gegenwart*, *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Bd.1. Faszikel 3c (2 Teil) (Freiburg: Herder, 1970), p. 4. "Schleiermacher gilt als der Vater der modernen Hermeneutik und hermeneutischen Bewegung, die bis heute nicht zur Ruhe gekommen ist."

[22] Cf. the following text from Schleiermacher that dates from 1819: "Die Hermeneutik als Kunst des Verstehens existiert noch nicht allgemain, sodern nur mehrere specielle Hermeneutiken." F. D. E. Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutik*, ed. by H. Kimmerle, *Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften*, (philologisch-historische klasse) (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959), p. 79. (Hereafter cited as: Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutik*, English Translation, *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts*, ed. Heinz Kimmerle and trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1977).

[23] Ricoeur, "La táche," p. 181.

[24] Cf. note 22 above.

[25] Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, p. 176: "Consequently for my own sake as well as for that of my audience, when I began to lecture on hermeneutics I searched for the best treatment of the method. But my search was in vain. Neither the numerous theological compendia--although many of them, such as Ernesti's book, are considered products of sound philological study--nor even the few purely philological essays on interpretation offered more than compilations of individual rules extracted from the

whether or not the disciplinary status of hermeneutics could be realized in a systematically coherent manner upon a firmly established general foundation. Previous hermeneutics had been oriented around the theme of immediate understanding: they had thought of understanding as occurring as a matter of course. Schleiermacher radically transformed hermeneutics by treating the understanding as itself being problematic. He argued that hermeneutics exists because there is at first misunderstanding.[26] Therefore, the artful practice of interpretation "presupposes that the speaker and the hearer differ in their use of language and in their way of formulating thoughts, although there is an underlying unity between them . . ."[27]

Schleiermacher employs the dialogical conversation as his basic hermeneutical model: this is the locus of the strangeness of discourse. In a conversation, the speaker and hearer are mutually related by the discourse of the speaker. The thinking and speaking of the speaker are dialectically related in such a manner that speaking is only the external side of thinking. A person thinks by means of speaking, and thinking is termed by Schleiermacher as "inner speaking."[28] Discourse, any thought

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researches of the masters. Moreover, although sometimes these rules were sometimes clear, frequently they were quite ambiguous; and although they were now and again arranged in a helpful fashion, at other times the arrangement was unsatisfactory. I had high expectations when Füllebon's philological encyclopedia, based on Wolf's lectures, was published. But the few references to hermeneutics in it did not amount even to a sketch of a general hermeneutical theory."

[26] Gerhard Ebeling, "Hermeneutik," Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Tübingen: Third edition, 1959), col.255.

[27] Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, p. 110.

[28] Ibid., p. 97.

which is expressed in written or verbal signs, is the inner discourse expressed in external discourse. Hence,

> whenever the thinker finds it necessary to fix what he has thought [i.e., to communicate his thoughts], there arises the art of speaking, that is, the transformation of original internal speaking. . . .[29]

There is no thought without discourse but there persists a distance between thinking and speaking which separates them. The dialectic of external speaking and internal thinking is what necessitates the act of understanding.

Schleiermacher conceives the art of understanding as the inverse operation of the art of speaking.[30] Discourse is foreign or strange, because the signs in which the thoughts are expressed are interposed between the speaker and the hearer. Due to these signs or barriers, it is not possible for the hearer to immediately comprehend the thoughts of the speaker. The dialectic of thinking and speaking, a dialectic of presence and distance, makes the problem of understanding unavoidable.

Thinking is not identical to speaking, thus the problem of understanding arises. If it were identical to speaking, the problem of understanding would never arise; but it does. We are unable to understand everything that other persons think simply by what they say. However, if thinking and speaking had no common ground, then there would be no need for the art of interpretation because there would be nothing to discern in the discourse.[31] We do, in fact, need the art of interpretation; such need presumes some common ground between thinking and speaking.

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] In the Academy Addresses of 1829, Schleiermacher formulates it in the following way:

The result of Schleiermacher's conversational model of interpretation is clear in his stated task of hermeneutics: The task of hermeneutics is to understand the author as well as, and even better than, he understood himself.[32] Hermeneutics has this goal, because the author usually does not reflect upon the relationship to his own discourse.[33] The reader must do this for the author.

The hermeneutical method by which one will uncover and methodically bring to consciousness the thinking which is the basis of discourse

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> If what is to be understood were so completely foreign to the one trying to understand it that there was nothing in common between the two, there would be no point of contact for understanding at all. But I conclude that the concept holds in a relative sense. It then follows that just as hermeneutics would be unable to begin its work if what is to be understood were completely foreign, so that there would be no reason for hermeneutics to begin if nothing were strange between the speaker and the hearer. That is, understanding would always occur immediately upon reading or hearing, or it would already be given in a divinatory manner, and understanding would take place by itself.
>
> I am quite content to restrict the application of hermeneutics between the extremes. But I must admit also that I want to claim the entire area for it, meaning that whenever one encounters something strange in the way thoughts are being expressed in speech, one is faced with a problem which can be solved only with the help of a theory presupposing of course some common point between the speaker and the one who is to understand.

Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, pp. 180-81.

[32] Ibid., p. 69.

[33] "Since we have no direct knowledge of what was in the author's mind, we must try to become aware of many things [e.g., "the individual spontaneity and the organic development of the discourse, and its coherence with its cultural context"] of which he himself may have been unaware or unconscious, except insofar as he reflects on his own work and becomes his own reader." Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, p. 112.

is the process of understanding itself. The internal structure of the hermeneutical method receives its character on the basis of speaking's dialectical relation to the speaker's thoughts and language.[34] Hence, understanding will occur only in the coherence of the two moments in which discourse is considered, the speaker's thoughts and language. The totality of language common to the speaker and the hearer is considered both "as a means by which a person communicates his thoughts" and as modified by the individuality of the subjectivity of the author.[35] Schleiermacher calls these two moments in the process of understanding the "grammatical interpretation" and the "psychological" or "technical interpretation."[36]

Grammatical interpretation functions in a negative way in that it points to the limits of comprehension.[37] Grammatical interpretation provides the linguistic framework as distinct from the individuality of the author and demarcates the boundaries of psychological interpretation.

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[34] "Just as every act of speaking is related to both the totality of language and the totality of the speaker's thoughts, so understanding a speech always involves two moments: to understand what is said in the context of language with its possibilities, and to understand it as a fact in the thinking of the speaker," Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, pp. 97-98.

[35] Ibid., p. 99.

[36] "Grammatical interpretation: To understand the discourse and how it has been composed in terms of its language. Technical interpretation: To understand the discourse as a presentation of thought, composed by a human being and so understood in terms of a human being. Grammatical interpretation: The person and his activity disappear and seem to be merely the organ of language. Technical interpretation: The language and its determining power disappear and seem to be merely the organ of the person, in the service of his individuality, just as in grammatical interpretation the personality is in the service of the language," Ibid., p. 161; Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 90.

[37] Ricoeur, "La tâche," p. 183.

Through investigation of the historical and linguistic knowledge held by the original audience, the interpreter overcomes the historical distance between the past and the present. The interpreter situates himself in the position of the original audience.[38] Grammatical interpretation, then, by overcoming those historical and linguistic obstacles, enables the interpreter to proceed to psychological interpretation.

Technical or psychological interpretation, however, attends to the act of thought which produces the discourse.[39] Psychological interpretation is divided into two methods, divinatory and comparative, which are dialectically related.[40] The interpreter is to "transform himself . . . into the author": the divinatory moment. The comparative method subsumes "the author under the general type" and by comparing him with other of the same general type, finds his "distinctive traits."[41] Here lies the truly positive element in interpretation. Indeed, especially for the later Schleiermacher,[42] it is here that the true project of interpretation is accomplished.[43]

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[38] Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, p. 113.

[39] Ricoeur, "La tache," p. 183.

[40] "By leading the interpreter to transform himself, so to speak, into the author, the divinatory method seeks to gain an immediate comprehension of the author as an individual. The comparative method proceeds by subsuming the author under the general type. It then tries to find his distinctive traits by comparing him with others of the same general type," Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, p. 150.

[41] Ibid.

[42] The "early Schleiermacher" refers especially to the years before 1810 while the "later Schleiermacher" refers especially to the years after 1819. Before Kimmerle's publication in 1959 of Schleiermacher's notes on hermeneutics dating from 1804 and the following years, these notes were not available to the general public. Lücke's edition of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics (published in 1836) had omitted the early manuscripts as being too fragmentary for publication. Kimmerle's edition shows that for the early Schleiermacher, "grammatical interpretation" was of far greater importance than had hitherto been realized. Kimmerle

However, neither with grammatical nor psychological interpretation by itself can the interpreter come to a complete knowledge of language or the person. Therefore, the process of understanding must necessarily oscillate between the grammatical and psychological moments. There are no rules which can stipulate in an exacting and mechanical fashion how one is to move back and forth between the two. Interpretation, for Schleiermacher, must be an art or technology (Kunstlehre), not a science, of understanding. The success of this balancing operation or art depends upon both the interpreter's linguistic competence and ability to know people.[44] In addition, each type of interpretation is artistic rather than scientific.[45]

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writes elsewhere: "The later Schleiermacher increasingly tended (since 1819) toward another, psychological understanding of individuality. The single linguistic utterance is no longer primarily related to the universality of language, but to totality of the specific life that produced it. It is his chief concern to explain (reconstruct) in what sense the individual discourse or act is an aspect of the total life (through so-called psychological interpretation). The fate of the individual person turns into the hermeneutical principle which guides the effort of understanding," H. Kimmerle, "Hermeneutical Theory or Ontological Hermeneutics," (English Translation by F. Seifert of "Hermeneutische Theorie order Ontologische Hermeneutik"), History and Hermeneutic, Journal for Theology and Church, vol.4. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 107-21, esp. p. 109.

[43] Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, p. 87.

[44] Ibid., p. 101.

[45] However, "although both sides of interpretation should always [in principle] be applied, they will always be weighted differently," according to whether or not the discourse to be interpreted is predominantly subjective or objective and depending upon the particular talents of the interpreter for one or the other. Discourse is "maximally significant for the grammatical when it is linguistically creative to an exceptional degree and minimally repetitive: classical texts. A statement is maximally significant for the psychological side when it is highly individualized and minimally commonplace: original texts. The term 'absolute' is reserved for statements that achieve a maximum of both

In short, Schleiermacher calls for an artful dialectic between psychological and grammatical interpretation that would capture the intention of the author as well as or better than he understood himself. It is then no surprise that Schleiermacher's basic understanding of the hermeneutical task would require historical research.

The link between Schleiermacher's general theory of understanding and historical criticism is crucial for understanding the two models to be developed in the first part of this inquiry. Historical criticism and hermeneutics are not identical for Schleiermacher.[46] They are distinct from one another and yet mutually condition one another. Hermeneutics and historical criticism are related in a fashion analogous to the relation between grammatical and psychological-technical interpretation within the process of understanding.[47]

Historical criticism is an initial and reoccurring moment in the

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linguistic creativity and individuality: works of genius [das Genialische]," Ibid., pp. 204, 102-03.

[46] Ibid., p. 95; Friedrich Schleiermacher, Brief Outline on the Study of Theology, trans., with Introduction and Notes by Terence N. Tice (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1970), p. 49.

[47] Heinz Kimmerle, "Editor's Introduction," Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, pp. 37-38; Kimmerle advocates Schleiermacher's adherence to this position by arguing that Schleiermacher, by concentrating solely upon the process of understanding in his hermeneutical theory, abstracts hermeneutics from its historical context through separating the process of understanding from knowledge of the historical conditionedness of the object it is seeking to understand. In this interpretation, historical criticism is removed from hermeneutics because it precedes the task of interpretation as a scientific aid, the task of which is to situate the interpreter into the historical position of the original audience so that the hermeneutical practice may begin. On the other hand, Schleiermacher can assert that "determining the sphere common to the author and the readers is only the first step" which "must be continued throughout the process of interpretation, and it is completed only when the interpretation itself is concluded," Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, p. 118.

process of interpretation. It is, also, an essential moment within that process. Schleiermacher argues that only historical interpretation can adequately "do justice to the rootedness of the New Testament authors in their time and place."[48] It enables the completion of the hermeneutical task. As Schleiermacher notes, the only difference between understanding ancient and foreign texts over against contemporary texts is that we, the interpreters, lack the historical context of the original readers for the former in order to make comparisons which "cannot be completed prior to the interpretation but [begin] and [are] completed with the process of interpretation."[49] And he adds, "only in the interpretation itself."[50]

## Dilthey

As is the case with Schleiermacher, we find in Wilhelm Dilthey a highly "psychologized" notion of the goal of text interpretation. Anxious to combat the positivist currents of the late nineteenth century, Dilthey sought to provide the _Geisteswissenschaften_ or human sciences with their own proper methodology.[51] He pointed out a radical difference between the epistemology of the natural sciences and that of the human sciences. He distinguished, on this observation, understanding (_Verstehen_) and explanation (_Erklären_). The former is the mode of knowing proper to the human sciences and the latter the mode of knowing proper to the natural sciences. According to Dilthey, whereas in the natural sciences one deals with objects of nature that are completely different from ourselves and those fundamental "thingness" escapes us,[52] in the human sciences the situation is totally different. Dilthey writes:

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[48] Ibid., p. 104. [49] Ibid., p. 108. [50] Ibid., p. 113.

[51] Cf. Palmer, _Hermeneutics_, pp. 100-06.

> Humanistic studies [Geisteswissenschaften] have indeed the advantage over the natural sciences that their object is not sensory appearance as such, no mere reflection of reality within consciousness, but is rather first and foremost an inner reality, a coherence experienced from within.[53]

In the human sciences, according to Dilthey, we are dealing with human beings, who, like ourselves, possess an inner psychic life. Hence, the ultimate goal of these sciences is understanding, i.e., intuitive grasping, of the psychic life of the person(s) under study. Access to this psychic life is, however, granted only through "expressions of life" (Lebensäusserungen),[54] or in the case of written texts, through "expressions of life fixed in writing." Thus, Dilthey defines understanding as ". . . that process by which we intuit, behind the sign given to our senses, that psychic reality of which it is the expression."[55] Moreover, written texts constitute for Dilthey a most important and fundamental type of "expression of life." Thus, he speaks of "the immeasurable significance of literature for our understanding of spiritual life and of history." The reason for this is, according to Dilthey, that

> . . . only in speech does the inner life of man find its

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[52] Ricoeur, "La tache," p. 185.

[53] Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Rise of Hermeneutics," trans. F. Jameson of Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik, New Literary History, 3 (1972-73): 229-44, esp. p. 231. Hereafter cited as Dilthey, "Rise."

[54] ". . . the existence of other people is given us only from the outside, in sensory events, gestures, words, and actions," Ibid.; for a lucid treatment of Dilthey's concepts of "life" and "expressions of life" see Palmer, Hermeneutics, pp. 106-14.

[55] Dilthey, "Rise," p. 232.

> fullest and most exhaustive, most objectively comprehensible expression. That is why the art of understanding centers on the exegesis or interpretation of those residues of human reality preserved in written form.[56]

Written texts are primarily an expression of the inner life of the author. Therefore, the ultimate goal of text interpretation is intuiitive grasping or understanding of that inner life. Like Schleiermacher, Dilthey sees this intuitive grasping or transposition into the inner psychic life of the author as a reproduction (Nachbilden) and a reexperiencing (Nacherleben) of this inner life.[57]

For both Schleiermacher and Dilthey, then, the art of textual interpretation is focused on the author of the text concerned. The text is viewed primarily as the product of a psychically endowed agent, and the act of interpretation is directed toward the psychic processes that went into the making of the text. Even if we were to leave aside the theological consideration of recovering the "real" Jesus beneath the New Testament writings[58] and seed to understand the meaning of the texts as texts, the hermeneutical principle referred to would still entail a primarily historical approach. The interpreter would employ mainly historical methods in establishing the date of the writing, the author's sources, milieu, audience, and so on, with a goal of uncovering the author's intention in writing the work.[59] As long as the meaning or sense intended by the author of the text is understood as the only genuine one, the historical paradigm will continue to dominate biblical interpretation.[60]

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[56] Ibid., p. 233.

[57] Cf. Also Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 104; P. Ricoeur, "Qu'est-ce qu'un texte? Explication et interpretation," Hermeneutik und Dialektik, vol. II. Festschrift for H. G. Gadamer ed. R. Bubner et al., (Tübingen: Mohr, 1970), pp. 181-200, esp. p. 187. Hereafter cited as: Ricoeur, "Texte?".

[58] Cf. Kimmerle, "Introduction," p. 109.

[59] The "scientificness" of the human sciences is of central importance to Dilthey, given his battle with positivism.

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[60] In official Catholic teaching this hermeneutical principle has become very closely related to the way in which biblical inspiration is conceived and explained. An examination of art. 11 of the Constitution Dei Verbum of the Second Vatican Council will show that "the explanation of the doctrine of inspiration emphasizes almost exclusively the author of the book." Cf. L. Griffen, "Hermeneutics," Irish Theological Quarterly, 37 (1970), 235-242, p. 236. It is on account of the fact that the sacred writers (according to art. 11) are so inspired that everything asserted by them must be "held to be asserted by the Holy Spirit," (Documents of Vatican II, p. 119). Art. 12 established the principle that it is the intention of the sacred author that is to be sought. Hence we read in art. 12 that "the interpreter of sacred Scripture, in order to see clearly what God wanted to communicate to us, should carefully investigate what meaning the sacred writers really intended." (Dei Verbum, art. 12, in The Documents of Vatican II, ed. W. M. Abbott (London: Chapman, 1969), p. 120. Cf. J. T. Burtchaell, Catholic Theories of Biblical Inspiration Since 1810: A Review and Critique (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

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# CHAPTER ONE

## THE TRANSPARENT TEXT: OBJECTIVITY IN HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

In the first model one is asked to imagine a transparent text. This transparent text refers to historical events "behind the text," which in the case of Mark are the events in the life of Jesus.

Vincent Taylor (1887-1968), who illustrates this model, has argued that the text of Mark represents, to a great degree, an accurate and sequential account of the life and ministry of Jesus of Nazareth.[1] He argued this position more explicitly than any other biblical scholar who has addressed Mark since the Second World War.[2] For Taylor the text is like a window; a person standing on the inside of a building looking out sees part of what lies outside. The window's tint, size, shape, and position may allow only a certain field of vision. Even when these possible distortions of the viewing field are taken into account, what lies beyond the window can be discerned. Taylor unabashedly maintains that the text is transparent to the historical events behind the text, to which the text refers, and by which it means.

Here it is important to distinguish between two possible meanings for the term "history." It may mean "the past" (history-as-past-event) or "our story of the past" (history-as-story). The adjective "historical" also bears this double sense. Historical may mean "that which really did happen, not legendary or fictitious but belonging to the past." When scholars in the nineteenth century sought to disentangle "the historical Jesus" from "the Christ of faith," they were distinguishing between historical as belonging to the past, rather than to tradition.[3] Historical may also mean "referring to the past, as it concerns our inquiry into a past event." Thus, in this second sense, we speak of historical records, historical evidence, historical teaching, and research.[4]

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[1] Vincent Taylor, New Testament Essays (London: Epworth Press, 1970), p. 36; hereafter, Essays.

[2] This is not to ignore others, notably fundamentalists, who have asserted this position on dogmatic grounds quite apart from textual theory and interpretation. Cf. James Barr, Fundamentalism (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977).

This chapter uses "history" and "historical" in both senses. It, furthermore, emphasizes how closely related the two are to one another. History-as-story presupposes history-as-past-event, and history-as-past-event can come before us only in history-as-story. The emphasis is on the narrative character of historiography, particularly Mark as historiography. So when Taylor says "Mark is true," he says, "Within the limits of its ancient historiography, the basic events of Jesus' life and ministry are available to the subsequent twentieth century historian."[5] Mark, then, is history-as-story that points beyond itself to history-as-past-event. The interpreter understands the interpreter's role as historian and, as historian, writes history-as-story. Taylor's interpretation of Markan verisimilitude, is, then, the ideal beginning point for developing the first model.

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[3] David Friedrich Strauss, *The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History. A Critique of Schleiermacher's Life of Jesus*, trans. and ed. Leander E. Keck, Lives of Jesus Series (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977).

[4] Humphrey Palmer, *The Logic of Gospel Criticism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), pp. 7-8; hereafter, *Criticism*.

[5] Taylor, *Essays*, p. 15; Vincent Taylor, *The Gospel According to St. Mark: The Greek Text with Introduction, Notes and Indexes*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 36, 145f; hereafter, *Commentary*.

## Procedure

First, the inquiry will examine in some detail Taylor's interpretation of Mark 8:34-9:1 which provides an example of an interpretation of Markan verisimilitude that matches the first model. Some reflection on and clarification of his methodological approach and assumptions aids our understanding of the nature and character of this model. The movement of thought is from particular to general. Conclusions will be described and the arguments leading to those conclusions elucidated. An outline of a relatively adequate interpretive model that would foster the goal of Taylor's interpretation should result.[6]

Taylor's interpretation of Markan verisimilitude requires an appeal to a "realist" critical philosophy of history.[7] Critical philosophy of history is the analysis of "what historical enquiry is and how it should be done."[8] The most effective contemporary defense of a realist critical philosophy of history[9] is the work of Maurice Mandelbaum.[10] Mandelbaum explains the relationship between the much discussed subjectivity of the historian (in this case, both Mark and Taylor) and the objectivity of the events represented by the text. He develops a general theory of the surface structure of historical narrative. A conceptual distinction between general and special history grounds this theory. The inquiry explicates, exposits, and explores this conceptual distinction. The distinction between general and special history accounts for both the peculiar and subjective choices of the historian and the possibility of objectivity in historical representation. General histories which take as their subject matter enduring, single, complex entities, such as a society or institution, become the context and norm for the evaluation of special histories. As histories whose subject matter are conceived by the historians who wrote them, both Mark and Taylor's interpretation of Mark are special histories. They require the context of general histories to legitimate any claims to historical reference.

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[6] I am not claiming that all possible options for the construction of the basic characteristics of this perspective can be subsumed under the following analysis of V. Taylor and M. Mandelbaum. Quite to the contrary, as my introductory chapter argued, there are several possible configurations of the basic characteristics within this perspective: I named only four.

[7] Rudolph H. Weingartner, "Historical Explanation," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1967), IV, 7-12.

[8] This definition is in clear contrast to speculative philosophy-of-history, the attempt to find "definitive and scientific diagrams of a necessary sequence of events." Cf. Palmer, Criticism, p. 24. Thus, I accept the criticism that such speculative philosophy-of-history can easily run away with the historian, who might take the grand scheme to the point of only seeing "its favourite theories monotonously veri-

For two major reasons Mandelbaum is most appropriate for this moment in the investigation. First, his mediation of the long-standing discussion between realist and idealist critical philosophy of history fits the basic characteristics of the first model. The text's meaning

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fied in every direction"; Robert Mackintosh, Albrecht Ritschl and His School (London: Chapman & Hall, 1915), p. 8.

[9] Palmer, Criticism, p. 24.

[10] Maurice Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1939); The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1977); hereafter, Anatomy.

is distinguished from its reference to events behind the text, but governed by and to a great extent congruent with those historical events. Although qualified, his defense of a realist critical philosophy of history has received considerable critical discussion. It represents a sophisticated development of this issue.

Second, his critical philosophy of history can incorporate the narrative model of writing history. In recent years several critical philosophers of history[11] have turned their attention to the traditional problems of causation and explanation, and the relationship between written history (history-as-story) and the events (history-as-past-event) by using the narrative model of writing history. The works of Morton White, Walter B. Gallie, Arthur C. Danto and Louis O. Mink on the narrative model of writing history will modify and supplement Mandelbaum's critical philosophy of history. This narrative model, which uncovers the "story" character of historical writing, supplements Mandelbaum's theory and incorporates the concerns of the inquiry's thesis: namely, the importance of "story" (the text understood as a whole) without losing the truth claims of the text.

In the third section of this chapter, the inquiry will evaluate Taylor's methodology in light of the modification of Mandelbaum's theory of historical narrative. The result will be both a correction and corroboration of Taylor's method; the correction will lead to a method of interpretation consistent with the first model. Mark 8:34-9:1, and in particular the Son-of-Man saying in v. 38, will serve as both an example and test case. Underlying this correction is the principal, conceptual distinction between general and special history outlined in Mandelbaum's work. With this distinction in mind, a reinterpretation of the Son-of-Man saying can be made. The reinterpretation can meet the standards of this model's theory of text and historical representation. The "narrative" quality of Mark will be affirmed, together with a greater awareness of the full range of referentiality available in the text.

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[11] Patrick Gardiner, ed., Theories of History (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959).

The fourth section will evaluate the first model's ability to interpret Mark as a whole without losing a full range of referentiality. Certain questions will arise from this evaluation that lead into the issues of the second model.

## Taylor on Mark 8:34-9:1

Taylor's hermeneutical perspective is especially clear in his interpretation of Mark 8:34-9:1, a part of the Gospel's crucial "hinge" section, Mark 8:27-9:1.[12] According to Taylor, this pericope is a collection of sayings inserted at this point in the Markan text for topical reasons.[13] In support of this claim, he notes phrases that connect the sayings. One such example is, ". . . And calling unto him the multitude with his disciples" (v. 34).[14] Whether these connecting links between the various sayings are part of a previous primitive church tradition or the result of the redactor's hand is not resolved.[15] It is, however, important to note that Taylor does take into account the hand of the redactor in his analysis of the Markan narrative. Equally significant is that Taylor does not grant the significance to the redactor found in the second model. This will be more extensively discussed in the third chapter.

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[12] William Wrede, Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963, 3rd ed.), pp. 115-24, where Wrede rejects this passage as a key turning point in Mark; cf. Julius Wellhausen, Das Evangelium Marci (Berlin: Georg Reimer Verlag, 1903), where Wellhausen argues against Wrede that 8:2f-9:1 is the hinge point (Wendepunkt) of Mark; p. 70.

[13] Taylor, Commentary, p. 380.

[14] Ibid.

Much earlier in the century K. L. Schmidt had described the redactor's additions as "connecting tissue."[16] Taylor's redactor functions in a similar way. Taylor, however, strikes a middle ground between Schmidt and C. H. Dodd. Schmidt considers the "connecting tissue" to be literary inventions by the redactor, while Dodd, Taylor's mentor, argues that they represent the general outline of the Gospel events transmitted within the oral tradition.[17] Taylor grants the possibility of literary invention as a product both of the oral tradition and the Markan situation. However, he asserts a high congruency between the general order of the Gospel narrative and the events to which they point in the life of Jesus.[18] The meaning of the text, therefore, lies with its reference to the historical events behind the text. Meaning is not synonymous with redaction. In Taylor's mind, the redactor has preserved these historical events for whatever interests he might have.

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[15] Ibid.

[16] "The uneven character of the material in Mark shows what the oldest tradition about Jesus was like: no continuous account, but a mass of separate stories, mostly arranged on grounds of content. . .the introductions to his paragraphs contain fragments of an itinerary. . . but as Jesus' actual itinerary is lost beyond recall, owing to the Christian church's complete lack of interest in it, our only way to arrange the stories of Jesus is to follow Matthew's lead [i.e. and neglect Mark's notes of time and place]. . .The stories of Jesus are really all on a single plane. Only occasionally can we date or place a story approximately, on internal grounds. All in all, there exists no Life of Jesus, in the sense of a biography showing inner development; there is no chronological sketch of Jesus' history, but only separate stories, paragraphs which have been placed in a framework." Karl L. Schmidt argues: "Aber im ganzen gibt es kein Leben Jesus im Sinne einer entwickelnden Lebensgeschichte, keinen chronologischen Aufriss der Geschichte Jesu, sondern nur Einzelgeschichten, perikopen, die in ein Rahmenwerk gestellt sind," p. 317. Taylor, Commentary, p. 381f.

[17] Dodd tried joining together the summaries which Schmidt had put asunder, and obtained quite a sensible and consecutive narrative. Mark, Dodd suggested, had received, quite separately from the traditional material he arranged, the outline of the ministry of Jesus. Mark could have misplaced some of the stories in the outline or included material for which he had no idea where in the outline they belonged. In short,

Whether gathered by the redactor or previous tradition, these collected sayings are organized around the theme of loyalty.[19] The first four sayings, vvs. 34-7, may have stood together in the source that the redactor, John Mark, used.[20] For Taylor this grouping may well have been preserved because of early church persecution.[21] Such an account of these first four sayings underscores their major point: Jesus asks "for attachment to his person, and not only for the acceptance of his message."[22] For the first time in the Gospel Jesus turns to the disciples, identifying himself with the content and import of the message that he has been preaching.[23]

The fifth saying, v. 38, will figure heavily in the subsequent

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while it "is hazardous to argue from the precise sequence of the narrative in detail, there is good reason to believe that in broad lines the Marcan order does represent a genuine succession of events within which movement and development can be traced." C. H. Dodd, New Testament Studies (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1953), p. 1-3; Taylor, Commentary, p. 381.

[18] Taylor, Commentary, p. 380.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., quoting M. Goguel, The Life of Jesus, tr. O. Wyon (London: SPCK, 1933), p. 385.

[23] Taylor, Commentary, p. 382.

discussion of this model. It too confronts the question of loyalty, but in this saying the extremely important Christological title, Son of man,[24] is incorporated in the Jesus saying. "For whoever is ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, of him will the Son of man also be ashamed, when he comes in the glory of his Father with the holy angels." Like the sayings in vv. 35, 36, and 37, this saying is "loosely connected with the rest by gar."[25] The ties are patently contrived.[26] In sharp contrast to the Son of man saying in v. 35, ". . . the Son of man must suffer many things . . ." the Son of man in v. 38 is not the "suffering Messiah of the present but the future Son of man of popular eschatology."[27] While Jesus identifies the first Son of man with himself, he apparently distinguishes himself from the coming one (cf., "when he comes").[28]

From Taylor's perspective, this discrepancy in Mark, particularly in contrast to Matthew, cannot be ignored. The contrast can be a clue to Markan redactional interests; if so, the nature of Jesus' original saying might well be retrieved. The window's tint and field of vision could be further identified and Mark's value as history enhanced. Did Jesus say what John Mark records? If he did, significant conclusions regarding his own Messianic claims might be made. The character of his basic message and ministry would be clarified also.

Taylor is convinced of the saying's authenticity or "originality."

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., p. 383.

[27] Ibid., p. 384.

[28] Taylor notes that Matthew takes the passage differently by identifying Jesus directly with the Son of man (Matthew 16:27). Luke follows more closely. Taylor, Commentary, p. 384.

First, the language in several instances is not characteristically Markan.[29] Second, the Son of man language has a traditional place in Jewish intertestamental literature.[30] "[T]here is nothing in the Markan saying which could not have been said by Jesus . . ."[31] On the other hand, Taylor is convinced that this text has been reshaped by the interests of the later community and the redactor. His major reason for this conclusion lies in his conviction that Son of man sayings were originally intended as "realized eschatology."[32] Later development in the early church produced the apocalyptic inferences that are evident in the Markan text. Taylor argues that the sixth saying, 9:1, confirms his analysis of the fifth saying (v. 38). Though early in origin, it too is tainted by the later church concern resulting in apocalyptic overtones.[33] Nonetheless, the original saying is still discernable in the reference to the speedy coming of the Kingdom of God. In short, Taylor is quite sure that "all sayings leave upon the mind a strong impression of originality"[34] despite second generational trajectories.

## Reflection on Taylor's Method

### Reliance on Source Criticism

If we step away from the immediate conclusions and reflect upon Taylor's arguments, his method of interpretation becomes clearer, along with the theory of the biblical narrative which it implies. Since Taylor's major method of interpretation is source criticism, he focuses on the concerns of the author only to demonstrate the reliability of the traditional designation, not to establish the intention of the author. Taylor accepts John Mark as the author and he accepts what he calls the Petrine-Papias tradition.[35] For Taylor "the traditional assignation" of Mark as the disciple of Peter appears to be beyond question:

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[29] Ibid., p. 383.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., p. 385.

[33] Ibid., pp. 384-85.

[34] Ibid., p. 20.

> There can be no doubt that the author of the Gospel was John Mark, the attendant of Peter. This is the unbroken testimony of the earliest Christian opinion from Papias onwards. In an age when the tendency of Christian tradition was to assign the authorship of the Gospels to Apostles, Mark is not likely to have been named as the author unless there was very good reason to make that claim.[36]

Taylor later qualifies the historical reliability of Papias via Eusebius. He recognizes the various influences that are reflected in the different layers of that tradition.[37] He rejects, nonetheless, the notion that "we should lament the effect" of the tradition of the primitive community, as if there were an "original Simon pure tradition,"[38] for there never was such a tradition. The results of these influences of the tradition layers reflect the many-sided life of a period otherwise hidden from us. They are "windows through which we peer into the past."[39] Though Taylor is skeptical of the "purity" of the Simon tradition, he is quite open to the possibility of discerning other history, especially early church interests, behind the text.

This reliance upon source criticism reveals itself further in Taylor's use of Matthew and Luke. Taylor explicitly states[40] that the primary historical value of Matthew and Luke is to isolate Q. Once isolated, Q can be compared with the data available from Mark. If both Q and Mark have a saying, its authenticity is greatly enhanced. Furthermore, this authenticity is strengthened in semitic sources and language patterns which can be discerned in a saying that is in both Q and Mark. This occurs often in Mark, according to Taylor.[41] Taylor provides extensive lists of such sayings, explaining the relationship between the Greek oral tradition and the signs of the original semitic sayings. Q has a secondary historical value as well. In conjunction with Markan order, Q can be used to discern the original order of Jesus' ministry.[42] To follow Taylor's own imagery, the text of Mark provides windows, not just a window, on historical events. Source criticism is the primary means of peering through these windows.[43]

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[35] Ibid., p. 26.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., p. 33.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

### Response to and Use of Form Criticism

Taylor believes that form criticism helps the scholar peer through the windows of the oral tradition, but form criticism's thoroughgoing skepticism must be rejected.[44] This rejection of skepticism in the practice of form criticism underscores Taylor's ongoing polemic against Bultmann. Taylor suggests that "some among us think that we cannot get far behind the Evangelists themselves," and these scholars stand "somewhat apart from the main body of British criticism."[45] They "represent an attempt to build securely on the firm basis of critical despair."[46]

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[41] Ibid., pp. 55-66.

[42] Ibid., pp. 20-27; Idem, Essays, p. 15.

[43] Norman Habel, Literary Criticism of the Old Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971).

[44] Taylor, Essays, p. 15.

[45] Ibid., p. 30.

[46] Ibid.

This theme occurs in Taylor's work wherever he responds to questions related to form criticism. It also appears in the subsequent discussion of this study. Through his observations about form criticism's skepticism, Taylor has pointed to one of the major issues confronting contemporary hermeneutics: the ever deepening skepticism about textual reference and meaning. Each step further to the right on the spectrum outlined in the introduction is engaged in a deeper sense of skepticism about the transparency of the text to events behind the text--or even the possibility of referents external to the text itself. Positions at the right end of the spectrum deny the possibility of a determinate meaning.

Taylor suspects that form criticism is unable to move beyond methodological skepticism. However, he makes limited use of form criticism. He discerns several forms in the oral tradition that are embedded in Mark. The "distinction between narratives and sayings, while primary, is not sufficient to cover the variety of the material . . ."[47] Pronouncement stories are an example of one of Taylor's major forms. Pronouncement stories, which Bultmann calls Apophthegms and Dibelius Paradigms, are "the short narratives in which everything is subordinated to the desire to give a saying of Jesus which was of interest and importance to the earliest Christian communities."[48] Taylor qualifies the value of the form critical analysis in the case of pronouncement stories. They are not "personal narratives communicated by an eyewitness" but are "popular in origin."[49] He lists twenty such narratives in Mark. They are clustered topically, and their arrangement probably reflects "catechetical interests."[50] The story of healing the man with a withered hand on the sabbath (3:1-6) is an example.

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[47] Taylor, Commentary, p. 78.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

The main interest of miracle stories is "the account of the miracle itself."[51] Three distinct moments form them: "circumstances, the wonder itself, and the effect produced . . ."[52] Taylor isolates seventeen miracle stories, arranged basically by geographical association.[53] Among these stories are the Paralytic at Capernaum (2:1-4, 10b-12) and the Gerasene Demoniac (5:1-20).

Taylor joins a large list of twenty-nine narratives that he names stories about Jesus. They do not share a common form. Rejecting the implications of the terms "legend" and "myth," Taylor suggests that such characterizations "beg the question in advance."[54] Most narratives are self-contained, indicating a significant period of independent existence from the rest of the tradition and narrative. Vivid details suggest to Taylor a link to the original event "more direct than the common oral tradition of the Church."[55] Here again, the visually concrete character of Mark is interpreted as historical referentiality. Taylor is convinced that some of these stories can be traced to a Petrine source and are "in harmony with the Papias tradition."[56]

It comes as little surprise that Taylor's evaluation of form critical considerations finally rests on considerations of historical originality. Insofar as form critical discussion can lead to some clarity on originality, form criticism is used.

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[50] Ibid., p. 79.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., p. 82.

[55] Ibid., p. 80.

[56] Ibid.

In the case of Mark 8:34-9:1, Taylor concludes that these sayings represent completely different original situations than the one in which they are now found. The first four sayings may have stood together in the source.[57] However, he cannot derive any further data about authenticity from form critical remarks. Taylor makes short note of the form critical discussion. He does not explore the possible oral development of this saying within the primitive church. In the crucial matter of apocalyptic enhancement in the Son of man sayings, this analysis could provide support for Taylor's position. This omission will be considered in my later analysis of this model.

## Use of Redaction Criticism

Taylor takes minimal notice of textual redaction. The interests of Mark or his community do not prevent one from gaining historical information about the events to which the text refers. Once the interpreter has determined the major interests of the redactor, it will be possible to subtract such interests and obtain an objective window on the historical events.

In his analysis of Mark, Taylor discerns three such major interests. First, he perceives consistent liturgical concerns. Taylor emphasizes the Palestinian character of the cultic tradition embedded in Mark. "Its Jewish ideas and Aramaic idioms" suggest to him that this tradition "was brought to Rome, and not formed there."[58] Second, he discerns a catechetical motive which tends "to elucidate the tradition rather than to obscure its original meaning."[59] Finally, he discerns a group of doctrinal motives. Despite the presence of such interests, Taylor maintains that "both in Christology and Soteriology primitive beliefs are grounded in the tradition, and, in spite of claims to the contrary, reflect the thoughts of Jesus." Taking issue with Wrede's reduction of the Gospel's reference, Taylor notes that though the "Gospel reflects the ideas of the primitive Christian kerygma, it does this because the earliest preaching rested upon what Jesus had done and taught."[60] To his mind, this includes Wrede's celebrated Messianic Secret.[61]

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[57] Ibid., p. 380.

[58] Ibid., p. 132.

However, the second generation's agenda has had its effect upon the text in three respects. Whenever Jesus is called the Son of God, this is clearly an addition. The polemic and identity crisis over against Judaism is reflected in such passages as the Rent Veil (15:38).[62] The apocalyptic enhancement of the traditional sayings in Mark can be seen by comparing parallels in Q, Luke 12:8f, and Matthew 10:32f. Realized eschatology is implicitly in the Markan parables and in the Messiahship of Jesus. But it is not as clearly present in Mark as in Q, because Mark's main emphasis is on the "unrealized eschatology" of the Advent Hope of primitive Christianity.[63]

Taylor sees the "denouement" of this tension between realized and apocalyptic eschatology in the Son of man "coming with the clouds of heaven" (v. 38). He believes that in this passage Mark is "faithful to the teaching of Jesus, but he sees it through the veil of apocalyptic."[64] Using his theory of sources, in particular the historical value of Q, Taylor notes the difference between the Lukan formulation of this saying

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[59] Ibid., p. 133.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid., pp. 133-34.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid., p. 134.

(Luke 17:22ff.) and the Markan version. He concludes his observations on the interests of the second generation community with this evaluation of the historical value of Mark:

> The extent to which the various interests discussed above affect the historical value of Mark will be variously estimated. To the present writer they do not seem to detract from its worth to any serious degree if allowance is made for them in exegesis.[65]

Supporting this evaluation, Taylor cites the wealth of detail in Mark and his previous work on the Markan outline of the ministry of Jesus.[66] He argues against K. L. Schmidt who suggests that the text is a heap of unstrung pearls. "On the contrary," argues Taylor, "the Evangelist has a true sense of the course of events, knows the issues involved, and the points on which the story turns. His framework is factual rather than chronological in the full sense. He writes, as it were, on an even plane, so that it is vain to argue that his account implies a ministry of twelve months or less, in contrast with the two to three years covered by John; but the plane has contours and dividing ridges which imply a broad knowledge of the events as well as of details. What Schmidt has destroyed is the cast-iron Markan hypothesis, which posits a fixed historical scheme, biographical in kin."[67] Mark is "an authority of the first rank for our knowledge of the Story of Jesus."[68] Combined with its early date, its ties to Peter, and its "fidelity to tradition," Mark is "a writing of first-rate historical importance."[69] It "sets at the center the personality of Jesus Himself and His redemptive work for men."[70]

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[65] Ibid., p. 135.

[66] Ibid., pp. 135-39.

[67] Ibid., pp. 147-48.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

## Summary of Taylor

Four generalizations can be made concerning Taylor's interpretation of Mark 8:34-9:1. First, in the process of his interpretation of Mark, Taylor has created a major dialectic between the subjectivity of the Markan and second generation community's interests and the objectivity of the traditional record embedded in Mark. The text is a historical narrative, and its truth depends upon the objectivity of the events to which it refers. If the one side of the dialectic waxes, the other wanes; they are directly related and interdependent. Textual meaning and reference are determined in the balance of this dialectic.

Second, in principle, Taylor would argue that this balance between the two poles in Mark leans to the time of Jesus. The objectivity of the Markan presentation is over against the subjectivity of Markan second generation interests. Or in the language of the window simile he asks, "How distorted is our vision through this window?" and he answers, "Not enough to prevent seeing important things."

Third, the purpose and norm of interpretation of the passage is the working out of this dipolar axis to the completion of a historical reconstruction of the life and ministry of Jesus. The resources and methods are structured so that historical reconstruction determines the value of each methodology. Even form and redaction criticism, which could be used for different ends, serve the purpose of historical reconstruction of the ministry and sayings of Jesus of Nazareth. Methods that tend toward skepticism about the relationship between text and reality are censured, then recast, for Taylor's purpose.

Fourth, the attempt to focus on what lies behind the text dissects the Markan text. A whole is recreated out of the remaining materials that point to the facts behind the text. In order to build a consistent meaning, or as he puts it, "the story of Jesus' ministry," Taylor dissects and reconstructs the text. He presumes a general hermeneutical principle: the achievement of meaning entails the process of consistency-building in light of the inconsistencies encountered in the reading of the text. For this model, then, a whole is created by means of the reconstruction of the story behind the text.

Each of these four generalizations follows from one another. The dipolar axis between the Markan second generation subjectivity and the objectivity of the history behind the text dovetails with the ordering of hermeneutical methods for historical reconstruction. The goal of historical reconstruction, meaning as the story of the Jesus behind the text, requires dissecting the text in order to reconstruct it. For example, Taylor understands all apocalyptic overtones in the Son of man sayings as additions to the primitive tradition, but the realized eschatology still shines through the added materials. Jesus actually said what John Mark records but the apocalyptic enhancement reflects second generational coping with the delayed parousia. Although Taylor begins with the suspicion of second generation subjectivity, he believes he can isolate it in the apocalyptic enhancement, reconstructing the balance in favor of the original saying. All methods are directed to this dissection and reconstruction of the Markan Son of man saying.

By his method, Taylor reveals his awareness of the complexity of relationships between historical events and what Mark records. He is, however, convinced that critical skepticism of the possibilities of isolating the original events is unwarranted. Through various source, form, and redactional techniques, he attempts to isolate the bias of the second generation. Once this is done, the original events remain. In short, Taylor incorporates the possibility of bias into his interpretation without renouncing historical referentiality.

By his practice and methodological predilection, Taylor has located himself within that school of critical philosophy of history that seeks to emphasize the objective and scientific character of historiography. The drive to undergird the objectivity of historiography has led in several directions. For example, the covering-law model of historiography, proposed in the middle of this century by Karl Popper and Carl Hempel, represents one facet of this debate. A parallel discussion, more germane to this chapter, is the extent to which the historian and the historian's preunderstanding construct the history that is written. What determines the choice of topic, data, witnesses, and subject matter? Since they all involve subjective choices, are not the historiographic results skewed? In the context of this inquiry in fundamental theology, we would ask what the conditions are for understanding Mark as historical narrative when the primary referential claims are to events that lie behind the text? Does the second generation bias which introduces subjective choices in historical research and writing preclude historical referentiality? If not, then what are the conditions, in principle, for understanding this model of referentiality? The discussion of the role of bias in historiography will be divided into two parts. The first part will discuss the role of bias in the historian's choice of topic, data, witnesses, and subject matter. The second part will consider the role of bias in the final rhetorical form the history (history-as-story) takes.

## Mandelbaum: Objectivity in General and Special Histories

### Bias and Research

Modern philosophy of history has revolved around the two major debates mentioned above. The first is the covering-law theory of explanation as applied to history.[71] The second, unlike the first, is not focused on a single explicit theory. The second debate is over the concepts which the historian brings to the interpretation of evidence: How much do the historian's preconceptions influence the reconstruction of the past? In this ongoing debate between constructionism (idealism) and representationism (realism), Maurice Mandelbaum has made a significant move. He accepts certain conclusions of the constructionist view without finally compromising his position as a realist. In his earlier work, The Problem of Historical Knowledge, he was an unyielding realist; however, in his most recent work, his revised position includes a substantial constructionist role in the historical task. This represents an excellent theoretical counterpart to Taylor's practical interpretation of Markan verisimilitude.

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[71] The term "covering law" actually was coined by W. H. Dray, *Laws and Explanations* (Oxford: Carendon, 1966), though K. Popper and C. Hempel initiated the discussion (London, 1959) in *History* (Oxford, 1957). K. R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. This is a translation of *Logik der Forschung* (Vienna, 1934), with additions; K. R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (New York: Harper, 1957); K. R. Popper, "Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences," in Patrick Gardiner (ed.) *Theories of History* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959); C. G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," *Journal of Philosophy*, 39 (1942) reprinted in P. Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History*; this is a significant modification of the earlier position to include probabilitic laws. C. G. Hempel, "Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation," in Geigl and G. Maxwell (eds.), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, III (Minneapolis, 1962); C. G. Hempel, "Explanation and Prediction," in Bernard Baumrin (ed.), *Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar* Vol. I (New York, 1963); C. G. Hempel, "Reasons and Covering Laws in Historical Explanation," in Sidney Hook (ed.), *Philosophy and History* (New York: University Institute of Philosophy, 1963). Maurice Mandelbaum has made his response to the covering law theory as well: "Historical Explanation: The Problem of 'Covering Laws'," *History and Theory*, I (1961). For a most helpful revision of the Popper-Hempel Theory cf. Alan Donagan, "The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered," in *Philosophical Analysis and History*, ed. Wm. H. Dray (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), pp. 127-59. There is a comprehensive review of suggested modifications of the covering law model in Wm. Dray's "The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered," in *Philosophy and History*, ed. Sidney Hook (New York, 1963), pp. 105-35.

Mandelbaum accomplishes this revision through a more descriptive analysis of historical writing than his earlier work. He also grounds his conception of historiography in a distinction between two types of historiography: general and special histories. These two types of historiography logically undergird his descriptive analysis of historical writing, a subject that will be examined under the second part of this discussion of Mandelbaum: the examination of bias and rhetorical form.

General histories deal with enduring, single, though complex entities, such as a society or a social institution. A history of the church in Roman antiquity might count as a general history. Special histories deal with a "collection of activities or works" which do not represent an "actual single whole," but rather are classified together only by virtue of the historian's "conception of the subject matter."[72] A history of philosophy in antiquity might be an example of a special history. By distinguishing between general and special histories, Mandelbaum recognizes the presuppositions that characterize "the particular subject matter with which a special history is to be concerned." But he can deny the constructionist claim that all history involves such presuppositions. As we shall see, Mandelbaum's case[73] is logically grounded in this crucial distinction.

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[72] Mandelbaum, Anatomy, p. 160. [73] Ibid., p. 160.

In the third part of his book,[74] Mandelbaum examines objectivity and its limits. First, he distinguishes three senses in which "objectivity" has been used in the ongoing discussion about objectivity in historical knowledge. These three senses depend upon a distinction between that "which has to do with the truth of what is actually affirmed or denied in the judgment we make . . . [and] the conditions under which that judgment was made and by which it may have been influenced."[75] Objectivity relates solely to what is affirmed or denied. "It may seem as if the question of what is 'subjective' and what is 'objective', taken in the sense of what is contributed by the subject through his own experience, and what is independent of that experience, would be the basic issue concerning the objectivity of historical knowledge."[76] However, this is not the case. These subjective factors may help to explain how any particular investigator came to certain conclusions, but "they will fail to settle any questions concerning the accuracy and reliability of what these judgments affirm or deny."[77] Mandelbaum summarizes:

> A judgment can be said to be objective not merely because it was not due to self-interest, prejudice, or the like, and not merely because it refers to events and relationships that existed independently of the experience of the person judging, but because we regard its truth as excluding the possibility that its denial can also be true.[78]

Drawing from what he calls the "laws of thought" he specifies his claim: "Our knowledge is objective if, and only if, it is the case that when two persons make contradictory statements concerning the same subject matter, at least one of them must be mistaken."[79] Objectivity must, therefore, be determined by some test applied "to what is being affirmed or denied, not to whatever real or supposed influences may have led to that affirmation and denial."[80]

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[74] Ibid., pp. 143-94. [75] Ibid., p. 142. [76] Ibid., p. 149.

[77] Ibid. [78] Ibid., pp. 149-50. [79] Ibid., p. 150.

Mandelbaum's distinction between general and special histories can be synthesized with his concept of objectivity. Mandelbaum remains a realist with respect to general histories. He argues that, in general, history's claims to objectivity can be made; that is, "history aims, and ought to aim, at being *wissenschaftlich*, which is to say that in laying claim to truth it must be able to advance external evidence that vouches for its truth; in default of this, it is not to be considered a historical study."[81] Even if different historical accounts are often "taken to be so diverse and disparate that no general standards are applicable to those that were written at different assumptions," they are not "intrinsically unrelated, but . . . tend to dovetail."[82] General histories dovetail because they address themselves to a society consisting "of individuals living in an organized community that controls a particular territory."[83] This territory is organized "by institutions that serve to define the status occupied by different individuals and ascribe to them the roles they are expected to play in perpetuating the continuing existence of the community."[84] Since general histories apply to society and thus make truth claims about "actual" entities rather than constructed ones, Mandelbaum claims that general histories can have objectivity. Objectivity applies only to the actual claims made. So the disparate approaches, various affects and backgrounds of the historical investigator in a general history must eventually be amenable to a dovetailing. In other words, contradiction is either apparent, or one of the truth claims in the general history is fallacious.

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[80] Ibid. [81] Ibid., p. 8. [82] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[83] Ibid., p. 11. [84] Ibid.

This process of dovetailing is similar to cartography, since a "mapmaker always operates on some scale."[85] Various maps will show more detail than others; others will include completely different information with respect to the same geography. Nonetheless, they can all be spliced together, referring to the same geography from different scales and perspectives. Some histories concern themselves with long periods of time; others are concerned with different regions of a society.

> Nevertheless maps drawn on different scales, if they are accurate, will fit together, allowing us to move toward an increasingly small target, or they will allow us to find our way from any particular starting point to other points that are extremely remote. In the realm of historical studies one can also move in either direction: from broad horizons to more accurate and detailed vision, or from acquaintance with what is most familiar to entirely unfamiliar territory. In each case, the historian will either follow connections that his own investigations uncover, or he will be helped by connections that other historians, working on a different scale, may have laid out for him.[86]

Like "actual" geography, all general historical perspectives can be accommodated since they deal with actual entities in a society.

Turning from general history to special history, "the problem becomes more complicated." The historian in special histories not only brings certain theoretical perspectives to the examination of subject matter, but "his work will also presuppose some characterization of the particular subject matter with which his special history is to be concerned."[87] For example, in the history of philosophy, one must begin with at least a tacit definition of who will count as a philosopher and, therefore, what will count for philosophy. These disputes are all within the realm of what Mandelbaum calls culture; they require certain agreed upon definitions of the subject. Since this is the case, they quite often cannot be resolved.[88] "Thus, we have here approached the possible limits of objectivity in one form of historical inquiry."[89]

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[85] Ibid., p. 15.

[86] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[87] Ibid., p. 160.

Mandelbaum deftly prevents any attempt to draw parallels between special history's limits of objectivity and general history. General histories have "as their subject matter particular societies, which are continuing entities existing in a region over a particular period of time, whereas the subject matter of any special history is a class of resembling cultural products, many of which are related through strands of influence but which do not comprise a unitary ongoing entity, as does a society."[90] As a consequence of this difference, a general historian cannot exercise the same freedom in delimiting what will and will not enter into account. Society must be taken as it is, and analyzed in terms of connections that exist among component parts. The general historian may deal with certain facets of society, but must submit to dovetailing with the work of other historians on the society as a whole. The special historian defines the subject matter; therefore, "he does not necessarily place himself under the same types of constraints."[91]

Mandelbaum uses the distinction between general and special history to analyze attacks upon his realist model of objectivity.[92] In each case

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[88] Ibid., p. 161. [89] Ibid. [90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid., pp. 162-63.

[92] This is particularly true of Mandelbaum's response to the work of W. H. Walsh. Walsh speaks of "dominant concepts and leading ideas" that

Mandelbaum's argument remains the same: with respect to special histories these observations demonstrate the limits of objectivity. But in regard to general histories, the use of dominant concepts, leading ideas, or particular periods cannot prevent the dovetailing of the events isolated by these techniques from other general histories applying to the same society. For example, periodization by a general historian may be dependent upon the political dimension of a society's history. Then, the general historian must allow the dovetailing of one time period into the various other forms of periodization. Various forms of periodization might conceivably be a reflection of other strands of a society's life. For example, the development of pottery may not follow the same periods as the development of military science. "General histories have as their subject matter entities having a continuous existence, and special histories do not."[93]

## Bias and Rhetorical Form

Mandelbaum's distinction between general and special histories may withstand the critical discussion it has engendered.[94] If it does, his notion of objectivity in historical research will be accepted. His notion is, of course, significantly qualified from that of his earlier works: valid claims apply only to general histories and demands that they obey the law of the excluded middle.

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move the historian from "plain narrative" to "significant narrative" and poses the problems inherent in any attempt to periodize history; Ibid., pp. 164-68.

[93] Ibid., p. 166.

[94] Louis O. Mink, "Review Essay: The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge, By Maurice Mandelbaum," History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History 17 (no.2, 1978): 221.

Be that as it may, Mandelbaum's characterization of historiography still requires that the historian make an explanation to the community of scholars. This explanation requires a certain format or literary form. At the level of the historian's written explanation, Mandelbaum's sense of historical objectivity is subject to a second, and substantially different, form of relativism which he did not discuss in Anatomy: rhetorical relativism. Rhetorical relativism is "the claim that the cognitive content of a written history is exhibited at least in part by its literary form, including its narrative structure."[95]

Among critical philosophers of history, rhetorical relativism has taken several different forms.[96] The form most appropriate to this model's development is the narrative model of history (history-as-story). Remember, in this interpretive model the interpreter is primarily historian. The model argues that to understand what historians actually do, we should examine what features are characteristic of narratives. We need to ask, in what manner does a narrative explain the events included within the narrative.[97] Earlier forms of this viewpoint are found in William H. Dray's continuous series model of explanation, in W. H. Walsh's account of history as "significant narrative," and in certain aspects of the theories of Croce and Collingwood.[98]

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[95] Ibid.

[96] Louis O. Mink, "Philosophical Analysis and Historical Understanding," Review of Metaphysics 21 (1968): 669-72. Hereafter, "Philosophical Analysis."

[97] Ibid.; what follows is significantly indebted to the analysis of Louis O. Mink in the cited essays.

[98] Robin G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948); Benedetto Croce, History, Its Theory and Practice (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1923). Croce, in this work, pt.1, chap. 8, uses the

The work of Arthur C. Danto, W. B. Gallie, and Morton White[99] are heavily involved in this characterization of historical explanation.[100] In each case, the authors are pointing to complex conceptual systems which function in an a priori manner, even though, unlike Kant's categories, they may change over time and thus sustain different styles of rationality. These complex conceptual systems show themselves in the narrative shapes historical explanations take.

White begins the discussion by analyzing the character of the "singular explanatory statements" that characterize much of historical narrative. A complex set of events is summarized under a general explanation that follows either a single character or issue through a series of cause and effect explanations.[101] White's mode of analysis points in the correct direction; he points to the narrative character of these "singular explanatory statements" but "depends essentially on redescribing the sequences of a story so that they can be regarded as the states of a system, isolated from each other for purposes of description and connected only by causal relations specified by general

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terms "special histories" and "general history." Despite this similarity with Mandelbaum their conclusions are significantly different, particularly concerning the place of the historian in the writing of history.

[99] Arthur C. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965); W. B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (London: Chatto & Windus, 1964); and Morton White, Foundations of Historical Knowledge (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).

[100] To follow Louis O. Mink's characterization of these three critical philosophers of history, "White contributes something to the debate [concerning explanation models], Gallie to the issue [of rhetorical form of historical explanation], and Danto to our understanding of the importance of the debate over this issue." Mink, "Philosophical Analysis," pp. 669ff.

[101] White, Foundations of Historical Knowledge, p. 84.

theories."[102]

In pointing to the narrative character of historical explanation, White takes a small step beyond Mandelbaum and Taylor's conception of historical explanation. Taylor, as was noted above, dissects the text of Mark into propositions (subject/predicate) that make reference to specific ostensible referents. For example, he isolates the Son of man saying in 8:38 and asks if Jesus said it; and, if he did, did it have a different meaning in the life or "story of Jesus"? To understand these propositions as an integral part of a narrative begins to erode away the tendency to dissect the text as the first step in understanding it as history.

W. B. Gallie intensifies this erosion begun by White. His chief contribution is his general account of the features which enable a story to flow and the reader to follow. Gallie observed, quite correctly, that no critical (that is, post-Kantian) philosopher has worked out a clear account of "what it is to follow or construct an historical narrative."[103] History, he concluded, is "a species of the genus Story."[104] But to understand what a story is is to know what it is to follow a story; that is, not merely to have done so (as everyone has) but to know what in general are the features of a story which make it intelligible.

How is this possible? First, the unity of the story is provided by the sense of alternative possible outcomes; what happens in a story acquires significance by reason of its relevance to a conclusion which we

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[102] Mink, "Philosophical Analysis," esp. p. 681.

[103] Gallie, pp. 12-13.

[104] Ibid., p. 66.

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await although we do not yet know which of the several possible outcomes it will be. Gallie appeals to the experience of following a ball game and understanding the features which make us able to follow it. The spectator is drawn into the flow of the events, shares the experiences of the game with the players, or suffers aversion to their playing of the game. The phenomenology of following the narrative as it relates the events sustains the intellectual interest. "The conclusion, when it comes, therefore not merely completes our understanding but provides a climax or culmination of a process whose sequences depend upon our emotional involvement."[105]

A wise old hand at baseball may notice nice details which escape the spectator of average keenness, and there can be no criteria for following completely. But the minimal conditions are the same for all. The features which enable a story to flow and us to follow, then, are the clues to the nature of historical understanding. A historical narrative does not demonstrate the necessity of events but makes them intelligible by unfolding the story which connects their significance. History does not as such differ from fiction insofar as it essentially depends on and develops our skill and subtlety in following stories. History does, of course, differ from fiction in that it is obligated to rest upon evidence of the occurrence in real space and time of what it describes, and it must grow out of a critical assessment of the received materials of history, including the analyses and interpretations of other historians.[106] But the research of historians, however arduous and technical, only increases the amount and precision of knowledge of facts which remain contingent and discontinuous.

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[105] Ibid., pp. 46-47. [106] Ibid., p. 33, and pp. 56-64.

There is a striking difference between the discussion by White and Gallie. White's discussion of explanation is preoccupied with causality. Gallie's discussion of understanding, on the other hand, virtually ignores causality--except the definitions of "discontinuity," "contingency," and other key terms might be thought to depend on a contrast with "causal," "normic," or "regular." Gallie gives an account of the naive reader's following of the historical narrative.[107] But the critical historian reading a history of an election will already know the outcome of the election and will instead be interested in the historian's explanation of why the events took place, not just that they took place. We need to ask if Gallie's rules for following a historical narrative apply equally well to the reflective reader as they do to the unreflective reader? Likewise, those who would like to understand Mark under the category of history-as-story, might ask the same question. Will this understanding of Mark be the experience of a reflective reader as well as of an unreflective reader of the text? Can the claim that Mark is history remain under such circumstances?[108]

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[107] Mink, "Philosophical Analysis," p. 685; Mink notes that "the most natural criticism of Gallie would . . . be that he has given an account of how we behave . . . under conditions of ignorance. The story of a political campaign with the constant adjustment of the candidates' strategies and tactics to each other and to unpredictable simultaneous events such as foreign crises, is a paradigm of Gallie's 'narrative'; but so is the counting of the vote after the polls are closed (emphasis Mink's). The outcome at that point is perfectly determinate, and we know that it is; yet we follow the spurious drama of reporting it as if it were a contest ("Nixon is slowly closing the gap in California"). The point is that there is, in Gallie's terms, no difference between following the drama of the campaign and following the pseudo-drama of counting the vote; but philosophically the difference between drama and pseudo-drama is clearly more fundamental than the similarities which depend on our accidental ignorance."

Arthur C. Danto points the way to a more reflective explanation of history as narrative. The general pattern of argument is to show that we already believe that there are true descriptions of past events which no one could have experienced those events explained using these descriptions.[109] Suppose, Danto says,[110] there is an Ideal Chronicler who could have witnessed and recorded every event as it occurred in the past, including what was going on in other minds. Would this be the whole truth about the past, leaving the historian only to select and collate? Danto thinks not. There are, he argues, true descriptions of every event under which the event could not have been witnessed even by such an Ideal Chronicler, since such descriptions essentially refer to other events which are yet to take place. For example, a witness of a certain birth of a baby boy in 1732 could not possibly report his experience as "I have just watched the birth of the first President of the United States of America." Clearly there is a very large class of descriptions of this kind: statements which refer to two time-separated events, describing the earlier event only, and dependent for their truth on reference to the later. And such "narrative sentences" belong to stories which historians alone can tell. In language different from Danto's, one could say that the present past does not consist wholly of past presents; and for the same reason, the present is not any particular future past. A present event may belong to an indefinitely number of stories, none of which can be told until it is completed. At any future moment some such stories may be complete, and others incomplete. The description of the past does not come closer and closer to an Ideal Chronicle but departs actually further and further from it, because more descriptions become available which were not earlier attainable even in principle.

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[108] Mink, "Philosophical Analysis," p. 689; Mink summarizes his criticism of White and Gallie, this way, "White is not serious about historical (Mink's emphasis), as historical, so Gallie is not serious about historical knowledge, as knowledge" (emphasis, Mink's).

[109] Danto, p. 62.

[110] Ibid., pp. 149-81.

Danto's argument depends on bringing out with maximum forcefulness the point that there are many descriptions of an event, but there is no standard or complete description. Louis O. Mink develops Danto's arguments in such a way as to further this chapter's thesis that the integral character of narrative in historical explanation. He extends Danto's observations regarding narrative sentences represent judgments and conceptions developed subsequent to the events which they describe. He argues that the narrative character of historical explanation is a necessary element. This is due to the kind of understanding "which characterizes history."[111] Historical thinking requires the historian to gather together "in a single act, or in a cumulative series of acts, the complicated relationships of parts which can be experienced only _seriatim_."[112] He calls this act "comprehension." It is operative, he argues, at every level of consciousness. At the lowest level, it is the grasping of perception and recognition of objects. At an intermediate level, it is the gathering together of a set of objects and issues in classification and generalization. At the highest level, it is the attempt to order our knowledge into a single system--to comprehend the world as a totality.[113]

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[111] Louis O. Mink, "History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension," _New Literary History_ 1 (1970): 548.

[112] Ibid.

Mink suggests there are three modes of comprehension: the theoretical mode, the categoreal mode, and the configurational mode. These are related to three major disciplines of humanity: natural science, philosophy, and history. The configurational mode of comprehension lies at the basis of historical perception and description. The historian, both in research but especially in writing an explanation, works on the basis of a configurational mode of comprehension. A gathering into a narrative whole takes place as the historian begins to propose historical explanation. Thus, Mink is in agreement with Gallie that history is a species of story. But Mink does not stop at examining the phenomenon of following a story; he continues by arguing that the written text of history requires a narrative conception in order to make it followable.[114]

Mink grants that "[n]ot all parts of a story are about actions correctly describable only by story-statement. . . . But if we generalize from this paradigm we can say that the actions and events of a story comprehended as a whole are connected by a network of overlapping descriptions."[115] Such overlap of descriptions "may not be part of the story itself . . . but only of the comprehension of it as a whole."[116]

In the case of Mark understood as historical narrative this analysis would suggest that any understanding of the historical claims being made by the text would require an appreciation of the text as a whole. It would require attention to the "overlapping descriptions" either present within the text itself or presupposed in the representation. It would exclude as appropriate methodology the dissection of the text into separate propositions which are taken to make singular references to events behind the text. Historical referentiality would remain possible, but the nature of the truth claims being made would be available only by considering the whole narrative.

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[113] Ibid. Mink argues that theology is this ultimate kind of gathering together.

[114] Ibid.

[115] Ibid., p. 556.

[116] Ibid.

### Mandelbaum on the Narrativist Theory of Historiography

Judging from certain moments in the *Anatomy* and in an article he wrote for *History and Theory*, Mandelbaum is quite sure that the historian "is not engaging in an activity which is best represented by the model of telling a story."[117] In *Anatomy* he isolates three types of structures used in historical accounts; and although a given work may use more than one of these types of structures, one of them will dominate any given historical account. Sequential history, the traditional type, traces the changes of its subject over time. Explanatory history identifies a state of affairs, tracing its causes backward through time. Interpretive history depicts the interrelationships of institutions and cultural life which characterize a particular place and time, or epoch.

In the development of his three styles of historical writing, Mandelbaum explicitly rejects the "narrativist understanding of historical writing as 'simplistic'"[118] choosing instead the terminology of sequential history. He thus avoids referring "to such works as narratives."[119] He also charges that the narrativist position undercuts and neglects the role of inquiry in the historian's enterprise.[120] The narrativist position does this insofar as it identifies historical writing with storytelling.

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[117] Mandelbaum, *Anatomy*, p. 25.

[118] Ibid.

[119] Maurice Mandelbaum, "A Note on History as Narrative," *History and*

Mandelbaum grants that the narrativist model of historical accounts has a degree of plausibility. First, there is similarity between a storyteller writing a story and a historian sitting down after the research has been completed and attempting to present the facts in as clear a manner as possible. Often this presentation takes the form of a sequential narrative.[121] Second, the tropistic, or teleological factor in historical writing does require the historian to shape a telos. Mandelbaum asserts that this second reason for plausibility does not warrant the relativist claims made upon it.[122] Third, the contemporary misunderstanding of the place of human intentional actions in the analysis of history ignores or underestimates other factors. By focusing on human intentions, the historian underestimates the significance of long standing conditions that create the complex setting for the understanding of history.[123] Thus, history writing is part/whole process, rather than an analysis of intentional actions of individual human agents.[124]

Mandelbaum grants that upon completion of research the historian

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Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History 6 (no.3, 1967): 413. Hereafter, "A Note."

[120] Ibid.

[121] Mandelbaum, Anatomy, p. 26.

[122] Mandelbaum, "A Note," p. 414.

[123] Ibid.

[124] Ibid.

must "construct his account in a manner that permits his reader to follow it . . . yet none of these resemblances is more than superficial when compared to the differences between 'telling a story' and all of those activities in which historians must become involved when they set to discover that which must be discovered, if they are to have any story to tell."[125] Underlying the entire process of historical work, Mandelbaum claims, is a search for evidence; it is the "historian's task to discover facts and relationships which are not already known to him, and which are not invented by him. We expect the historian to engage in research, to weigh alternative possibilities, and to marshal evidence in favor of one rather than another of these possibilities."[126]

Secondly, Mandelbaum asserts that "the demands placed on a historian by his subject matter rarely permit him to follow any simple story line."[127] Mandelbaum grants that "there is a topistic, or teleological, factor in historical writing," but the use of the story-telling model is "not warranted . . ."[128] Plausibility in this instance assumes and fosters a "simplistic" linear model of historical accounts.[129]

In support of the claim that the linear model of historical accounts is simplistic, Mandelbaum offers a Presidential campaign as an example.[130] To understand the campaign, it would take more than a tracing of certain human intentions isolated in a linear narrative. Tracing the candidate's and campaign manager's decisions would only tell a very isolated story, one which would need the important addition of complex conditions. Circumstances made campaign decisions possible, relevant, and successful or unsuccessful. These "longer enduring factors which are not themselves links in the sequential chain of events which constitute the 'story' of the campaign" are nonetheless terribly significant in understanding the campaign.[131]

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[125] Ibid.

[126] Ibid.

[127] Ibid., p. 415.

[128] Ibid., p. 416.

[129] Ibid., p. 417.

[130] Ibid.

> In other words, an election, unlike a chess match, is not won or lost by a series of neatly arranged moves and countermoves made in sequential order; the past is not wiped clean each time one makes a new move or commences a new game. For this reason, a sequential narrative, or 'campaign', story is not likely to give a reader much insight into why the elements in that story did actually occur nor why they had the effects which they did.[132]

In a footnote, Mandelbaum clarifies his principal claim, accusing the narrativists of drawing too "sharp a line between 'causes' and 'condition', and mistakenly believing that the historian's primary concern is with what they look upon as causes not conditions."[133] The historian's task is to reconstruct "a complex pattern of change into the factors which served to make [history] precisely what it was."[134] This process, he argues, is a "relationship of part to whole, not a relationship of antecedent to consequent."[135]

Mandelbaum effectively responds to Gallie's and White's narrative models. The similarity between a storyteller writing a story and a historian writing history does not negate the historical referents of the text nor the place of research in historiography. These responses qualify Gallie's conclusions. Mandelbaum's response to the third reason for a degree of plausibility for narrative models qualifies Morton White's argument. White depends upon a description of narrative as descriptions of human intentional actions and underestimates other factors. Mandelbaum is quite right regarding the complex setting for understanding history.

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[131] Ibid.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Ibid., p. 417, n.5.

[134] Ibid.

[135] Ibid.

Mandelbaum effectively responds to these proposals by returning to his argument regarding the bias of the historian as researcher. He does not effectively respond to Mink's more complex proposal regarding the character of historical comprehension. Mink's arguments are untouched by Mandelbaum's responses to the narrative model. Likewise, Mink's arguments do not question the possibility of retrievable historical referentiality in a historical narrative. Rather, Mink's argument qualifies Mandelbaum's model by requiring an appreciation of the whole rhetorical form of a historical narrative before seeking to go behind the text. Mink's qualification is complementary to this inquiry's concern for the whole text of Mark without ignoring historical referentiality.

### Summary of Theorist Section

I started this analysis of Maurice Mandelbaum by reflecting on Vincent Taylor's interpretation of Mark. Taylor understood his role as interpreter to be primarily that of a historian. He ordered all the exegetical methods for the purpose of historical reconstruction.[136] What was to be reconstructed was the "story of Jesus."[137] For example, he interprets the Son of man saying in Mark 8:38 as apocalyptically enhanced by the second generation concern with the delayed parousia. But this second generation bias did not prevent Taylor from isolating the

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[136] Taylor, Commentary, pp. 148-49.

[137] Ibid., p. 148.

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original "realized eschatological" saying of Jesus. Taylor's methodology implies the complex relationship between alleged historical events in themselves and the record of such events in a narrative.

The discussion of Mandelbaum led to greater complexity on the matter of historical referentiality and bias. It has, nonetheless, defended a position compatible with Taylor's. Mandelbaum takes into account the many skeptical claims regarding the "objectivity" of historical narratives, providing a defense for a qualified realist position. Louis O. Mink's narrative model supplemented and qualified Mandelbaum's realist position.

In short, Mandelbaum gives good reasons to support Taylor's claim that Mark can be understood primarily as historical narrative and that the meaning of the text can be related to the historical referents behind the text. The inquiry now returns to Taylor's interpretation of Mark, taking seriously both the defense of Taylor's basic position and the considerable qualifications of that position that the analysis of the general theory has produced.

## Taylor After Mandelbaum

If Mark is to be taken primarily as historical narrative, it must be seen as a special history of the sequential narrative type. The evangelist's choice of topic has profoundly affected the historical narrative. The importance of understanding the narrative as a whole in relationship with any attempt to reconstruct a story of Jesus behind the text is the subject of subsequent chapters. But, with significant qualifications, my analysis of Mark still understands the text as historical narrative and the interpreter's self-understanding as historian.

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Thus, in contrast to those form-critics who assume that the first Christian invented stories-of-Jesus to suit the situation of their Church, methodological skepticism can be qualified.[138]

It is one thing to claim that what people say is intimately related to their interests.[139] It is another thing to suggest that interests invalidate any claim to historical reference. The retelling of Jesus stories, again, was presumably done for a purpose; much can be learned about the people who retold the stories. The next chapter will explore those possibilities. It does not follow, however, that these stories are of no use for reconstructing the story of Jesus. For example, Vincent Taylor examines each case on its own merits: this results in the dissection of text, the deconstruction and reconstruction of a new story, which is located behind the text. Form-critical speculation (about possible origins for Christian traditions on the life of the early Christian community) is only the first step of the necessary historical judgments to be made; it cannot be a substitute for it.[140]

Some might argue that Mark is only evidence for the belief of the author and the community of believers to whom he wrote. They would limit referentiality to these referents. In answer to this skepticism Humphrey Palmer's analogy of the text to a telephone summarizes the conclusions of the model to this point:

> Consider the telephone. All the subscriber has is an instrument, making noises, and attached to a piece of wire.

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[138] Taylor, Essays, p. 30; Palmer, Gospel Criticism, p. 185.

[139] Taylor, Commentary, pp. 130ff.; Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), develops this theme in a most helpful manner.

[140] Palmer, Gospel Criticism, p. 186.

> He is assured that some of the crackling noises are due to electric aberrations on the line--poor contacts, heavy rain, and the like. But the voice that he hears is also said to be conveyed by electrical vibrations in the line. It could be argued that all he really receives are vibrations--they are all that the line could possibly convey--and that the alleged voice is a further and somewhat shaky inference from these, which in the nature of the case can never be confirmed or justified, and which some philosopher may therefore one day be brave enough to do without. Now in spite of this argument, we all distinguish between voices and mere 'noise'. The early Christians may be responsible for a modicum of 'noise' on our only line to the Jesus of history. But through the crackling all later generations have made out their master's voice.[141]

In light of Mandelbaum and Taylor's work, Palmer's analogy is telling. We are perfectly willing to live with considerable inference with respect to many matters. If we are to function with thoroughgoing skepticism with respect to the text of Mark, why should we not function with regard to all experience in the same manner?

The narrative model of historiography would suggest that we ask first if we find the entire Gospel relatively reliable. If we find it relatively reliable, why should we have complete methodological doubt regarding a component paragraph. Each form-critical discussion will, in this model, require a single judgment. With respect to a particular form, for example, the Son of man saying, the form-critical questions will remain valid. The model only suggests in principle there are no reasons for discounting the qualified claims of historical reference.

According to Mandelbaum's types of structure used in a historical account, Mark would fall into the type called sequential history.[142] The sequential history traces the changes of its central subject over time. Thus Jesus, the central figure, is traced from the arrest of John to the empty tomb.[143] To be sure, these are "not 'pure' forms; no historical work uses one to the exclusion of the others."[144] This surely is the case in Mark. One might argue that some passages, like the Transfiguration narrative, are of the explanatory type.[145] Mark identifies a state of affairs, in this case the resurrection, and traces its cause backward through time; this narrative is one of those moments in the process of tracing backwards. Nonetheless, this explanatory type of historical narrative is integrated into a much more traditional format of sequential history.[146]

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[141] Ibid.

[142] Mandelbaum, Anatomy, p. 26.

As was noted above, Mandelbaum distinguishes two basic types of historiography: general and special histories, which undergird his three types of structure in historical narrative. General histories deal with enduring and single (although complex) entities such as a society or a social institution. Special histories deal with some "collection of activities or works" which do not represent an "actual single whole," but rather are classified together only by virtue of the historian's "conception of the subject matter."[147]

The category of special history allows for the historian's special interests in determining the topic of the history that is to be written.

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[143] Taylor, Commentary, p. 148.

[144] Mandelbaum, Anatomy, p. 25.

[145] Taylor, Commentary, p. 386f.

[146] Mandelbaum discusses the traditional historical format in some detail; Mandelbaum, Anatomy, pp. 26f.

[147] Ibid., p. 130.

Special histories cannot bear the same heavy claims to objectivity that a general history can support. They are intensely skewed by the definition of the subject matter to be discussed and the particular perspective from which it is to be examined. Under this model Mark is a special history. The subject matter and the perspective from which it is treated clearly are less than a general history.

Taylor sees the text as a special history of the ministry of Jesus. Such an approach to Mark requires a clearer definition of the subject matter of Mark. This would demand consideration of the text's perspective as well.[148] Secondly, the question of how the subject matter is selected must be taken into account. What are the ruling considerations for the author for such a choice? Comparison of other special histories, with similar subject matters, could clarify the perspective and concerns that led to the choice of this viewpoint and material.

Mark is not the only special history to be considered in this model. Taylor's reconstructed story of Jesus is a special history as well. Taylor's claims to historical value do not lie in the present state of the Markan text; they lie instead with the reconstructed text, minus the prejudice of the redactor. The model complicates the matter once more, arguing that even Taylor's reconstructed story of Jesus is a special history. Again, the question of Taylor's construction of the subject matter and perspective must be kept in mind. In the analysis of Mark for historical reconstruction of the life of Jesus, discussion of objectivity must be subject to investigation of Taylor's construction of the subject matter, "life of Jesus."

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[148] The development of the "text's perspective" will take place more completely under the third model.

This does not discount objectivity. The model has the option of dovetailing the special history, the reconstruction of the life of Jesus, into a general history. Whenever Taylor's historical claims can be dovetailed into the conclusions of contemporary general histories, or with social institutions of Mark's milieu, these claims to historical reference gain warrants.

## The Son of Man Saying, Once Again

What would this process of dovetailing the special histories of Mark and Taylor into a general history of the period look like? I believe the process would have essentially four steps:

1. The text in question would need to fit into the text of Mark as special history of the sequential type.
2. Taylor's methodology outlined above would then follow.
3. The results of the first two steps would then be reconstructed into what Taylor has called the story of Jesus.
4. The resulting special history could be related to the general history of the time period or the institution with which the text is related--in this case the Hellenistic religion that became identified as the Church.

In the case of the Son of man saying singled out from Taylor's interpretation of Mark, each of these four steps apply. The importance of 8:38 in the entire text must be investigated. "The task is not to read the Gospel in terms of a reconstruction of the pre-Markan tradition or of the alleged heresy of Mark's church, but to follow the contours of Mark's story."[149]

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[149] Taylor, *Commentary*, p. 130f.; Cf. Hans-Dieter Betz, "Gottmensch," II, *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* XII (1982), fasc. 2.; also, Betz in *Jesu Christus in Geschichte und Theologie*, Festschrift for Hans Conzelmann (1975) where bibliography on this topic might be found; an

The second step has been outlined above. The third step would move outside Mark, testing the results of the first two steps against a possible construction of the story of Jesus. The tradition of Jewish apocalyptic is the logical place to begin the dovetailing of the reconstructed "story of Jesus" with the special history of Son of man sayings.[150] Such texts as Daniel 7, Enoch 37-71 (the Similitudes), and IV Ezra 13 provide the starting point for such a dovetailing enterprise.

The fourth, and final step, entails the dovetailing of this special history of Son of man sayings with the general history of the time period, or with an enduring institution. With each step, claims to historical objectivity gain support. The process of interpretation is now more complex than the initial analysis made by Taylor. The claim to historical referentiality, although qualified, remains.

The end of this dovetailing process does not deny the major claims of historical referentiality. It does not deny that the interpretation of Mark as a whole is an important part of the process of understanding the text as special history. An interpreter who follows such an approach could interpret Mark as a whole, without losing historical referentiality. Such an interpreter sees the text primarily as a special history of the sequential type intensely affected by the redactor, but still retaining historical referentiality. Many other narrative forms, far closer to the explanatory type are interspersed with the text, together with many

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alternative position: Jack Dean Kingsbury, "'The Divine Man' as the Key to Mark's Christology--The End of an Era?" *Interpretation* 25 (July, 1981): 243-257.

[150] Norman Perrin, *The Kingdom of God in the Teachings of Jesus* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963).

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other literary types--yet a case can be made for the interpretation of the text as historical narrative.

## Evaluation of the Model

The model achieves its goal: it gives good reasons for understanding Mark as a historical narrative. It provides the procedures for interpreting the referential claims of the text that point to historical referents behind the text. The interpreter is primarily a historian and the text primarily history. The model's ability to understand the historical referential claims is its strength. It makes the model useful to historians and to theologians who intend to construct a systematic theology upon historical truth claims.

The model does not lead to an appreciation of the redactor's positive contribution to the meaning of Mark. Instead, the redactor is the noise to be subtracted from the line. Once the redactor's bias is established, it is to be filtered out, like the noise on the telephone line and the tint in the window. Appropriate interpretation of Markan verisimilitude depends upon the exclusion of this redactor. In the chapter that follows, the second model, the redactor/author becomes a positive norm for interpreting Markan verisimilitude. In that model the interpreter remains historian, but the events which the interpretive process seeks to reproduce is the mind of the author.

Another part of a full range of referentiality is omitted in this first model. The role of the contemporary interpreter, having arisen to some extent in the question of the contemporary historian's subjectivity both in the question of methodology and rhetorical presentation, is not fully appreciated. This will become much more apparent in the third model.

The internal structure of the narrative is noted within this model, but the full implications of the narrative model are not present. The weakness in this first model will be balanced by both the third and fourth models. The third model develops a literary interpretation of the surface structure of the Markan text. The deep structure of Mark is the concern of the fourth model.

Each of the major components of the four models of interpretation have surfaced in this first model. The context of the text, the author, the reader, and the internal structure of the text have played a part within this model. In the subsequent models each of these four models will make a contribution; they will be arranged in significantly different manners depending on the goal and structure of each of the models.

# CHAPTER TWO

## STABILITY AND AUTHORIAL INTENTION

The inquiry began with the reader's sense of Markan verisimilitude[1] and asked, "What are the possibilities and conditions for understanding Markan verisimilitude?" Is Mark primarily mimetic information about the alleged historical events "behind the text" or is it an artfully crafted narrative bearing no direct reference to historical events? Those in the modern period who have argued that the text is primarily mimetic have tended to dissect the text and lose the narrative as a whole.[2] Recent literary and linguistic analysis that has emphasized the narrative whole has generally lost the sense of historical reference.[3] This study seeks to recover and discover the narrative character of Mark without ignoring the question of truth. To that end the three terms of the inquiry (verisimilitude, meaning and reference) have been construed into four possible models, each within one of four perspectives on a spectrum of possible general theories of hermeneutics.[4]

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[1] At this stage of the inquiry it is clear that the reader must read Mark from beginning to end in order to have a full sense of verisimilitude. The narrative whole needs to be taken into account.

[2] The last model attempted to ameliorate this dissection of the text when it noted the importance of the narrative character of Mark. Nonetheless, the interpreter still dissected the text and reconstructed it in the shape of the story of Jesus.

[3] Cf. Kermode, Genesis of Secrecy, pp.185-87.

[4] It is worth noting, once again, the distinction in this inquiry between the terms "models" and "perspectives." Models are one ordering of the four factors of interpreting a text: text, author, reader, and context. This ordering shares with other possible orderings the general

The first chapter sought to recover the narrative as a whole without ignoring the question of historical reference to the events in the life of Jesus. Though this model took into account the role of the author/redactor, it did not appreciate the redactor's positive contribution to the verisimilitude of Mark. The redactor was to be excluded under that model. In this chapter the redactor will be central to the interpretive process.

Mark in this model can also be compared to a transparent window. In contrast to the first model, however, the person peering through the window looks not at the events in the life of Jesus but at the events in the mind of the author and the community to which the author wrote. This model does not deny the possibility of seeing something through the transparent text as in the previous model but it quite deliberately limits its searching behind the text to investigations of authorial intention. Willi Marxsen and Eric Donald Hirsch, Jr., will guide us in our investigation of this model.

This model explains the sense of verisimilitude in Mark by an appeal to the author's normative intention. The goal and purpose of interpretation is to establish a stable textual meaning; any other reference or possible meanings subsequent to the author's intended meaning cannot be seen as determinative of meaning. Reference to the author's intention contrasts with reference to the historical events "behind the text," which are the concerns of the first model. To be more exact, the author's consciousness is a special kind of event behind the text. As

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characteristic of a particular perspective. In the case of this model, the author is the normative ordering point in the interpretation. Several models would fit within this same perspective. Thus, perspectives can include several models within them.

one reproduces the author's intention, the sense of verisimilitude will in turn be explained. The interpreter is still primarily historian but is now, to a greater degree than before, mind reader as well. In this model the author's intention unifies the narrative as a whole and thus furthers the purpose of narrative recovery. The chapter will be developed in four major parts: (1) an example of Marxsen's practical criticism of Mark, (2) theoretical reflection on Marxsen's practice, (3) development of Marxsen's author-oriented hermeneutic by discussion of E. D. Hirsch's defense of such a general theory of hermeneutics and (4) finally, a summary and evaluation of the model.

## Marxsen's Practical Criticism of Mark

Willi Marxsen contends that the geographical "framework" associated with the region of Galilee in Mark is a theological redactional device that contributes to the unification of the Markan narrative.[5] His analysis of the geographical framework takes shape in three stages. First, he separates tradition from redaction in the three major sections of the book: the use of "Galilee" prior to the "Journey Report"; the geographical detail of the "Journey into Gentile Territory"; and the utilization of "Galilee" in the "Passion Narrative." Second, he constructs a redactional pattern around the notion of the author's intention. Third, these conclusions are compared with the other synoptic Gospels.[6]

### Stage One: Redaction and Tradition

Marxsen alleges that many instances of geographical detail in Mark are present because of an already solidified tradition whereby certain Jesus sayings and incidents are associated with particular locations.[7] Since this is the case, it is necessary to engage in a deconstruction[8] of the text which will clarify which geographical details can be attributed to the tradition and which to the redactor.

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[5] Willi Marxsen, Mark the Evangelist, tr. Roy A. Harrisville, et al. (Nashville: Abingdon, 1969), pp. 92-94; hereafter, Evangelist.

[6] Ibid., "Study Two," pp. 54-116.

Such a concern for distinguishing between redaction and previous tradition plays a role in Marxsen's initial discussion of the Galilee occurrences in the material prior to the "Journey Report." Jesus and Nazareth were connected in the "old tradition," but this connection was usually adjectival.[9] Such an adjectival connection is not the case in most Markan occurrences, however. Since the adjectival connection is not predominant, it is possible that the redactor may in fact associate the sum of Jesus' ministry, rather than merely his birth, with Galilee.[10] The numerous instances of "Galilee" in the first chapter (1:9, 14, 16, 28, 39) probably cannot be explained simply by extant tradition, but represent the concern of the redactor.[11] The seeming addition of "Galilee" at crucial moments in the narrative also occurs in other chapters. As we shall see in later analysis, Galilee is the location of many important events in the Markan narrative.[12]

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[7] Ibid., p. 62.

[8] The use of this term, "deconstruction," is not to attribute to this model the enterprise called "deconstructionist criticism." Rather the term does capture what happens to the text as the critic interprets it within this model. Cf. Harold Bloom, et al., Deconstruction and Criticism (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), pp. vii.f. for a description of deconstructionist criticism.

[9] Marxsen, Evangelist, p. 57; see discussion of nazeranos, Mark 1:24, 16:6.

[10] Ibid., p. 58.

[11] Ibid., pp. 59-60.

Markan redaction steps beyond the "editorial links" or "connecting tissue" of Bultmann and K. Schmidt in which geographical references are attributed neither to the extant tradition nor to the logic of the saying or incident.[13] For example, the calling of the disciples is placed at the sea, it may be argued, probably follows from the tradition of "fishers of men" and certainly need not represent a theological redactional device on the scale that Marxsen implies the presence of "Galilee" in Mark does. Galilee may, indeed, have been the location of many of the actions and words of Jesus' early ministry, but the frequency of "Galilee" and the crucial placement indicates that it has not only a historical but also a "special interest for Mark."[14]

### Stage Two: Author's Intention

What might this special interest and motivation be? Two occurrences in the Passion Narrative provide the decisive clues: 14:28 and 16:7.[15] In Mark 14:27-28 Jesus foretells his passion and resurrection: "And Jesus said to them, 'You will all fall away;' for it is written, 'I will strike the shepherd, and the sheep will be scattered.' But after I am raised up, I will go before you to Galilee.'" Jesus' statement according to Marxsen, is redactional because Jesus' declaration, "after I am raised up, I will go before you to Galilee," abruptly intrudes into the sequence of the narrative. The seam shows; Jesus has said in v. 27 that the disciples will all fall away and Peter replies in v. 29: "Even though they all fall away, I will not." An incongruous foreign element between Jesus' prediction of the disciples' fear and desertion and Peter's stalwart reply appears.[16] "Not only does the prediction that Jesus will go before his disciples to Galilee disrupt the Markan narrative, it also lacks a counterpart in any of the other Gospels."[17] That feature alone, of course, could be explained by an appeal to a separate tradition not available to the other Evangelists. However, the rest of Marxsen's argument for the redactional nature of this intrusion in 14:28 depends upon his analysis of 16:7.

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[12] Marxsen suggests a series of redactions even in the passion narrative, Evangelist, pp. 92-93.

[13] Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition, p. 242; Schmidt, Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu, pp. 18f.

[14] Marxsen, Evangelist, p. 60.

[15] Ibid., pp. 89-90.

As Bultmann and Bousset before him noted, 16:1-8 is not in accord with the former section of Mark 15:42-47.[18] The blatant contradiction between vs. 7 and 8 adds to the confusion of this most interesting Easter narrative. In verse seven the angel commands the women to go and tell the disciples that Jesus has gone before them to Galilee as he had told them (14:27). In verse eight the women exit in fear and silence; they tell no one. Marxsen argues that this can hardly be a Markan emphasis on the disobedience of the women.[19] How then do we account for the contradiction?

The several options fall into two groups: depending upon whether the contradiction is said to arise because of the addition of v. 7 or

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[16] Ibid., p. 95.

[17] Ibid., pp. 112-13.

[18] Bultmann, History, pp. 284-85; Wilhelm Boussett, Geschichte des Christusglaubens von den Anfängen des Christentums bis Iranaeus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), pp. 64-65.

[19] Marxsen, Evangelist, p. 76.

v. 8. Marxsen concludes that v. 7 is the redactional addition to the Easter narrative (vv. 1-6, 8.).[20] Whether v. 7 originates with Jesus, the community, or the evangelist is not at all certain. Marxsen passes over this question to address the issue of why Mark would have added this verse. "It is what he (Marxsen's emphasis) intended to say by it" that is Marxsen's concern.[21] He argues that the Galilean prediction and fulfillment motif (14:28 and 16:7) represents Mark's concern to interpret "his own time." The Galilean motif unites the text so that "we are not primarily concerned with interpreting an isolated piece of the tradition as (emphasis Marxsen's) tradition; rather, the tradition, precisely because of its redactional adaptation, serves the interpretation which is oriented to the evangelist's own time."[22] Since the Markan concern is not with a reproduction of a past event but the interpretation of those events for the concerns of the present time, the appearance predicted both in 14:28 and 16:7 refers not to resurrection appearances but to the Parousia which is of imminent concern to Mark's audience.[23] To Marxsen's mind, the insertion of 14:28 following v. 27 makes greater sense. The scattered sheep are the Galilean Christian community to whom Mark is speaking. And the Lord's promise to gather his scattered sheep is directed to them. If we understand the Easter narrative in a redaction-historical manner, we can explain the command to speak and the response of fear and silence as a continuation of the Markan disclosure and concealment motif. The continuity is clear and "we establish a 'contradiction' only if we inquire behind the redaction in historical or historicizing fashion."[24]

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[20] Ibid., p. 80.

[21] Ibid., p. 83.

[22] Ibid., p. 85.

[23] Ibid., p. 85.

But why Galilee? Mark's Gospel is a "Galilean Gospel" directed to the Christians of Galilee immediately following the fall of Jerusalem. Mark has used the Galilee tradition, "stretched" it into the present in order to support and underwrite the Christians in Galilee who await the Lord's return when "they see the kingdom of God come with power" (9:1). Mark's intent is to turn the tradition of Galilee into a trajectory to the present situation.[25] This concern with Galilee and the entire ministry of Jesus is summarized by the redaction of 1:14, "Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the gospel of God, and saying, 'The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent, and believe in the gospel'." In short, Mark's concern is kerygmatic. He is preaching to the Christians in Galilee.[26]

### Stage Three: Comparison with Luke and Matthew

Mark's kerygmatic concern is contrasted with the other Evangelist's redactional tendencies. Marxsen especially distinguishes Mark's kerygmatic interest and Luke's biographical interest.[27] Although still a believer, Luke is far more interested in giving an accurate biographical account of the life of Jesus than Mark is. Mark appends the two major sections of the gospel to the Passion Narrative as "a large knot" or "a sermon." This "uniform complex" contrasts vividly with Matthew, who "unties the knot." Matthew stretches out the tradition whereas Mark consolidates it.[28]

In contrast to the biographical and historicizing elements in Luke,

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[24] Ibid., p. 91.

[25] Ibid., p. 65.

[26] Ibid., pp. 65-66, 94.

[27] Ibid., pp. 99-100.

[28] Ibid., p. 99.

Mark has a kerygmatic interest tied to the concept of the imminent Parousia.[29] In such a uniform complex the resurrection is merely transitional. Marxsen warns that the interpretation that "bypasses Mark and, instead of focusing first upon the narrator, desires immediate and direct control of what is narrated" will prove "false. . .since it is oriented to time, a factor which Mark did not yet consciously experience as a sequence of events, as did Luke later on."[30] Proclamation wins over historical narration. "The 'history of the church' lies outside the evangelist's horizon. He proclaims."[31]

Though much effort has been spent on establishing the literary form of Mark, no consensus has resulted.[32] Despite this lack of consensus more critical comparative study of such literary antecedents in Hellenistic and Jewish tradition could lead to a better understanding of Mark. Therefore, when Marxsen argues that Mark is a sermon because the author had a kerygmatic interest, he extended his conclusion beyond his evidence. A kerygmatic interest does not warrant the conclusion that Mark is a sermon and not a historical narrative. The author could have a kerygmatic interest and adopt historical narrative as the major literary vehicle of the message. Furthermore, the "history of the church" may lie beyond "the evangelist's horizon" without concluding that the text is not historical narrative.

In making this criticism of Marxsen, our inquiry does not intend to offer another interpretation of Mark; rather, it intends to clarify the possibilities of understanding Markan verisimilitude. Marxsen's judgment on the Markan genre was probably overstated but his need to make such a judgment was appropriate. Within this model, as the theoretical section makes clear, the discernment of genre is crucial.

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[29] Ibid., pp. 112-13. [30] Ibid., p. 113. [31] Ibid.

[32] Cf. Howard Clark Kee, Community of the New Age: Studies in Mark's Gospel (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), pp. 14-49, where Kee discusses the literary antecedents of Mark.

## Marxsen: The Preacher and the Community

Be that as it may, Marxsen's practical discussion of the Markan geographical framework provides an excellent example for theoretical reflection on his method. He considers the narrative of Mark as a whole to be the work of a final editor or redactor. The text, as the product of various traditions, might appear fragmented. Marxsen unifies the narrative by an appeal to the intention of this redactor, who Marxsen explicitly argues, is analogous to a preacher proclaiming to a particular community.[33] The central kerygmatic effort shapes and orders all the disparate, individual traditions, parables, logoi, eschatological sayings, and Christological attributions.[34]

Marxsen's redaction criticism has, then, two foci: first, the general situation of the community and second, the special interest and point of view of the redactor/preacher. Marxsen makes no pretension about establishing a clear cut location of the community to which the redactor/preacher writes. Galilee becomes an important clue for analysis of the audience. This is theoretically significant, since his evidence for audience is primarily internal. This conclusion is apparent for the following reasons. He regards Bishop Papias of Hierapolis' traditional placement of the Gospel's composition in Rome as "historically worth-less."[35] He is most concerned about what is typical in the community. External historical documentation, though apparently skimpy in the first place, is discounted.[36] What is typical in the community, then, must be a reflection of the text which, as the Galilee example makes abundantly clear, is itself a reflection of the preacher/redactor's intention. To return to the preacher/community analogy, we might say that the characters of both the preacher and his congregation are made evident in the text of the sermon.[37]

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[33] Marxsen, Evangelist, pp. 65-66.

[34] Ibid., p. 94.

The other focus for the redaction critic's task, according to Marxsen, is on the special interest and point of view of the redactor/preacher. We have seen how the first focus, the general or "typical" situation of the community, can only be discerned in the case of Mark by internal evidence. Thus from the discernable intention of the author, it is clear that this focus is the stronger and dominant of the two. Once again, external evidence as to the character of the redactor of Mark is discounted by Marxsen as more likely the product of Bishop Papias' desire to counteract Gnostic heresy by an appeal to an apostle than documentation by reliable tradition of Markan authorship. Marxsen is also quick to note that "ultimately we cannot know even the names of our authors, their backgrounds, or their careers, [but] we must still emphasize that we are dealing with authors."[38] The matter of authorship is at best complex and tenuous.

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[35] Willi Marxsen, Introduction to the New Testament, tr. G. Buswell (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968), p. 143; hereafter, Introduction.

[36] Marxsen, Evangelist, p. 24.

[37] Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.III.4.

[38] Marxsen, Evangelist, p. 24.

Since the expression "author" can refer to several different things, some clarification at this point is necessary. The examples which follow are drawn from Pauline literature, since only this material in the New Testament, has an example for each of the senses of author. First, author can refer to a biographical flesh and blood person. For example, the Paul of Tarsus that his best friends and relatives knew would be recognized as the biographical author. Understood within this sense of author are the peculiar personal idiosyncracies that might be hinted at in Galations and in First and Second Corinthians which are unavailable to anyone but his closest intimates. Second, there is the career author. In the case of Paul, one can discern a career author by tracing his supposed development from First Thessalonians through Romans. Third, there is the public figure, which in the case of Paul is best characterized by his portrayal in Acts and, subsequently in the Church's tradition of his public character to this day. Finally, there is the implied author: the persona that the reader creates in his mind and projects onto the text in order to follow the narrative.[39] Without further explanation the outlines of a spectrum of possible meanings and theories about the author can be discerned from these four possible meanings of "author." Each might be the appropriate meaning of "author" in the expression "author's intention," depending upon the situation in which the expression is used and the text in which it is used as an interpretive device. What I hope will become clear is that "author's intention" has a very limited use in the case of Mark. It is, nevertheless, possible to interpret the sense of verisimilitude in Mark by a normative appeal to the implied author's intention and thereby to recover the narrative as a whole.

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[39] Marxsen, Introduction, p. 10.

In what manner does Marxsen use the expression "author" when he speaks of "author's intention"? At the outset, by using redactor/ preacher he excludes the biographical author, since he says we neither know a name nor a place. The category of career author is hardly possible either, since we have only one text upon which to base our evaluation of the author's career. Marxsen has discounted the subsequent Church and the public author by his rejection of Papias as acceptable evidence. We are therefore left with the implied author. If we are to discern the implied author's point of view and special interest, then we must appeal primarily to the internal evidence of the text.

### Distinction between Exegesis and Theology

Since, in Marxsen's opinion, the text of Mark is like a preacher's manuscript, it follows that the exegetical task is one of repeating (nachsprechen) what the author wanted to say to his audience.[40] The exegete, in this account of exegesis, is only involved insofar as it is necessary to repeat in his own words what the author meant to say to the original audience.[41] To do more than a repetition (nachsprechen) would be to cross the line into theology which concerns itself with what the text says to me today or to my audience.[42] The exegete need not necessarily be a theologian.[43]

A distinction might also be made between exegesis and history, as history is viewed as an attempt to go behind the text to establish what really happened in the life of Jesus. For Marxsen the exegesis of Mark excludes "from the outset. . .what really happened" as the subject matter for its investigation.[44] In this way he makes clear his polemic against the form critical school which had sought to isolate the earliest reliable synoptic material as the basis for a reconstruction of the historical Jesus.

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[40] Ibid. [41] Ibid. [42] Ibid. [43] Ibid.

This is not to deny that Marxsen relies on form critical judgments. He often cites Bultmann's History of the Synoptic Tradition to support his claims that many of the instances of Galilee are indeed not the product of the given tradition, instead the results of the redactor's concerns.[45] He also appeals to textual criticism to support judgments. When in 1:27-28 the people react to Jesus' exorcism of the unclean spirits, the narrative ends with the expression that "his fame spread throughout all the surrounding region of Galilee."[46] This is a redaction, concludes Marxsen. He not only cites form critical conclusions but also the text critical apparatus that notes several copyists' attemps to correct this "obvious error."[47] They apparently felt that Jesus' fame must have spread beyond Galilee. The copyists' attempt to correct the "error" underscores its Markan authenticity.[48] Thus, Marxsen deconstructs the given text of Mark by way of form and textual criticism and assumes that such deconstruction of the text will allow a reconstruction of the redactor's choices and, therefore, a discernment of his intention. This deconstruction and reconstruction of the text requires the interpreter to read the mind of the author. Each judgment regarding the redactor's choices implies such mind reading. For this reason, this model might best be understood as the mind reading model. The theoretical discussion intensifies this identification.

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[44] Marxsen, Evangelist, p. 23.

[45] Ibid., pp. 58, 68, 73, 76, 91.

[46] Ibid., p. 60. [47] Ibid. [48] Ibid., pp. 60-61.

Marxsen is nonetheless consistent in his use of textual and form critical analysis in that he seeks to ascertain the redactor's intention rather than the historical veracity of the claims. Whether Jesus' fame spread beyond Galilee is tertiary to the conclusion that the redactor wished his audience to believe it was limited to Galilee. He of course does not deny the place of searches for the historical Jesus and indeed presumes that such searches are necessary and possibly successful.[49] The task of the exegete is more concerned with Mark's kerygmatic aim than his historical veracity. There is "behind Galilee" something "more than meets the eye": namely, the redactor/preacher's kerygmatic motives.[50] Galilee may have been the location of many of the actions and words of Jesus' early ministry, but the frequency of Galilee in Mark is its "special significance for Mark."[51] The task of exegesis is not a search behind the text for the original historical material or for what really happened. Rather the exegete draws our attention to what is repetitive and presumably significant to the redactor. Therefore, the exegete repeats what the author says happened and, in accordance with the second focus of Marxsen's preacher/community analogy, establishes the "situation of the community in which the Gospel arose."[52]

Marxsen criticizes Bultmann's move from an analysis of the "Jesus" as represented in the Church's earliest formal expression of faith to the Jesus of history. He argues that Bultmann in earlier years always noted by quotation marks the difference between the earliest "Jesus" of the Church and the Jesus of history, but later in the New Testament Theology dropped this notation.[53] Furthermore, form criticism, no matter how early the forms might be, can only call upon expressions of the early Church.[54] The historical foundations lie before the earliest documentation of I Thessalonians, beyond the earliest community expression, and out of reach of the historian or exegete.[55] Therefore, though the question of the historical Jesus is important theologically and historically, it cannot be the subject matter of the exegete. The exegete is concerned at all times to isolate what is peculiar to the Gospel by discerning the author's intention and what is typical in the community. The latter is discerned within the author's intention in the author's understanding of that community.

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[49] Ibid., p. 24.

[50] Ibid., p. 59.

[51] Ibid., p. 60.

[52] Ibid., p. 24.

## Summary on Marxsen's Position

In summary, Marxsen's approach to Mark has three moments. First, he searches "back behind Mark and separate[s] tradition from redaction."[56] Second, he seeks "by way of construction, [to] illumine and explain his [the evangelist's] composition."[57] Finally, he "include[s] the major gospels in [his] investigation and pay[s] special attention to their (altered) points of view . . ."[58] He unifies Mark by an appeal to the implied author's intention, based on the analogy of the preacher/community. The major historical reference is to this authorial intention.

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[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid., p. 26.

[56] Ibid., p. 28.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

In unifying Mark in this manner, Marxsen also explains the sense of verisimilitude as a product of the author's kerygmatic motive. Searches "behind the text" to the historical events are rejected for an inquiry into the author's intention. The quest, however, cannot be appropriately described as a search "behind the text," since only the implied author is meant when "author" is used by Marxsen in his discussion of Mark. Authorial intention in Mark, for Marxsen, is nothing more than those arguments that unify the text and that can be used to extrapolate the "typical" in a community that might have read the text. Whether this limited sense of authorial intention only applies to Mark because of its historical distance and our lack of knowledge about the author, or whether this is an example of all texts interpreted from this perspective is the subject of the next section.

What follows is a discussion of E. D. Hirsch's defense of the traditional claim that in principle authorial intention is the determinative and sufficient norm of textual interpretation.

## E. D. Hirsch, Jr.: In Defense of the Author

E. D. Hirsch's "defense of the author" has two major interrelated parts: (1) his argument in support of a rigorous separation between meaning and significance and (2) his discussion of reference and authorial intention. He is above all concerned with providing stability in textual meaning in the face of the contemporary flux regarding textual meaning. To support his claims of stability in textual meaning, he argues that there is "no objectivity [of interpretation] unless meaning itself is unchanging."[59] Objectivity and stability are intimately related in textual meaning. They both depend upon the location of the stable norm for interpretation: the author's consciousness. Hirsch asserts, "meaning is an affair of consciousness not of words";[60] that, indeed, words themselves have no meaning without the presupposition of the author's consciousness.[61] As the next section makes clear, the former claim directly relates to Hirsch's major hermeneutical distinction between textual meaning and significance. The latter claim relates to his theory of authorial intention which is the major interest of this inquiry and the subject of the second of the two discussions within this section on Hirsch. But in order to understand his defense of the author, his distinction between meaning and significance must be developed.

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[59] E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale

## Meaning and Significance

Meaning, for Hirsch, refers to meaning "in-itself" versus "significance for others."

> Meaning is the determinate representation of a text for an interpreter [while] significance is meaning-as-related-to-something-else . . . Thus, while meaning is a principle of stability in an interpretation, significance embraces a principle of change.[62]

This distinction between meaning and significance has a certain tidiness to it. This is the sort of orderliness characteristic of Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana which begins with a very similar distinction.

> There are two things necessary to the treatment of the Scriptures: a way of discovering (inveniendi) those

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University Press, 1967), p. 214; hereafter, Validity.

[60] Ibid., p. 4.

[61] Ibid.

[62] E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Aims of Interpretation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), hereafter, Aims.

> things which are to be understood (intelligenda), and a way of teaching what we have learned.[63]

Augustine's two moments of interpretation, understanding and teaching, bear more than a passing resemblance to Hirsch's meaning and significance. The bishop's reasoning is easy to follow: surely you cannot teach something unless, of course, you know what it is you are going to teach. Likewise, Hirsch might say, you cannot say of what significance a text is, either to an audience contemporary to the author or to the interpreter, unless one has a stable meaning to apply to the particular situation. One can--indeed, for Hirsch, one must--think upon both the meaning and significance simultaneously. Therefore, one must have explication [explicandi] as a logical pre-condition of application [applitio]. Hirsch, unlike his ancient counterpart in hermeneutical theory, is far more sanguine about the stability of the knowledge gained in the discovery of understanding. Then, too, his argument is far more complicated than Augustine's.

Hirsch claims to derive his distinction between meaning and significance from Frege's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.[64] Within the term Sinn, what Hirsch translates oddly enough as "meaning," are two constructive tasks of the interpreter: understanding (subtilitas intelligendi) and interpretation (subtilitas explicandi).[65] Understanding is the construction of meaning in the author's own words, while interpretation is the explanation of the text in the interpreter's words. Both understanding and interpretation have as their object the *Sinn*, the meaning of the text. To draw a parallel to the earlier discussion of Marxsen, Marxsen's concept of repetition (*nachsprechen*) is quite close to Hirsch's concept of the first constructive task of meaning: understanding. Interpretation, for Hirsch, serves a double purpose in that it also bridges the gap between meaning (*Sinn*) and significance (*Bedeutung*). In Marxsen's language this distinction is between exegesis and theology. Interpretation leads to judgment which leads to criticism, both of which are significant in that they apply the meaning to "something."[66] (See Figure 4.)

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[63] Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, I,I,i. Rhetorical discovery for Augustine did not encompass the same sense of stability and 'scientific' certainty that Hirsch seeks, for apparently the bishop of Hippo had a greater sense of flux and degrees of certainty in interpretation than Hirsch's language sometimes suggests.

[64] Hirsch, Validity, p. 211.

[65] Ibid., p. 129.

| *Hirsch* | | *Marxsen* |
|---|---|---|
| MEANING (*Sinn*)<br>of the text itself | understanding<br>(*subtilitas intelligendi*) | EXEGESIS<br>repetition<br>(nachsprechen) |
| | interpretation<br>(*subtilitas explicandi*) | |
| SIGNIFICANCE<br>(*Bedeutung*)<br>to-something-else | judgment<br>criticism | THEOLOGY |

Figure 4.--Hirsch/Marxsen Compared

Hirsch contrasts this distinction between meaning and significance, including the four separate procedures within the terms of the distinction, with Heidegger's hermeneutical circle.[67] In order to stabilize meaning in texts, Hirsch is convinced he must break the hermeneutical circle by establishing the author's intention as the locus of determinative and normative meaning. These four procedures are meant to be a way of breaking the hermeneutical circle. Hirsch claims to break the hermeneutical circle with an argument which contains two major moments. He carries on the explication of his distinction between meaning and significance on three levels which might be roughtly equivalent to the level of words, sentences, and texts. What follows is a discussion of the distinction between meaning and significance on the level of words; this is the first major moment of his argument. The second moment takes place on the level of texts.

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[66] Ibid., p. 143.

[67] Hirsch, *Aims*, pp. 4-6. Heidegger, his student Hans-Georg Gadamer, along with Derrida, Foucault, and others represent what Hirsch calls 'cognitive atheism', and 'dogmatic revelativism'. Heidegger's analysis of the hermeneutical circle of *Dasein* in the first half of *Sein*

In an essay on the question of "Stylistics and Synonymity"[68] Hirsch most clearly makes his argument regarding the distinction between meaning and significance at the level of words. He accurately observes that "synonymity is the mortal enemy of linguistic determinism, which holds that the form of language necessarily constitutes the form of thought. That cannot be so if synonymity occurs, since differences in form obviously do not in synonymous instances compel differences in thought."[69] As in his Validity in Interpretation in Aims of Inter-

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und Zeit (Being and Time, p. 194; Sein und Zeit, p. 152.) is rejected on two counts: it is not an accurate metaphysical description, and even if it were, it would not have any application to the epistemological consideration at hand in the principles of general hermeneutics (Aims, pp. 81-85). Gadamer's focusing on this hermeneutical circle in the context of historical knowledge, what Hirsch calls "radical historicism," "lent intellectual respectability to a prevalent and popular form of historical self-consciousness which had already created an atmosphere of skepticism regarding the genuine knowability of past cultures"; Validity, p. 41.

[68] Hirsch, Aims, pp. 50-73.

[69] Ibid., pp. 51-52.

pretation he quotes, as the *locus classicus* (outside Plato's *Cratylus*) for the debate over the essential indeterminacy of the relationship between meaning and form, "the conversation between Humpty Dumpty and Alice in *Through the Looking Glass*."[70] Hirsch, of course, sides with Humpty Dumpty, since, in accordance with his second principle, meaning is a matter of consciousness, not words.

> "You're holding it upside down!" Alice interrupted.
>
> "To be sure I was!" Humpty Dumpty said gaily, as she turned it round for him. "I thought it looked a little queer. As I was saying, that *seems* to be done right--though I haven't time to look it over thoroughly just now--and that shows that there are three hundred and sixty-four days when you might get un-birthday presents--"
>
> "Certainly," said Alice.
>
> "And only *one* for birthday presents, you know. There's glory for you!"
>
> "I don't know what you mean by 'glory'," Alice said.
>
> Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't--till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you!"
>
> "But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument'," Alice objected.
>
> "When *I* use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean--neither more nor less."
>
> "The question is," said Alice, "whether you *can* make words mean different things."
>
> "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master--that's all."
>
> Alice was too much puzzled to say anything, so after a minute Humpty Dumpty began again. "They've a temper, some of them--particularly verbs, they're the proudest--adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs--however, *I* can manage the whole lot! Impenetrability! That's what *I* say!"
>
> "Would you tell me, please," said Alice, "what that means?"
>
> "Now you talk like a reasonable child," said Humpty Dumpty, looking very much pleased. "I meant by 'impenetrability' that we've had enough of that subject, and it would be just as well if you'd mention what you mean to do next, as I suppose you don't intend to stop here all the rest of your life."

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[70] Lewis Carroll, *Alice Through the Looking Glass* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967), chap. 6, pp. 213-14.

> "That's a great deal to make one word mean," Alice said in a thoughtful tone.
>
> "When I make a word do a lot of work like that," said Humpty Dumpty, "I always pay it extra."[71]

Hirsch, by this quotation, wishes to break the relationship between meaning and form. Humpty Dumpty can mean whatever he chooses with his word "impenetrability." Its form does not establish its meaning. To illustrate his argument at this level of words Hirsch speaks of the synonymity of "bachelors" and "unmarried men." He makes his argument by appealing to an experiment that contrasts the isolated word pair, "bachelors" and "unmarried men" with the same word in a paragraph. He qualifies Humpty Dumpty's generalization that form does not establish meaning by observing the wide variations of meaning these two word pairs can have, even though under certain circumstances they can be synonymous. He concludes:

> [T]he different isolated expressions possess different ranges of *probable* [author's emphasis] meanings in use. The decisive semantic distinctions of words presented in isolation are their different meaning-probabilities. . . . *We intuit these different semantic probabilities from our past linguistic experience, and when we encounter the words in isolation, we position their most usual past meaning as their normal meaning-in-isolation. On the other hand, when we encounter these in actual use, their semantic probabilities, and accordingly, our meaning expectation, may shift rather far from this norm*[72] [author's emphasis].

Words do, indeed, have a surplus of meaning. The inferences drawn from the experiment on this level are both instructive and somewhat convincing. Words can only be synonymous when placed into a context where they are equated. The key ingredient is the new context. However, to conclude that the context is crucial for establishing the meaning of a word presents problems for Hirsch and his explication of the principle of meaning and significance on the level of the text. The essay on synonymity succeeds in setting the predecence of extensive change in word meaning rather than creating Hirsch's desired stability. Hirsch's conclusion that words have a very large set of possible meanings is a double-edged sword. Apparently the principle of variable possibilities of meaning on the level of words cannot be transferred to the level of text. Hirsch, however, never makes this argument. Since he does not make this argument, he must break the hermeneutical circle between words and context by an appeal to some external norm or anchor other than the context of the text. Furthermore, since he continuously bases his argument on the level of the text by analogy to particular sentences, it would be at best inconsistent for him to deny the possibility of applying his principle of variable possibilities of meaning on the level of words to the level of the text. For this reason, he must appeal to an external principle or anchor to maintain his distinction between meaning and significance and the more important possibility of stable and scientific knowledge in the humanities. As Humpty Dumpty says, the question of meaning and stability is, "which is to be master--that's all." Though apparently aware that the master need not be the author, Hirsch, nonetheless follows his second principle clarified by his use of Humpty Dumpty, and argues that meaning is a matter of consciousness and not a matter of words. And it is the author's consciousness that is the crucial factor of context and establishes the "use" and "meaning" of words. In short, the author's intention is master.

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[71] Ibid.

[72] Hirsch, *Aims*, pp. 50-73. What in ordinary discourse one calls their "significance."

## Authorial Intention

> An interpreter, like any other person, falls under the basic moral imperative of speech, which is to respect an author's intention.[73]

Hirsch ends the first half of Aims with this reiteration of his "defense of the author," the title of his first chapter in Validity. His argument is at once straightforward in its purpose and complex in its execution. In order to stabilize meaning in texts, Hirsch is convinced he must break the hermeneutical circle by establishing the author's intention as the locus of determinative and normative meaning. The interpreter determines the meaning of any text, in contrast to its many significances, by determining what the author intended his words to mean. Meaning is a matter of consciousness, not words. The text does not mean, the author means. This is straightforward.

In appealing to authorial intention, Hirsch knowingly locates himself in the Romantic tradition of general hermeneutics, especially that of Schleiermacher and Dilthey.[74] Unlike Schleiermacher and Dilthey, however, whose hermeneutical model was one in which one speaker's intended meaning is transferred into words and "divined" by the other conversant, Hirsch has stepped back from the psychologistic model of interpretation. He hopes to avoid the double threat of psychologism: first, the searching in the consciousness of the biographical author to reproduce an intention, and second, the relativism of radical historicism, or the creation of historical reconstructions on the basis of present values. By appealing to Husserl's phenomenological analysis of intentionality, he hopes thereby to show that the text has only one meaning, the author's intended meaning. In a footnote to his appendix, "Objective Interpretation," Hirsch attempts to distance himself further from a fishing expedition in the territory of the author's pre-linguistic consciousness by suggesting that what he means by "author's intention" is different from the phenomenologists' description of the activity of consciousness.[75] He attempts to extricate himself from psychologism by suggesting that the author who is the concern of the literary interpreter is not the "biographical person," but a linguistic construct, the "speaking subject."[76] This is relatively equivalent to the category referred to as the implied author in this inquiry.

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[73] Hirsch, Aims, p. 92.

[74] Cf. Prologue One.

The intention of the "speaking subject" is the normative principle of "the presentation of meaning for an interpreter." Two questions, related though distinguishable, must now be addressed. First, what practical difference, in light of our discussion of Marxsen, does this make in the interpretive process? Second, what difference in principle does this make in a general theory of interpretation? In response to the first, Hirsch admits in Validity that the understanding of the text (the meaning in the words of the author) remains hidden in any commentary of the text, since it is the interpretation of the text (the meaning in the interpreter's words) that is of primary concern to the interpreter. Further, in the opening description of his distinction between meaning and significance, he underscores the fact that they are intimately related in the interpretive process.[77] Meaning is not determined first, and then, significance; but, in point of fact, the interpreter may find the meaning of the text through various discoveries of significance drawn from previous readings of the text. Therefore, the priority of meaning over significance is primarily logical priority, since Hirsch allows no practical priority in his argument.

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[75] Hirsch, Validity, p. 218.

[76] Ibid., pp. 242, 244.

[77] Ibid., pp. 134-35.

Marxsen's fluctuation, for example, between the possible significance of Galilee as a theological motif and the structure of authorial intention in the Markan text is a perfect example of this practical relationship between meaning and significance. Indeed, one does not have to look very hard to find two levels of the interplay of meaning and significance in Marxsen's interpretation of Mark. First, Marxsen moves back and forth between the meaning of the text in the pre-Markan tradition and its significance in the "mind" of the redactor. Second, he articulates the interplay between the meaning for the redactor and the significance for the early Markan community. One is further tempted to move onto another level by suggesting the same interplay between the meaning of the text and any subsequent contexts that establish further significance for the text. In this way significance begins to live up to its role as a principle of change. In no way, therefore, can Hirsch claim a practical priority of meaning over significance in the interpretive process.

This latter admission only raises the importance of the second question as to the significance in principle of his appeal to the "speaking subject" in a general theory of hermeneutics. How, for example, can one distinguish between the intention of the "speaking subject" and the actual realization in the text? For example, since Marxsen can only appeal to the implied author of Mark with no other means of access to the "consciousness of Mark," then what one sees as the implied author's realized intention is all you can possibly hope to know. Is the interpreter able to ascertain the success of an intention on the part of the "speaking subject" only after determining the intention from the meaning? Can not what the "speaking subject" intends be synonymous only with what the text yields upon interpretation? Furthermore, if one cannot make a distinction between the meaning and any failure to realize the author's intention, then Hirsch's attempt to stabilize meaning by appealing to the intention of the "speaking subject" has failed.

In Validity, Hirsch attempts to clarify the difference between intention and meaning by distinguishing between intrinsic genre and meaning. Verbal meaning is genre bound, argues Hirsch, and as an interpreter reads a text, certain traits give clues to the genre of the text.[78] Each clue gives the interpreter more data to establish the genre of the text.[79] The ability of the "speaking subject" to give appropriate clues to the interpreter is the socializing of expectation that underlies the possibility of genres.[80] In Marxsen's case the subtle shifting of genre distinctions figures centrally in his discussion of the major differences between Mark's kerygmatic interest (the "untied knot"), Luke's biographical interest and Matthew's untying the Markan kerygmatic knots. Inaccurate guesses at genre in Hirsch's terminology are extrinsic genres;[81] appropriate guesses, intrinsic genre. "Consequently, types of meaning are always necessarily wedded to types of usage, and this entire, complex system of shared experiences, usage traits, and meaning expectation which the speaker relies on is the generic conception which controls his utterances."[82] Marxsen follows this pattern by his establishing the preacher/community analogy as the principle of commonality between contemporary expectations and those of Mark's time.

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[78] Ibid., p. 76.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid., p. 80.

[81] Ibid., pp. 88-89.

This argument, however, seems weak. Hirsch shares the same opinion at this juncture of his argument, when he admits that "if we cannot preserve a distinction between the particular type (Hirsch's emphasis) of meaning expressed and the particular meaning itself, then the intrinsic genre becomes simply the meaning as a whole."[83] If every text has an intrinsic genre unique to itself, then a distinction between an intrinsic genre and the meaning of the text will not hold. Nothing but confusion is achieved by calling a particular meaning a "genre."[84] He wishes, therefore, to demonstrate that "there are fewer intrinsic genres than there are particular meanings [and that this, in turn] reveals the distinction between genre and meaning and lays the foundation for a precise and stable definition of an intrinsic genre."[85]

He appeals to the "temporality of speech," as an "essential condition for distinguishing an intrinsic genre from the meaning that governs it."[86] Here his treatment follows the lines of his argument on synonymity in Aims. One has a sense of the whole, the intrinsic genre, which would not be significantly changed by minor variations in the text that one has not yet read; that is, one can accurately establish the intrinsic genre of the text long before one has read the entire text and achieved understanding of the meaning of the text. "We can understand the earlier parts of an utterance before we reach the end and, furthermore, that we can understand them in their determinacy (author's emphasis) as meanings functioning in a particular way."[87] Therefore, Hirsch concludes that an "intrinsic genre is that sense of the whole by means of which an interpreter can correctly understand any part in its determinacy."[88]

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[82] Ibid., p. 80.

[83] Ibid., p. 81.

[84] Ibid., p. 81.

[85] Ibid., p. 82.

[86] Ibid., p. 83.

The success of Hirsch's search for stability depends heavily upon the concept of intrinsic genre. An analogy can be used to describe the situation: I have in mind the image of a spider's web with abundant room for internal movement but clearly defined external boundary lines. The intrinsic genre is like this web, if the stability of this structure proves either too protean or too weak to sustain Hirsch's claims for it, his argument fails or suffers considerable qualification. A pattern of decisive qualification has been established.

Let us note that what had taken place on the level of the word under the discussion of synonymity now has taken place on the level of text in the discussion of intrinsic genre. In this case, however, the escape clause, by grounding the argument in the author's intention, has been so qualified by the notion "speaking subject" that we are left with a circular argument. At this point, the realized intention of the "speaking subject" is identical with the intrinsic genre, and Hirsch admits it. To extricate himself from circularity and support his distinction between intrinsic genre and the meaning of the text, Hirsch depends upon another distinction. In this instance, he distinguishes two senses of the word context:

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[87] Ibid., p. 85.

[88] Ibid., p. 86.

> . . . the word "context" embraces and unifies two quite different realms. It signifies, on the one hand, the givens that accompany the text's meaning and, on the other, the constructions that are part of the text's meaning.[89]

By making this distinction, Hirsch incorporates within his discussion of intrinsic genre the "givens" of possible interpretation. The various conventions, traditions, language, and general milieu of the "speaking subject" are necessary givens in any interpretation of a text. They are, however, not within the meaning of the utterance; they are not constitutive of it in the way that "purposes, conventions, and relationship to the audience are."[90] By "context" Hirsch means, therefore, "a construed notion of the whole meaning narrow enough to determine the meaning of a part," and, at the same time, he uses the word "to signify those givens in the milieu which will help us to conceive the right notion of the whole."[91] In this way, he is able to conclude that "the essential component of a context is the intrinsic genre of the utterance. Everything else in the context serves merely as a clue to the intrinsic genre and has in itself no coercive power to codetermine partial meanings."[92] Furthermore, one of the main tasks of interpretation can be summarized as "the critical rejection of extrinsic genres in the search for the intrinsic genre of a text."[93] In other words, interpretation is primarily the search for stability by rejecting change.

In short, Hirsch with his theory of intrinsic genre is able to falsify possible subsequent construals of the text in a particular context by showing that they are incompatible with the intrinsic genre and, therefore, the meaning of the text. To claim as he does in Aims that this allows for a verification principle, or determinacy in terms of a positive stable sense of meaning, is then to claim far more than his argument will sustain. A principle of falsification is not a principle of verification. On the other hand, the title of his earlier book, Validity in Interpretation, was closer to the case. His notion of intrinsic genre and substantially qualified principle of authorial intention can establish valid interpretation; that is, interpretations that are coherent within themselves, but do not claim to provide determinacy and principles of verification. The concept of intrinsic genre, and the principle of authorial intention support a now considerably weakened claim for Hirsch's distinction between meaning and significance. Indeed, the constituent context, determined only by a principle of falsification, can determine what the text cannot mean. Just as the words "bachelor" and "unmarried men," when isolated, represent a more determinate non-synonymous meaning than they can have under certain contextual situations, so the meaning of the text has various possible variations within its intrinsic genre. However, when we encounter an intrinsic genre in actual use--to draw a new meaning from Hirsch by quoting him in a new context--"its meaning probabilities, and accordingly, our meaning expectation, may shift rather far from these initial norms."[94]

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[89] Ibid., p. 87.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid., pp. 87-88.

[93] Ibid., p. 89.

## Summary of Theoretical Discussion

Has Hirsch achieved his goal? Has he stabilized meaning or objectified interpretation? Yes, but not to the extent that he sometimes claims. He has demonstrated, contrary to the formalists who polemicize against what they call the "intentional fallacy," that something can be learned by an appeal to authorial intention. Hirsch's conclusions through such an appeal provide limits to the possible meanings of the text. However, Hirsch's, and also Marxsen's, appeal to the author's intention is at most a principle of falsification. One can say more clearly, upon using Hirsch's criteria, what meanings probably will not fit a text than those that will. Hirsch stabilizes meaning by providing the internal validation of a proposed interpretation.

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[94] Hirsch, Aims, p. 62.

The meaning probabilities established by Hirsch's process of validation and falsification may shift considerably. These shifts are due, of course, to the interpreter's varied reading of the two contexts that Hirsch isolates: (1) the givens that accompany the text's meaning and (2) the constructions that are a part of the text's meaning.[95] These two contexts will surely have varied content depending upon the interpreter. The subsequent responses to Marxsen's arguments with respect to Galilee only serve to illustrate the shifts of meaning that take place. These shifts result from changes in historical data and variations in scholarly consensus on either of Hirsch's realms of context. The conclusions of Markan redaction criticism, for example, are by no means stable. To be sure, many New Testament scholars share the same goal of determining the author's meaning; but even this consensus has not produced any stability in interpretations of Mark.

Marxsen's preacher/community model as an example of practical interpretation of Mark illustrates this instability in interpretation. The two contexts that Hirsch isolates are roughly equal to Marxsen's preacher and community concepts. As Marxsen notes he is interested in the "typical" of the community and in the particular of the author. Thus author/community are really like two mirrors: the one reflecting the individual, the peculiar, and the other the community, the typical. Hirsch's context as the givens that accompany the text's meaning is the typical or the community, and his context as the constructions that are a part of the text's meaning are roughly equal to the author.

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[95] Hirsch, Validity, p. 87.

In respect to what this inquiry has called the two poles of the author-oriented interpretive model, Marxsen is more theoretically sophisticated in that he realizes these two poles (author/community) are much like two mirrors reflecting back and forth on one another. Author/audience criticism participates, then, in a dialectical relationship. Depending upon what the reader sees as the givens that accompany the text's meaning, the "typical" community to whom the text is addressed, his reading of the author or the peculiar will change. Therefore, as one's understanding of either of the poles change so does one's construction of the other.

What led Marxsen to argue that "Galilee" is intended by the author as a theological motif? Despite the two source theory that lay behind his method, the same conclusions would be available to the reader who would ignore it. "Galilee" as a theological motif could be readily observed without the two source theory, or form criticism. The textually external methods at best confirm what the interpreter has isolated as particular and peculiar in the text. Marxsen did not seek to find out if the author came from Galilee. He noted a pattern of occurrence of "Galilee" in the text and argued that a theological meaning could be discerned in this pattern. This hypothesis about theological meaning was attributed to the implied author. In other words, the hypothesis regarding "Galilee" says much about Marxsen's discernment of patterns and little about the consciousness of the author. "Galilee" is a pattern of intention discerned primarily from internal textual data. This observation on practical criticism does not question in principle separation of meaning and significance. On the one hand, once Hirsch grants the practical back and forth movement between meaning and significance, the argument in principle becomes less significant. The qualification of his achievement is considerable.

What began as an appeal to reach behind the text to the consciousness of the author has resulted in a move to immanent internal textual interpretation which is dominated by an author/community analogy. To be sure, in order to understand a text at all one assumes as a necessary state of affairs the sense of a willed, conscious intention; however, in practice this willed consciousness of the biographical author becomes the implied author. Likewise, one assumes as a necessary state of affairs, a typical audience or what in practice might by extension be called the implied reader.

To pursue the relationship between these two poles, the implied reader and author, would be to get ahead of ourselves. It is enough to say that the forray behind the text in search of the consciousness of the author has ended in something quite different. In practice author/audience criticism takes place in the mind of the interpreter quite in front of the text.

In this inquiry's theoretical treatment of this perspective, certain major qualifications developed parallel to the practical. Hirsch's attempt to anchor hermeneutics in the consciousness of the biographical author either led him to psychologism, a choice he wisely eschewed, or to this inquiry's position concerning the implied author.

The distinction between meaning and significance could have led to a stylistic approach in which form determined meaning. However, at the level of words, Hirsch provided a convincing argument for the great variance of verbal meaning and the possibility of synonymity. He, however, was left with the dilemma of anchoring meaning, then, in the consciousness of the author. In avoiding psychologism, he turned to the concept of the speaking subject, what this inquiry has called the implied author, and a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic genre. This required some distinction between the particular meaning of a text and the intrinsic genre of the text. This, in turn, led to the distinction between two varieties of contexts--the one the typical and the other the individual--to use the terminology that resulted from our examination of Marxsen.

Finally, Hirsch has raised more questions than he has answered about stability of meaning and interpretation. These questions arise once again in the next chapter and relate to the unresolved issues of this chapter.

## Evaluation of the Model

This model's greatest strength is its appreciation of the relationship between the individual context, the author/redactor and the communal context, the original audience. This refocusing of the interpreter's gaze through the Markan text changes what can be seen behind the text. In the language of the window simile: the interpreter is able to see through the window into the dynamic relationship between the author and the original community.

A second notable strength follows from the first. The interpreter's focus on the dynamic of author/community unifies the text as a whole. The appreciation of the author/redactor's work overcomes the fragmentation of the text that takes place in the first model. Although the first stage of this model engages in the deconstruction of the text, its ultimate goal is the unification of the text.

This model opens another mode of referentiality in Mark. This is its third strength. In the first model, "Galilee" would be reduced to a geographical location. In this model, a dual referential character of "Galilee" can be discerned. "Galilee" is understood as the place of ministry for the author and community. The geographical referent, "Galilee," points to another referent, the place of ministry where the Kingdom of God is at hand, repentance is called for, and the gospel preached. In this way the complexity of referentiality in the Markan historical narrative has grown.

This model shares a fourth strength with the first model. Both lend themselves to the development of a theology based on the discipline of history. This lends credibility to the theological enterprise and creates a community of scholarship within which the interpreter can work. The second model does not negate the search behind the text for the events in the life of Jesus and can, then, serve as a supplement to the first model.

The model's weaknesses have been discussed in the process of qualifying and clarifying E. D. Hirsch's defense of the model. First, the model intends to create stability in interpretation by appealing to authorial intention. To a significant extent, it fails to do so. In trying to avoid psychologism, it loses much of its claim to have broken the hermeneutical circle which is the source of instability in Hirsch's opinion.

Second, the model can only provide a principle of falsification in the interpretive process. It cannot say what the text means, only what it cannot mean. This weakness alone demands a more positive appropriation of meaning and reference in the interpretation of Markan verisimilitude.

Third, the model is not as publically available as one might like. It requires, like the first model, a substantial amount of historical research and sophistication to understand the conclusions of the interpretations.

Fourth, the model does not sufficiently take into account two other major components in a relatively adequate general hermeneutic: the contemporary reader, the audience, and the deep structural constraints and convictions within the text itself. Both of these components will provide as great a degree of stability in the interpretive process as the appeal to authorial intention has in this model. These models follow the prologue to the second part of the inquiry.

# PROLOGUE PART TWO

## THE LINGUISTIC PARADIGM

The first part of the inquiry presumes the romantic hermeneutic. For Schleiermacher, understanding requires that the interpreter attain to the spirit or genius of the author. Or, as Richard Palmer puts it, "understanding is the art of reconstructing the thinking of another person."[1] Understanding as the ultimate goal of text-interpretation involves a "reconstruction of the mental experience of the text's author."[2]

As in Schleiermacher's case, and also in Dilthey's, this requires a highly "psychologized" notion of the goal of text interpretation. This notion dominates Hirsch's argument for text-interpretation as well. Questions about this hermeneutic were raised in the qualifications of the last chapter. How will this highly psychologized model ever attain the stability it desires? Without the significant qualifications made in the last chapter, stability under the historical paradigm is illusory.

Martin Heidegger's ontology of understanding[3] indicates a way out of the dilemma encountered under the first paradigm. He proposed a depsychologizing of the notion of understanding. Heidegger, having read Nietzsche, was no longer as confident as Dilthey was of the possibility of reaching the intimate psychic life of another. On the contrary, this is precisely the area where the problems of the romantic hermeneutic begin.[4] Hence for Heidegger, the ontology of understanding begins not with being-with (others)--Mitsein--but with being-in (the world). According to Heidegger's analysis, Dasein finds itself "thrown" into a situation, and the first function of understanding is to become oriented in that situation. Heidegger, therefore, frees the fundamental notion of comprehension from any psychological connotations which are involved when understanding is conceived primarily as a "communication with the psychic life of another." This conception of understanding was the case with Dilthey.

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[1] Palmer, Hermeneutics, p. 89.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The reference to Heidegger's ontology of understanding indicates the radical shift that takes place within the hermeneutical tradition with Heidegger and Gadamer--a shift from epistemology to ontology. Instead of asking "What is understanding?" and "How does understanding operate in relation to texts?" the new question is: "What is the mode of being that exists only through understanding?" Cf. Ricoeur, Text and Text-Interpretation, p. 11; Ricoeur, "La tâche," p. 190; Palmer, Hermeneutics, pp. 130-32.

On the level of methodology, several important consequences follow from Heidegger's depsychologizing. If understanding is primarily grasping a possibility of being-in-the-world, it would follow that to understand a text one should seek out the novel way of being-in-the-world that the text proposes.

Heidegger has moved the search for textual stability to the level of ontology, whereas Dilthey had developed the problem on the level of epistemology. Paul Ricoeur notes that Heidegger, having elucidated the ontological ground, fails to return to the epistemological/methodological level. Indeed, he is unable to return.[5]

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[4] Ricoeur, "La tâche," p. 192.

[5] Ibid., p. 191.

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Ricoeur's project, however, is precisely to take up again the epistemological and methodological questions which Heidegger and Gadamer abandon in favor of ontology. He takes the "long way" to a depsychologized text-interpretation theory.[6] Ricoeur investigates the implications of the Heideggerian ontology of understanding for the romantic hermeneutical theory. Ricoeur's interpretation theory takes the shape of four distinct moves which seek to lay the foundation for a "philosophy of integral language." First, Ricoeur develops a theory of discourse which is based on a dialectical concept of discourse. Second, he reflects on "the amplitude of the changes that affect discourse when it is no longer spoken, but written," and he develops a theory of the text by applying the dialectics of his theory of discourse to the problem of writing. Third, Ricoeur provides an extension of "the field of the theory of interpretation" by incorporating "the surplus of meaning of metaphors into the domain of semantics." This move enables a transition to the fourth moment in which he is concerned with the "apparent conflict between explanation and understanding" and its resolution in appropriation.[7] This prologue will sketch this investigation as the basis for the development of the second part of the inquiry. It is greatly indebted to the work of Robert E. C. Johnston.[8]

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[6] Ricoeur, "Existence," p. 10.

[7] Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), pp. vii, xi, 45; I am indebted to several interpreters of Ricoeur's interpretation theory, especially Robert E. C. Johnston, David Pellauer, and H. W. Vestermark, Jr.

[8] Johnston, "Author-Oriented," p. 19; although I develop the third model by using Gadamer, it is a Gadamer significantly qualified by the positive concept of distanciation proposed in this prologue. Gadamer's conception of distanciation is wholly negative; he refers to it as

## Ricoeur on Text and Textual Meaning

For Ricoeur, a text can be defined briefly as a written work of discourse, or, phrased somewhat differently, "discourse written in the form of a work,"[9] or again "discourse both. . .inscribed and wrought."[10] In order to understand this definition, the notions of "discourse," "writing," and "work" will be clarified. The science of linguistics greatly inform this discussion and underscores the linguistic character of the paradigm for the second part of the inquiry.

The depsychologization will take place under successive distanciations which these categories of "discourse," "writing," and "work" imply. This succession will lead to the distanciation of the world of the text from the world of the author and the original reader. The two models explored under this paradigm, then, are two possible ways of relating meaning and reference under this paradigm. As a result, two significantly different explanations of Markan verisimilitude will be given.

### Text as Discourse: The First Move

"The source of the notion of text is 'discourse'."[11] The notion

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alienating distanciation (Verfremdung) and collapses the interpretive process into a "participation in," and a "dependence on" or "belonging to" tradition (Abhängigkeit, Zugehörigkeit), which appears in his work, particularly in his magnum opus, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen: Mohr, 1960$^{1}$, 1965$^{2}$, 1973$^{3}$). English trans. of second German ed.: Truth and Method, ed. G. Barden and J. Cumming (London: Sheed & Ward, 1973), hereafter: Truth and Method.

[9] Paul Ricoeur, "Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theological Hermeneutics," Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses, 5 (1975-76):21; hereafter, "Philosophical Hermeneutics."

[10] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 33.

[11] Paul Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics," Semeia 4 (1975):66; hereafter, "Biblical Hermeneutics."

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of language as discourse is opposed to the notion of language as langue.[12] Ricoeur is dependent upon the French linguist and Sanskritist Emile Benveniste who, Ricoeur holds, has gone furthest in pointing to the essential and radical differences between discourse and langue.[13]

For Ricoeur the distinction between langue and discourse is crucial.[14] Whereas the smallest unit of langue is the sign (phonological, lexical or syntactic), the smallest unit of discourse is the sentence. At the level of langue, language says nothing; signs refer simply to other signs within the system.[15] Elsewhere Ricoeur specifies further:

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[12] Since the one English word, "language" translates both "langue" and "langage," I shall, in an attempt to avoid ambiguity, retain the French "langue" when referring to language as a system: the object of the linguistics of langue; we shall use "language" solely as the English equivalent of the French "langage."

[13] Emil Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale, I (Paris: Gallimard, 1966); Riceour, "La distanciation," p. 203; "Model," p. 92.

[14] Paul Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation," Philosophy Today, 17 (1973): 129-41; esp. 130-31; hereafter, "Distanciation"; cf. Ricoeur, "La distanciation," p. 203; note that Riceour follows Benveniste in opposing langue to discours rather than to parole as Saussure did. His main reason for this is as follows: "My substitution of the term 'discourse' for that of 'parole' (which expresses only the residual aspect of a science of langue) is intended not only to emphasize the specificity of this new unit (the sentence) on which all discourse relies, but also to legitimate the distinction between semiotics and semantics as the two sciences which correspond to the two kinds of units characteristic of language, the sign and the sentence," Interpretation Theory, p. 7; cf. Saussure's assertion: "La langue est pour nous le langage moins la parole," F. de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, p. 112.

[15] This is clear from Saussure's definition of a sign: the basic unity of langue. As Ricoeur puts it, "Instead of being defined by the external relation between a sign and a thing, a relation that would make linguistics dependent upon a theory of extra-linguistic entities, the sign is defined by an opposition between two aspects, which both fall within the circumspection of a unique science, that of signs. These two aspects are the signifier (signifiant), for example, a sound, a written pattern, a gesture, or any physical medium, and the signified (signifié), the differential value in the lexical system." Riceour, Interpretation Theory, p. 6, cf. Saussure's definition of sign as "la combinaison du concept et de l'image acoustique," in Cours, p. 164.

> Only the sentence level allows us to distinguish what is said and about what it is said. In the system of language [langue] say as a lexicon, there is no problem of reference, signs only refer to other signs within the system. With the sentence, however, language is directed beyond itself.[16]

This fundamental distinction between langue and discourse calls for two different kinds of linguistics: a linguistics of langue (Semiotics or Semiology)[17] and a linguistics of discourse (Semantics).[18] The former concerns itself with units of language (langue) below the level of the sentence (e.g., phonological and lexical signs), and the latter devotes itself to units of language (discourse) at and above the level of complexity of the sentence (e.g., poems, narratives, taxis).[19]

This radical disjunction between langue and discourse suggests that only in discourse does the capacity of language to say something about something take place. This is the predicative act, and it is the distinctive feature of the sentence.[20] Predication Ricoeur (following Benveniste) observes, "is the only indispensable factor of the sentence,"[21] and involves the application of some "universal" feature to a logical subject.[22] The "objective correlate" of the predicative act is "what logicians call the proposition."[23] The proposition, therefore, constitutes what is said in the sentence.[24]

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[16] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 20.

[17] Ricoeur uses the terms "semiology"/"semiotics" and "semantic" in a manner borrowed from Benveniste: "semantics" referring to the domain "ou la phrase est le portuer de la signification complete minimale" and "semiology"/"semiotics" where "le mot est un signe dans le code lexical," Ricoeur, La métaphore vive (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1975), p. 8; hereafter, Metaphore; cf. E. Benveniste, Problemes, II (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), pp. 215-38, especially Ricoeur's comments and Benveniste's reply, pp. 236-38.

[18] Although a word is obviously a unity of language smaller than the sentence, it is not as such a unity of langue. As Ricoeur points out: "The unity of speech [discourse] is the sentence. Words are signs in sentence-position. And words are the meeting-point of the semiological and the semantic in each occurrence of speech. Signs appear as words only in an act of speech [discourse] or, better, in a communication episode." Ricoeur, "New Developments in Phenomenology in France: The Phenomenology of Language," Social Research 34 (1967): 22-23; hereafter, "New Developments." Elsewhere Ricoeur writes: "Words belong to the linguistics of the sign. They are semantic entities not semiotic entities...Of course words are based on lexical entities which are undoubtedly semiotic things. But a lexical entity is not yet a word. It is only the possibility of a word," Ricoeur, "Creativity in Language: Word, Polysemy, Metaphor," Philosophy Today, 17 (1973): 97-111, esp. p. 100; hereafter, "Creativity."

[19] Ricoeur, "La distanciation," p. 203.

More is said by a sentence than the propositional content. The meaning of the sentence is not only the locutionary act (the proposition as such), but also in decreasing order, the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act, insofar as these are rooted in grammatical paradigms[25] which permit identification and reidentification of the total meaning of what is said. It is the perlocutionary act that is least expressed in grammatical paradigms and hence is the least inscribable or "fixable" aspect of the meaning of discourse. However, as Ricoeur points out: "L'action perlocutionnaire est precisement ce qui, dans le discours est le moins discours. C'est le discours comme stimulus."[26] In other words, the perlocutionary act is not so much concerned with "saying something about something to someone" as with acting as a kind of stimulus upon the hearer.

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[20] Ricoeur, Metaphore, p. 273.

[21] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 10. In "Creativity" Ricoeur points out: "The sentence, of course, may be reduced to its predicate. Then we have a one word sentence as in the imperative, but it is a sentence nevertheless in as much as it is a predicate," p. 99; cf. also Ricoeur, "La metaphore et le probleme central de l'hermeneutique," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 70 (1972): 93-112; esp. 96-99; hereafter, "le problème central."

[22] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, pp. 10-11; for this elucidation of the predicative act and what it involves Ricoeur is largely dependent upon Stawson; cf. Saussure, Cours, p. 16.

[23] Ricoeur, "Philosophical Hermeneutics," p. 17.

[24] Ricoeur, "La distanciation," p. 205; cf. "This fundamental polarity between singular identification and universal predication [in a sentence] gives a specific content to the notion of the proposition conceived of as the object of the speech event. It shows that discourse is not merely a vanishing event, and as such an irrational entity, as the simple opposition between parole and langue might suggest." Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 11.

[25] e.g., for the illocutionary act: indicative, imperative, and subjunctive moods.

Two principal features summarize the distinction between discourse and langue up to this point: First, discourse is an actualization of langue: it is an event. It is an event that must at least take the form of a sentence, so that the language is able to say something; it is a bearer of signification or meaning. Thus, "the dialectic between the utterer's utterance and the utterance's meaning," results.[27] The event of speaking, then, is surpassed in the meaning of what is said.[28] A person may say something now, and langue becomes actualized in discourse. But the event is over as soon as the person has finished speaking. As Ricoeur points out elsewhere:

> An act of discourse is not merely transitory and vanishing . . . It may be identified and reidentified as the same so that we may say it again or in other words. We may even say it in another language or translate it from one language to another. Through all these transformations it preserves an identity of its own which can be called its propositional content, the 'said as such'.[29]

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[26] Ricoeur, "La distanciation," p. 206.

[27] Ricoeur, "Philosophical Hermeneutics," p. 18; cf. Interpretation Theory, pp. 12-14.

[28] Ricoeur, "La distanciation," p. 204; cf. Saussure, Cours, p. 34.

[29] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 9; note that the "said as

All this, as we have already seen, is rooted in the propositional structure of the sentence, the unit of discourse.

This dialectic of fleeting event and identifiable (and reidentifiable) meaning[30] is foundational to distanciation which is characteristic of all discourse. "What is said is already at a distance from the event of saying."[31] The event surpasses itself in the meaning. Moreover, it is this dialectic of event and meaning that makes fixation in writing possible. What is fixed in writing is not fleeting event but the enduring and reidentifiable meaning.[32]

Discourse is an event, while langue is an atemporal, virtual system. Discourse says something about something since it has a propositional structure and a predicative function. These two characteristics of discourse, event and signification bearing, make up the first distanciation: the saying in the said. This first distanciation is what makes fixation of meaning in writing possible. Writing then is the next logical concern.

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such" is wider than the propositional content in the narrow sense of the locutionary act.

[30] Note that this detachment of meaning from event whereby the former becomes identifiable, reidentifiable, translatable, etc., results in the fact that meaning as such is not restricted to a given situation, a given time, or place, but is characterized by what Ricoeur calls "omnitemporality," cf. Ricoeur, "Evénement," p. 24; Interpretation Theory, p. 93.

[31] Ricoeur, "Philosophy and Religious Language," The Journal of Religion, 54 (1974); 164; hereafter, "Religious Language." Note however that distanciation is minimal at the level of spoken discourse; cf. "Model," p. 95; "Biblical Hermeneutics," p. 66.

[32] Ricoeur, "Evénement," p. 19; cf. "Model," p. 93; Interpretation Theory, p. 27.

## The Text as Written Discourse: The Second Move

The utterer's utterance has been seen to be separate from the utterance's meaning. It is this dialectic of utterer's utterance and utterance's meaning that is, for Ricoeur, "the basis of the problem of writing."[33] This first distanciation gives rise to a "triple distanciation introduced by writing: 1) distanciation from the author; 2) from the situation of discourse; 3) from the original audience."[34]

Writing seeks to fix the meaning of discourse. But, as Ricoeur points out, writing also

> provides the text with a certain autonomy in relation to the intention of the author. What the text means may no longer coincide with what the author meant. Verbal meaning [i.e., textual meaning] and mental meaning [i.e., psychological intention] are henceforth disconnected.[35]

This disconnection can best be understood by comparing the speaking and writing subject. Discourse always implies a subject by use of personal pronouns and related verbal forms.[36] However, the immediacy in spoken discourse is lacking when discourse becomes a written text. Ricoeur writes:

> In spoken discourse this ability of discourse to refer back to the speaking subject presents a character of immediacy because the speaker belongs to the situation of interlocution. He is there, in the genuine sense of being-there, of Da-sein. Consequently the subjective intention of the speaker and the discourse's meaning

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[33] Ricoeur, "Philosophical Hermeneutics," p. 18.

[34] Ricoeur, "Distanciation," p. 134.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ricoeur, "Evénement," p. 19, "la phrase désigne son locteur par divers indicateurs de subjectivité et de personalité."

> overlap each other in such a way that it is the same thing to understand what the speaker means and what his discourse means.[37]

In the case of written discourse the writer is not there in the reader's presence. Ricoeur argues that what the discourse means, then, becomes more important than what the author meant.[38] He argues:

> Inscription becomes synonymous with the semantic autonomy of the text, which results from the disconnection of the mental intention of the author from the verbal meaning of the text, of what the author meant and what the text means.[39]

Not only does the meaning become separated from the author, but also the situation in which it arose. The meaning has been fixed in the literary work (as far as that is possible) and is "open to an indefinite range of readers and readings within different socio-cultural contexts."[40] In this sense, then, writing also brings distanciation from the original situation of discourse.

As the result of writing, meaning becomes available to whomever knows how to read.[41] This universalization of the audience is, of course, limited but is potentially the case.[42] "Discourse is now linked to a material support; it becomes more spiritual in the sense that it is liberated from the narrowness of the face to face situation."[43]

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[37] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 29.

[38] Ricoeur, "Evénement," p. 19; e.g., the responses to a letter to the editor.

[39] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, pp. 29-30.

[40] Ricoeur, "Philosophical Hermeneutics," p. 18.

[41] As Gadamer puts it, "What is fixed in writing has raised itself publicly into a sphere of meaning in which everyone who can read has an equal share." Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 353.

[42] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 31.

The interpretation of a written text does not allow the reader the opportunity to question the author about the meaning intended. The reader can, of course, seek to meet the writer and then inquire about the meaning, but then we no longer have a writing-reading situation. There is, then, an essential difference between the dialogical situation and the writing-reading situation, a difference not taken into account by the romantic hermeneutic.[44] By taking the dialogical situation as the standard for the hermeneutical operation, the romantic hermeneutic skewed the process.[45] Even the first two major moments of distanciation, event and author, point to the inadequacy of this basic presupposition of romantic hermeneutics.[46]

The next step of distanciation is understanding the text as "work." This will move the text further away from the author's intention and intensify semantic autonomy.[47] This semantic autonomy creates a "world-in-front-of-the-text" rather than inviting the search for the one behind the text.[48]

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[43] Ibid.

[44] Ricoeur, "Evénement," p. 24.

[45] [The]...priority given [by romantic hermeneutics] to the author's intention from the point of view of the original audience tended...to make dialogue the model of every situation of understanding, thereby imposing the framework of intersubjectivity on hermeneutics. Understanding a text, then, is only a particular case of the dialogical situation in which someone responds to someone else," Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 24.

[46] Ricoeur notes: "Nous ne pouvons plus définir l'herméneutique par la recherche d'un autrui et de ses intentions psychologiques qui se dissimulant derrière le text," Ricoeur, "La distanciation," p. 212; cf. "Religious Language," pp. 78-80; "Philosophical Hermeneutics," p. 25.

[47] Ricoeur draws upon Gadamer's concept of *Verfremdung* in this conception of the semantic autonomy of the text. Ricoeur writes: "The semantic autonomy of the text is the support of what Gadamer calls the 'thing' of the text [*die Sache des Texts*] because this autonomy creates the possibility that what is at issue in the text escapes the narrow intentional horizon of the author. In other words, thanks to writing, the 'world' of the text can shatter the world of the author," Ricoeur, "Philosophical Hermeneutics," p. 18.

## The Text as Work: The Third Move

Up to this point, the analysis of the text has not attended to the complex relationship that exists between the various sentences that make up the text. It is the relationship between the various propositions of the text that creates the world-in-front-of-the-text. A text is not a mere succession of sentences each "on an equal footing and separately understandable."[49] Rather, "a text works as the first context for each partial meaning. As such it delineates a relatively closed space for each individual sentence's interpretation."[50] There is in the production of the text a distanciation of the text best described as "a work." The discourse itself becomes the object of praxis and techne; it is a work, an act of production.[51]

Ricoeur equates the form that the work imposes on discourse with Aristotle's notion of taxis; he writes:

> Aristotle calls taxis, 'composition' [the] . . . second-order mode of organization which affects discourse at a level higher than that of the sentence and makes the text into a complex organism.[52]

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[48] Ibid.

[49] Ricoeur, "Distanciation," p. 135; cf. "Model," p. 106.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ricoeur, "La distanciation," p. 207. In this context Ricoeur quotes Aristotle to the effect that all praxis and production bear on the creation of the individual. He also refers to G. G. Granger for whom "le travail est une des structures de la pratique, sinon la structure principale: c'est 'l'activite pratique s'objectivant dans des oeuvres'," p. 207; cf. "Biblical Hermeneutics," p. 69.

[52] Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics," p. 68.

And in the same context, Ricoeur immediately adds: "the literary genres are the codifications ruling these second-order units of discourse."[53]

In characterizing the written discourse as a work Ricoeur is drawing on an analogy with the artisan. When subjected to taxis,

> . . . discourse displays a quite high level of objectification, similar to that of the products of work in relation to the process of production. Man objectifies himself through the works of his discourse, as he does through the products of his craftsmanship, and his art. Other alterations of the initial features of discourse proceed from this general trait of objectification. First, the speaker appears as an 'author'; this expression indicates that an author is more than merely an 'utterer'; it designates the artisan at work in discourse.[54]

Here already we see the beginnings of a distanciation or an objectification in addition to that which writing brings.

Understanding written discourse under the category of work means that "to produce discourse as a poem, or as a narrative, or as an essay, is to 'encode it according to the rules of the appropriate mode of discourse'."[55] Here Ricoeur refers to Erhardt Güttgemann's notion of "generative poetics"[56] which in turn is an application of Chomsky's "generative grammar" to the level of texts.[57] The crucial discovery in the perception of the written discourse at this point is that "the consideration of discourse as work suggests that we look at literary genres less as modes of classification than as means of production."[58] Literary genres, like grammar, have generative processes or rules in which native speakers of a natural language can generate an indefinite number of new sentences in that language. A "generative poetics," then, considers the various literary genres (poems, narratives, etc.) as rules or codes in which discourse can be made to produce an indefinite number of new works of literature. This is in opposition to the rhetorical tradition which views literary genres as "classificatory devices, invented by literary criticism to master the chaos of individual works . . . or taxonomic devices. . . ."[59] Rather, Ricoeur, suggests, literary genres have a generative or "genetic" function. In fact, the taxonomy or classification comes afterward as a recognition of what particular generative process has been operating in a given work.[60]

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[53] Ibid.

[54] Ricoeur, "Philosophical Hermeneutics," p. 21; cf. Saussure, Cours, p. 43.

[55] Ricoeur, "Philosophical Hermeneutics," p. 68.

[56] E. Güttgemanns, "What is Generative Poetics?," Semeia 6 (1976): 1-21.

[57] Ricoeur, "Distanciation," p. 136; "Biblical Hermeneutics," p. 70. Note that in the latter article Ricoeur expresses some uncertainty as to whether Güttgemann uses the term in the same way as Ricoeur does. On "generative poetics" see W. G. Doty, "Linguistics and Biblical Criticism," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 41 (1973):114-21.

Generative poetics adds a new dimension to the distanciation of the work of discourse from both sides of the interpretive process. From the side of the author, the work is the result of the performance of a given literary "competence." From the side of the reader, these same rules make possible the "competence" of the author that permits the reading. Thus these generative principles allow the identification of a work as poem or narrative. So, as in the case of this inquiry, the exploration of the Markan narrative, the concern would be with the rules for understanding the production of narrative. The genre is thus an instrument of distanciation in that it consists of (objective) rules for sending and for receiving messages in a given form (poetic, narrative, etc.).[61]

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[58] Ricoeur, "Distanciation," p. 135.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics," p. 70.

Genre also allows for the preservation of the integrity of a particular message by giving it an accepted public status. This removes it from the private domain of a personal consciousness, preserves the text as an autonomous entity, and reinforces the notion of its semantic autonomy.[62] The literary genre functions as a code within which the form of a given work is made available to a reader with the competence to understand the code. Thus, the reader has the task of decoding a publicly available code rather than a private consciousness.

In this inquiry two basic approaches to decoding the publicly available code will be explored. The first is a more traditional analysis of the surface structure or code of the text using more traditional methods under the heading of a rhetoric of narrative. The second involves the deep structural codes using the methods of structuralism. Both share the basic understanding of the public status of the text.

This emphasis on the public and shared character of the text does not necessarily ignore the peculiar and individual characteristics of the text. Ricoeur discusses these characteristics under the category of style. Stylization is the creating of individual discourses out of certain rules.[63] Each work has its own style which reflects the unique character of the composition.

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[61] Ricoeur, "Distanciation," p. 135.

[62] Ibid., p. 137.

[63] Ibid.

In short, the text is not best understood under the classification of a private conversation, or dialogue, but a publicly available work, a *poesis*, which has about it public codes and an individual style. Interpretation is less the task of a mind reader and more the task of one who understands the generative poetics and peculiar style that lies in front of any particular text. All of this is quite publicly available.

### The Text and the Disclosure of a World: The Fourth Move

The linguistic paradigm readily lends itself to unifying the text of Mark but may well lose its full range of referentiality. In keeping with the inquiry's purpose, this referentiality needs to be retrieved. The introduction to this inquiry discussed briefly the different character of referentiality in an oral direct speech situation and in written discourse. This difference must be examined in greater detail before turning to the two models under the linguistic paradigm.

In spoken discourse the speakers share a common "framework of reference."[64] This framework of reference is quite ostensive and subject to the speakers showing one another their intended referents.[65]

In written discourse, referentiality is significantly changed. First of all, the reader is not present to the writer and hence, with writing, clearly there is an "abolition du caractère monstratif de la référence."[66] It is possible for a text to restructure the ostensive referential system in an attempt to recreate the sense of making reference to "at hand" objects. Ricoeur gives as examples, "letters, travel reports, geographical descriptions, diaries, historical monographs, and in general all descriptive accounts of reality."[67] These are written in "the mode of 'as if', thanks to the ordinary procedures of singular identification."[68]

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[64] Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, p. 34.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ricoeur, "La distanciation," p. 212; cf. "The absence of a common situation generated by the spatial and temporal distance between writer and reader; the cancellation of the absolute here and now by the substitution of material external makes for the voice, face, and body of the speaker as the absolute origin of all the places in space and time;

The entire project of 'as if' writing underscores the significant difference between the dialogical situation and the writing-reading relation. In the dialogical situation the interchange is limited to the ostensively demonstrable referents in the situation (Umwelt). "The writing-reading relation, however, extends the boundaries of our situation and opens up a world (Welt)." Hence, as Ricoeur writes:

> We speak about the 'world' of Greece, not to designate any more what were the situations for those who lived then, but to designate the non-situational references which outlive the effacement of the first and which henceforth are offered as possible modes of being, as symbolic dimensions of our being-in-the-world. For me, this is the referent of all literature; no longer the Umwelt of the ostensive references of dialogue, but the Welt projected by the nonostensive references of every text we have read, understood, and loved.[69]

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and the semantic autonomy of the text, which severs it from the present of the writer and opens it to an indefinite range of potential readers in an indeterminate time--all these alterations of the temporal constitution ostensive character of the reference," Interpretation Theory, p. 35.

[67] Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 35.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Johnson, "Text-Oriented," p. 68; Ricoeur, "Model," p. 96. The terms "world" (Welt) and "situation" (Umwelt) are Heideggeran. Umwelt is connected with the idea of "throwness" and "facticity"; it is the situation in which Dasein finds itself thrown. Welt is connected with the idea of "possibilities of being-in-the-world revealed through "understanding" (Verstehen). Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), especially pp. 169-210.

The Greek "world" was unknown to the Greeks themselves who lived in the Greek "situation." We who live outside the situation have access to it, not as a situation, but as a world, as a possible way of being-in-the-world. Descriptive texts do have a reference, but it is to the world opened up by such texts.

In the case of historical narrative, this requires that primary attention be given to the world in front of the text that proposes the world to the reader. Since this inquiry has insisted on characterizing Mark in terms of a historical narrative, then it is to the world in front of the text of Mark that the reader is asked or invited to see as a possible way of being-in-the-world.

As the first model suggested, the examination of Mark as historical narrative must tend to the narrative character of the text. In this part of the inquiry, the text will be understood primarily under the category of a written work of discourse. Attention will be given to its literary genre and style, its surface and deep structures. The peculiar character of Mark's narrative will include the narrative God-language which is part of the world in front of the text to which the reader is invited to accept as a way of being-in-the-world.

## Against the "New Criticism"

Some contemporary literary critics, especially the so-called "New Critics," wish to deny any referential function in a written text. The argument against reference in literary texts is based "largely on what Roman Jakobson calls the 'poetic function' of language."[70] The literary text is the text in which the poetic function of language predominates. Such texts, according to these critics, are about nothing but themselves. As Northrop Frye writes:

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[70] On the "New Criticism" see e.g. M. Bradbury, "Introduction: The State of Criticism Today," Contemporary Criticism, ed. M. Bradbury and D. Palmer, Stratford-upon-Avon Studies 12 (London: Edward Arnold, 1970),

> Verbal structures may be classified according to whether the final direction of meaning is outward or inward. In descriptive or assertive writing the final direction is outward [i.e., toward a reference in reality]. . . . In all literary verbal structures the final direction of meaning is inward. In literature the standards of outward meaning are secondary, for literary works do not pretend to describe or assert and hence are not true, not false . . .[71]

This inquiry cannot follow Frye's path for providing an acceptable fundamental theory for understanding the verisimilitude of Mark. Such a path would fail to take seriously the descriptive historical narrative which best characterizes Mark. Furthermore, such a path is epistemologically skeptical regarding all literature and is unable to appreciate the basic truth claims that literary texts make. Once again the inquiry chooses to follow Ricoeur's argument for a general referential function in written texts.

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pp. 11-39; on R. Jakobson, "Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics," *Style in Language*, ed. T. A. Sebeok (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1960), pp. 350-77, esp. 353-57. Compare P. Guiruad, pp. 5-24. The poetic function, according to Jakobson's analysis, is one of six functions of language corresponding to the six factors which he isolates as being involved in verbal communication. In the poetic function, language as it were calls attention to itself and this results, according to Jakobson, in "conversion of a message into an enduring thing," p. 371.

[71] Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 74. Or as in Susan Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (New York: Mentor Books, 1951), p. 220, ". . . though the *material* of poetry is verbal, its import is not the literal assertion made in the words, but *the way the assertion is made*, and this involves the sound, the tempo, the aura of associations of the words, the long or short sequences of ideas, the wealth of poverty of transient imagery that contains them, the sudden arrest of fantasy by pure fact, or of familiar fact by sudden fantasy, the suspense of literal meaning by a sustained ambiguity resolved in a long-awaited key-word, and the unifying, all-embracing artifice of rhythm."

Ricoeur quite agrees with Frye that "first-order reference" is abolished; the characters of a novel, for example, do not refer to actual people. However, discourse in the form of a literary text does not totally abolish the fundamental characteristic of discourse: to be about something. It is Ricoeur's thesis, rather, that reference is not completely abolished but transposed to a different order. In this, he follows a clue given by Jakobson who writes that "the supremacy of poetic function over referential function does not obliterate the reference but makes it ambiguous."[72] It is precisely this ambiguity that showed itself in the first model when it was necessary to qualify Mandelbaum's theory of historical narrative by the rhetorical bias of the text. In effect, White, Gallie, Danto and Mink were intensifying the ambiguity of first-order referentiality. This ambiguity is not the end of referentiality, however, but the birth of a second order referential system. This reference is to a "fictional" or "hypothetical" world which is offered to the reader as a possible mode of being-in-the-world.[73]

Ricoeur develops his argument for the second order referential system by analyzing the metaphor as a literary form in miniature. Since this analysis is not an immediate need in this prologue, a detailed analysis of Ricoeur's argument will not be given. It is enough for the purposes of this inquiry to note that by analyzing the metaphor in this manner, Ricoeur has returned to Heidegger's analysis of _Verstehen_ which is a fundamental structure of being-in-the-world. _Verstehen_, for Heidegger, is essentially connected with Dasein's finding itself "thrown" in a situation and its first function is to orient Dasein in that situation. It is this notion of apprehending a possibility of being that Ricoeur applies to the notion of the reference of the literary text as the "world"[74] which the text opens up or discloses.[75]

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[72] Jakobson, "Closing Statement," p. 371; cf. Ricoeur, Métaphore, p. 282. Ricoeur does not deny the possibility of what he calls "limiting cases" where all reference has been abolished; e.g., Mallarmé's poetry, Interpretation Theory, pp. 36-37.

[73] Johnston, "Text-Oriented," appendix on Metaphor.

At this point, we have come to the modality of distanciation that is proper to the literary text as a work. This is the distanciation of the world of the literary text from everyday reality (_la réalité quotidienne_), and Ricoeur calls it the distanciation "du réel avec lui-même."[76] In contrast to romantic hermeneutics, the object of interpretation is moved one more step away from authorial intention and is situated in the ("fictional" or "hypothetical") "world of the text." Therefore, interpretation seeks, not psychological intentions hidden behind the text, but the sort of world that is opened in front of the text. Hence, Ricoeur's description of the task of interpretation as "la saisie des propositions de monde ouvertes par les références non ostensives du texte."[77]

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[74] It is Ricoeur's claim that the literary text _does have_ a reference that is of particular importance. This is brought clear in a footnote of Mary Gerhart's article: "Paul Ricoeur's Notion of 'Diagnostics': Its function in Literary Interpretation," _Journal of Religion_, 56 (1976): 137-56, esp. 152, n. 48, where Gerhart refers to Ricoeur's (oral) reply to David Tracy's request for clarification of Ricoeur's use of the term "world." See for example where Ricoeur is quoted as saying: "I do not want to seclude the concept of world disclosure from a specific hermeneutic problem--what the text is about--from the problem of reference. Therefore it is a minimal concept of world that is required here. In the linguistic dimension of language which I call here reference, world is nothing more than the ontological counterpart of the reference."

[75] The French term used is l'overture-découverte or découvrir-ouvrir; cf. Ricoeur, "Le problème central," pp. 106-12. In "Model" Ricoeur defines "disclosure" as "the equivalent for written language of ostensive reference for spoken language," p. 114.

[76] Ricoeur, "La distanciation," p. 213.

## Conclusion

This prologue began where the second chapter left off: Hirsch's appeal to the author's intention had been considerably qualified by the notion of the speaking subject, or what Wayne C. Booth has called the implied author. Ricoeur's analysis of the distanciations from author and the author's situation points to the inadequacy of any hermeneutic theory that would identify authentic textual meaning with author's intended meaning. Ricoeur's analysis has gone beyond the qualification of Hirsch's romantic hermeneutic and proposed another way of interpreting a text. He has affirmed Hirsch's process of text-interpretation as a dialectic of guessing and validating.[78] However, he has opened up a far more public enterprise for interpreting the text.

Ricoeur has also provided a way beyond the reactionary model of the literary text proposed by the New Critics who would deny all referentiality for literature. He has done this without reducing the interpretive task to (_Verstehen_) a matter of understanding, or, as Gadamer has it, participation. Ricoeur has replaced Gadamer's negative notion of _Verfremdung_ with a far more useful notion of distanciation which allows for the two different models to be developed in this part. First, chapter three will explore the text understood as a literary whole related to its interpreter and contemporary audience and second, the fourth chapter will explore the text understood as an internal structure related to itself.

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[77] Ricoeur, "Le problème central," p. 107.

[78] Hirsch, _Validity_, p. 242.

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# CHAPTER THREE

## HORIZONS AND STORY

The first two models locate the hermeneutical enterprise primarily within the historical paradigm. In the first model, the interpreter as historian, the text was primarily evidence for the events in the life of Jesus. Since it points to or represents these events, it is descriptive discourse. In the second model, the interpreter seeks to ascertain the intention of the writer of Mark as the norm for a valid interpretation of the text. In that model the interpreter is characterized as a mind reader.

In each of these models all four factors: historical context, author, reader, and text were included in the exploration of the interpretive task. This has allowed the results of the inquiry to be somewhat cumulative and interrelated, as the enquiry seeks to recover Mark as a whole without losing a full range of referentiality. For example, the second model continued the first chapter's concern to consider Mark seriously as historical narrative but understood the redactor/author in a more positive light than the first model had.[1] The first model sought to eliminate the author's influence in order to ground interpretation in the events behind the text. The second model brought the author to the fore and made the author's intention the normative ground of interpretation. At the end of the second model, only the implied author of Mark was available to the interpreter.

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[1] Nonetheless, the conclusion of the first model disagreed with Marxsen's reduction of Mark to a sermon and the author as a preacher.

The concept of the implied author will carry over into this model and bridge the movement from the second to the third model. A dialectic between text and contemporary audience in the third model replaces the second model's interaction between author and original audience. The interpreter's horizon and that of the contemporary audience will become prominent in the interpretation of Mark in this third model. The text and the interpreter will be understood as historical linguistic horizons that are fused in the interpretive process.

From Implied Author to the Horizon of the Text

It is helpful at this point to review the spectrum of possible perspectives for relating the four factors of textual interpretation.[2]


Degrees of Skepticism:
complete transparency--------------------complete opacity
1
2
3
4
Normative Principle:
historical events & context
author
reader
text

Figure 5.--Perspectives

The second model develops one possible point that would fall within the second perspective of the spectrum: it significantly qualifies the transparency of the text into the mind of the author. This qualification was made concrete in the notion of the implied author. What was of special concern then for interpreting the text was the "core of norms and choices (standards of judgment),"[3] which could be construed primarily on the basis of the text. A perspective fixing valid interpretation to the implied author's intention is at the extreme right end of possible points within the second perspective. Any further moves toward greater opacity of the text would move further right on the spectrum and pass into the third perspective.

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[2] Introduction, Figure 2.

The easiest transition from the second to the third perspective would be to recognize the various ways of speaking of author, besides implied author, but set aside their normative status. In such a way the focus of interpretation would be on the text as a literary whole. This move, though it retains the concept of the implied author's intention, reappraises--and the reappraisal is crucial. It is what holds the normative status in the interpretive process. Once the text is to be taken first and foremost as a literary whole, searches to establish a behind-the-text norm will be corroborative. As a result of this transition, this model is within the linguistic paradigm.

This model's strategy begins with the text as a whole. The Markan Seminar of the Society of Biblical Literature is the strategy's initial resource. Their observations propel this chapter's argument into a discussion of the text's rhetoric and how the text makes arguments to a present-day interpreter and audience. Thus the strategy has four steps: First, the analysis of Mark as a literary whole leads to the next step, an analysis of Markan rhetoric. The third step examines a general theory which accounts for the interaction of the contemporary audience and interpreter in textual understanding. The final step is an evaluation of the model.

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[3] David Rhoads, "Contemporary Literary Criticism of Mark," (Unpublished paper for Markan Seminar, National Convention, SBL, 1980), p. 9; hereafter, Rhoads, "Literary Criticism."

Among biblical scholars the work of Donald Juel[4] is representative of the subtle move across the divide between redaction criticism and literary criticism, properly understood.[5] This chapter summarizes Juel's basic argument in Messiah and Temple, reflects on its implications for the concerns of this study, and develops it with the aid of his colleagues in the Markan Seminar of the Society of Biblical Literature. Following this exposition, reflection, and development, the chapter will integrate this discussion of Markan interpretation into a general theory of hermeneutics appropriate to this model. In this section, the chapter follows the lead of Hans-Georg Gadamer[6] and further develops the role of the contemporary audience in interpretation. This discussion ends in an evaluation of the model in light of the question of verisimilitude and the benefits and strengths of the model.

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[4] Donald Juel, Messiah and Temple: The Trial of Jesus in the Gospel of Mark, Society of Biblical Literature Series, ed. Howard C. Kee and Douglas A. Knight (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1977); hereafter, Juel, Messiah and Temple.

[5] I refer here not to what is commonly known as "literary criticism" among biblical scholars but to what R.W. Funk calls "literary literary criticism": "It is a pity that the term 'literary criticism' was earlier preempted by biblical scholars as a means of referring to source criticism and related studies. It is now necessary to qualify the phrase in order to be able to use it in its primary sense: literary literary criticism. That is to say, we are speaking of that type of literary criticism which is employed by literary critics of the non-biblical sort, rather than to the literary criticism of the traditional sort known to biblical scholars." R. W. Funk, "Foreword," to Semeia, 8 (1977), vii; throughout this study, the term "literary criticism" shall be used in this broader sense.

[6] The primary source for this discussion will be Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. In addition Gadamer's collected essays are cited from the several volume Kleine Schriften (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1967), or, when translated into English in Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), and Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).

The process begins by reading the narrative as containing a closed and self-sufficient world, with its own integrity, its own past and future, its own set of values, its own universe of meaning. Only when interpretation begins with this universe of meaning can the reader and audience enter into the marvelous world of the narrative. The process of interpretation will proceed from this moment which understands Mark as a work of art, with a special world, with its own space and time, its own ideological system and its own standards of behavior. Mark will be seen to have its own truth, "in accordance with probability or necessity."[7] By creating a possible set of conditions and causes for our actions and living, it will do more than point at ordinary "at hand" events or objects.

## Irony and the Trial Narrative

Donald Juel's entrance point into the Markan "world-in-front-of-the-text" is the trial before the Sanhedrin (14:52-65). Jesus is led before the high priest, the chief priests, the elders, and the scribes who sought testimony against him. But the false witnesses could not agree on their testimony. Two main charges are made: that he "will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and in three days . . . build another, not made with hands" and secondly, that he claims to be "the Christ, the Son of the Blessed." Though ostensively both charges fail, all of the Sanhedrin condemns Jesus as deserving death. Some spit on him, cover his face, strike him, and say to him, "Prophesy!".

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[7] Redfield, Nature and Culture, p.xxii.

Juel begins his central analysis of the text by making a literary observation regarding the messianic secret motif in Mark: The secret in Mark is only for the characters within the story, not the reader.[8] Juel's observation regarding the messianic secret is crucial in this model's analysis of his interpretation of Mark. As a rhetorical device it is characteristic of the entire gospel. There is a story for the characters which is really quite incongruous to ordinary historical events. Juel argues that there is no need, in principle, to explain all "sudden scene changes" and other apparent historical inconsistencies as crude redaction.[9] Quite to the contrary, this rhetoric underscores the two different stories being told in the text. One story is written for the characters and includes the messianic secret as one of its major themes. The second story is "for us," the readers. Juel refers to this latter story as the "deeper level."[10] The continuous juxtaposition of the first level with the deeper level of the gospel represents the basic literary device of at least the passion narrative and perhaps the entire book. This device is irony.

With respect to the trial narrative itself, Juel argues that it functions to introduce the passion story themes on both levels of the story. On the first level, Jesus is rejected on the basis of both charges. He is rejected first as Messiah/King and then as the destroyer of the temple. Though both charges are not proven and fail because of false and confused witnesses, the purpose of the narrative is to point to their truth at the deeper level. At the level for the readers, all of this trial and passion are seen in the light of vindication at the resurrection. Those who read the text, presumably Christians, know that on the third day Jesus rose from the dead. This rhetoric of irony projects not only an implied author, but both an implied and ideal audience. Therefore, Juel can argue:

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[8] Juel, Messiah and Temple, p. 12.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., p. 35.

> The details, such as two kinds of temples, are unimportant to the participants in the drama but are clues "intended for the reader, pointers to the deeper level of meaning at which the truth of the charge could be appreciated. It would be as inappropriate in this case to ask how the false witnesses could have understood so little of what they were saying as to ask how those around Jesus could have failed to hear the confessions of Jesus as the "Son of God" by demoniacs (esp. 3:11 and 5:7). . . . [T]he failure of the witnesses to grasp the truth of what they are saying is a consistent feature of the passion story and an appropriate expression of the messianic secret in the Gospel as a whole.[11]

The irony of the trial is the key to understanding the trial narrative which introduces the themes of the passion. When Jesus is charged, Mark implies to his readers, Jesus' opponents not only cannot prove the charges, but they fail to realize their truth. Jesus "will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and in three days . . . build another, not made with hands." Jesus is "the Christ, the Son of the Blessed." The general double-level style, the rhetoric of irony, is an important tie between the charges at the trial and the taunts at the foot of the cross:

> And those who passed by derided him, wagging their heads and saying, "Aha! You would destroy the temple and build it in three days, save yourself, and come down from the cross!

And following that the scribes, said,

> He saved others; he cannot save himself. Let the Christ,

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[11] Ibid., p. 124.

> the King of Israel, come down now from the cross, that we may see and believe.[12]

In this manner, two key passion themes, Jesus as the Christ and the destruction and reconstruction of the temple, are introduced by the trial narrative.

Juel has explained the apparent historical and logical inconsistency between the charges, the witnesses, and the outcome of the trial without appealing either to the events in the life of Jesus that might lie behind the text or the tradition that the redactor might have felt obliged to include in a crude manner. In short, nothing "behind the text" was necessary or sufficient for understanding the text; the "world-in-front-of-the-text" is the necessary ingredient for understanding both meaning and reference of the text.

Saying that Juel is able to explain the text by appealing to the logic of the world that stands in front of the text, does not suggest that historical data is insignificant for his interpretation of the trial narrative. In this model for interpreting the text, however, the historical analysis functions primarily as a corroboration of the literary analysis of the text. In effect, Juel asks if it is possible, given the historical and sociological circumstances of the text, for it to bear the meaning achieved by literary analysis. In this sense, the historical analysis functions as a negative check which is built on the suspicion that some meanings are possible within a text which might not be possible within a certain historical or cultural situation. Juel's analysis of the temple charge illustrates my point.

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[12] Juel argues that the difference in language regarding Jesus as King of Israel and King of the Jews is Mark's concern to put the appropriate terminology in the right lips: "Jews in the lips of Gentiles and Israel in the lips of the temple establishment; Ibid.

The contrast between a temple made with hands and one made without hands is crucial to the temple theme introduced in the trial narrative and developed by the rest of the passion story. Juel argues that the temple charges at the trial represent a suggested viewpoint for the relationship between Christians and the temple establishment.[13] The destruction of the temple implies the rejection of the temple establishment--those who have condemned Jesus. Christians need no longer be associated with the temple establishment but are members of a temple not made with hands but made by Jesus the Messiah. The world-in-front-of-the-text serves as the primary data source.[14] This literary analysis leads Juel to his hypothesis regarding the temple charge.

Another line of reasoning follows this literary analysis. Juel corroborates his interpretation of the trial narrative's temple charges by examining the conception of a spiritual temple in the Qumran documents. Christians, he then argues, had access to a tradition which included this contrast between temples. The temple in Jerusalem could be, in the mind of the reader, the temple establishment. The destruction of Jerusalem could have pointed to the spiritual temple understood as the Church. The crisis for this community, created by the temple's destruction, is then addressed by the temple charges introduced in the trial narrative and developed in the passion narrative.[15]

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., references to other verses in Mark suggesting the theme: 11:24-28, 12:9, etc.

[15] Ibid.

The Qumran documents corroborate Juel's literary interpretation of the narrative. In the terms developed later in this chapter, Juel, by his search into Qumran documents, has sought to understand the horizon of the text of Mark. He has in effect asked, "To what question is this text an answer?" If he had been unable to find such corroboration in historical documentation, he would have lessened the probable validity of his interpretation. He would have, in that event, a weaker argument for his interpretation. In this model, the historical data corroborates and/or provides a negative check but does not provide the sufficient grounds for determining the meaning of the text. Historical research is necessary but not sufficient, significant but secondary in this interpretive model.[16]

## Areas of Literary Investigation: Story and Rhetoric

Juel's attempt to understand Mark initially as literary whole has affirmed the achievement of the text in projecting a world-in-front-of-the text.[17] Such narrative study is best done under two categories: story and rhetoric.

Story is the "what" of the narrative, and rhetoric the "how" of the narrative.[18] The "what" of the narrative is a chain of events told or implied by the narrator, the chronological order, the characters, and the places and details of setting. The "how," or discourse, is the particular way in which a given story is told, including the arrangement of events in the plot, the type of narrator, point of view, style, and rhetorical devices. To separate these categories is inappropriate since both must be included in a unified explanation of narrative.

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[16] Juel's tentative moves to understand Mark as a literary text have been extensively developed. The Markan Seminar of the Society of Biblical Literature has been a crucial part of these developments. I am indebted to members of that group, especially David Rhoads, John Donahue, and Robert Tannehill for sharing some of their unpublished but privately circulated work. This group has brought a new conception to the description "literary criticism."

[17] In speaking of the text projecting a "world-in-front-of-the-text" I am denying the place of the interpreter; however, it is not my intention to describe this phenomenon purely as the projection of the author in the way that Wolfgang Iser does in The Implied Reader and especially Act of Reading.

In concern with this distinction, Norman Peterson distinguishes between plotted time (discourse) and story time.[19] If we rearrange the various references to events in the story in their chronological order, we reconstruct the story time.[20] In the Markan story world the ministry of John the Baptist precedes the ministry of Jesus. Plotted time is the order in which the reader learns of the events. Peterson contrasts the sequence of events in the narrative (plotted time) with the chronological sequence (story time) and identifies various devices that Mark uses to plot the story. Mark includes anticipation, recollection, flashback, and repetition among other devices. Imagine yourself reading Mark for the first time. What does a first time reader know and when is it known? Such a reading outlines the Markan arrangement of events. This arrangement creates the tension or suspense that maintains the reader's interest.[21] These various devices related to plotted and story time shape the response of the reader and are crucial in establishing the world-in-front-of-the-text.[22]

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[18] Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).

[19] Norman Petersen, "Literary Criticism in Biblical Studies," in Orientation by Disorientation: Studies in Literary Criticism and Biblical Criticism, ed. Richard A. Spencer (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1980); Literary Criticism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), pp. 49-80.

[20] Literary Criticism, p. 62; cf. the narrative devices discussed by Tannehill, who draws upon the work of Gerard Genette, "Disciples," pp. 390-91.

## The Story: The Analysis of Conflicts

David Rhoads has provided an excellent summary of Markan interpreters as they have turned their attention both to the story and the discourse of Mark.[23] Under the topic of story, interpreters have analyzed the conflicts within the story.

Events move a story. Action on the part of characters toward other characters propels the reader along the plot. Conflicting events often accomplish this movement in Mark; for example, the protagonist struggles with natural and supernatural forces. He encounters the temple establishment and the sick, and his character is revealed. More is revealed in these conflicts. They reflect the basic conflict between the "at hand" character of the Kingdom of God, God's rule, and all other powers and claims to authority. Jesus is the agent of God's rule; he is, then, the location of these various levels of conflict. Between God's rule being established and the events of the story stand demons whom Jesus can command and the forces of nature which he subdues. However, he cannot subdue people; they have an independence that demons and nature do not have. He can only heal when people have faith. They can speak even against Jesus' will. The disciples can manage to see and hear Jesus but not understand. In the face of these conflicts Jesus moves toward one alternative: his death on the cross.[24] His death resolves the conflicts between Jesus and the temple establishment or Jesus and the disciples. The crucifixion, in turn, is to some degree explained as a result of those conflicting relationships that have moved the story along.[25] The crucifixion within the-world-in-front-of-the-text is "earned," it follows and is consistent with the contentious setting of Mark.

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[21] Ibid., p. 72. On the various forms of suspense, many of which are quite relevant to Mark's narrative, see Rick Rabkin, Narrative Suspense (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973).

[22] The relationship between these narrative devices and the ability of the reader to follow the narrative is quite important to this model. This relationship was important, as well, in the first model where Gallie's concept of followable historical narrative figured heavily in the recognition of rhetorical form in interpreting Mark within that model. There are important parallels between these two models.

[23] Rhoads, "Literary Criticism," p.5.

## The Story: Characters

The "what" of narrative also includes characters. Characters show themselves by what they say or do and how other characters perceive or react to them. Interpreting characters requires attention to their actions and the functions of their actions within the movement of the story. In Mark very little of Jesus' internal psyche is revealed. Rather most of our knowledge regarding Jesus in Mark is gained by observing his actions, statements and encounters with other people. His character develops in such interactions.[26]

Characters can also be understood as autonomous beings and assessed much more like other human beings. Huck Finn and Hamlet, Chatman argues, are thought of more like real people than characters which are revealed simply by their actions and interactions, their functions in a particular narrative.[27] In what Chatman calls an "open theory of character" he suggests we not only analyze what characters do but also analyze who they are.[28] The persons within the story in this theory of character are assigned traits; the interpreter then follows the development of the character's traits throughout the narrative. This, then, becomes one more manner in which the narrative develops and moves.[29]

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[24] Ibid., p. 5.

[25] Ibid., p. 6.

[26] Edward Schillebeeckx, Jesus; An Experiment in Christology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), pp. 77-81.

By trait Chatman means a quality of character as it persists over a whole or a part of a story. Sometimes traits will be named by the narrator; other times the reader is led to infer such traits. Chatman insists that such traits must come from within the realm of traits familiar to the culture during the era of writing.[30] Recent Markan interpretation has applied this open approach to characters even though Mark is action-centered. This works insofar as the traits result from inferences gleaned from the actions of the characters. Chatman refers also to the work of E. M. Forster, who dubbed as "round" those characters with many and conflicting traits;[31] characters who are complex and unpredictable. By contrast, "flat" characters have fewer, usually consistent traits and are generally predictable. "Stock" characters are completely flat, having only one trait (e.g., "a crooked lawyer").

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[27] Chatman, Story, pp. 107-38. On character analysis see also W. J. Harvey, Character and the Novel (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).

[28] Ibid. Chatman draws on works by psychologists; e.g., Gordon Allport, "What is a Trait of Personality?" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 25 (1931): 265-97.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

Robert Tannehill, in his article, "Mark as Narrative Christology," extended Markan character study by his treatment of the protagonist, Jesus.[32] He follows the first method of character study: the examination of the function of the characters' actions. By scrutinizing the roles and tasks Jesus takes on and how he carries them out in relation to other characters, Tannehill explores Jesus' titles.[33] For example, God designates Jesus as "Son of God." Tannehill looks to the way Jesus functions in subsequent narrative as ameliorator, protector, and corrector in order to see what his character role is.[34] Tannehill focuses primarily on the functions of Jesus' actions in the plot.[35]

Chatman's "open view of character" would extend Markan character study quite differently. The character would be reconstructed from descriptions by the narrator. What did Jesus say and do? How do others react to him? What are his motives as they are revealed by his actions, particularly as he interacts with other characters. The answers to these questions represent the material for the reconstruction of Jesus' character in the story. This reconstruction would include his personal traits, his values and world-view, his style and the dynamics of his relationships, the integrity of his words and actions, his struggle and possible development of character. In addition to attributes like "authoritative," "innovative" and "charismatic," David Rhoads suggests that "Jesus' traits might include "clever," "abrasive," "frustrated," "impatient," "determined," "loyal," and so on.[36] Jesus is not a round character; his traits to not conflict or change. Nonetheless, the full nature of his rich complex of many traits is only gradually unfolded in the course of the narrative. He is, then, at once a complex character who is not presented as changing or involved in conflictual development of his character.

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[32] Robert Tannehill, "Mark as Narrative Christology," Semeia 16 (1979): 57-95.

[33] Ibid., p. 59. [34] Ibid., p. 61. [35] Ibid., p. 78.

[36] Rhoads, "Literary Criticism," p. 7.

## The Story: The Disciples

Theodore Weeden's analysis of the Markan portrayal of the disciples has opened an intensive literary and historical study of the disciples.[37] Weeden highlighted the negative portrayal; others have sought a balanced appraisal. Some of these studies have focused on a literary character study. Mary Ann Tolbert argues that the few positive characteristics of the disciples are present, in part, "to make a good story."[38] Joanna Dewey explains that due to their negative portrayal, the disciples serve as a foil for the character of Jesus and provide questions or problems in the story as a way to maintain reader interest.[39] Be that as it may, the disciples are quite clearly "the most rounded characters in the story."[40] Loyal and courageous, with a capacity for sacrifice, and perceptive enough to follow Jesus they are, nonetheless, afraid, self-centered, dense and preoccupied with their own status and power. They are developing, conflictual, rounded characters.

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[37] Theodore Weeden, Mark--Traditions in Conflict (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), p. 14; hereafter, Weeden, Traditions.

[38] Mary Ann Tolbert, "Response to Robert Tannehill," 1978 Markan Seminar; Perspectives on the Parables: An Approach to Multiple Interpretations (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979); hereafter, "Response," and Perspectives.

[39] Joanna Dewey, Disciples of the Way: Mark on Discipleship. (The United Methodist Church, 1976); hereafter, Disciples; and "Mark 10:35-40 from the Perspective of the Implied Reader: The Disciples as a Narrative Device," Markan Seminar Paper, 1979; hereafter, "Device."

[40] Rhoads, "Literary Criticism," p. 8.

### The Story: Settings

It is helpful to recall from the interpretation of Mark in the second perspective how integral was the geographical setting of Galilee. The same could be said of other geographical settings such as the desert, the sea, the mountain, the synagogue, the house, the way, Jerusalem, and the temple. Each setting is to a degree part of the story's sense. Temporal settings, such as the Sabbath, nighttime, or Passover add significant richness to the story. Chatman argues that settings can serve multiple functions: shaping atmosphere, contributing to conflict, bringing out traits in a character, or providing commentary on the action.[41] Settings are, in short, part of a complex pattern.

Once the complex pattern of settings is integrated with the other parts of the story (characters, analysis of conflict and other events) the pattern of the whole Gospel becomes clearer. However, if Mark is thought of as a whole cloth of which the story is the pattern, then the material and techniques that make up the pattern require examination. The material and techniques are the "how" of the world-in-front-of-the-text: its rhetoric.

### The Rhetoric

The "how" of the narrative is rhetoric, the execution of the story into narrative. Stories are told in different ways; the author chooses, consciously or unconsciously, how he or she will tell it. Wayne C. Booth uses the traditional word "rhetoric" to depict all the choices and techniques an author uses to impose his or her fictional world upon the reader.[42] These choices and techniques include the plot (arrangement of the incident, which we have discussed), the narrator, point of view, standards of judgment, style, and other rhetorical devices such as the implied author and the ideal reader.

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[41] Chatman, Story, p. 140. On setting see Robert Liddell, A Treatise on the Novel (London: Muethen, 1977).

## Rhetoric: The Narrator

The "narrator," not the author, is the storyteller. The narrator is the rhetorical device that leads the reader through the story. In some stories the narrator may be a character. Or, an unnamed narrator may be outside the story being told but still be evident in the narrative as a storyteller. Some narrators have omniscience, others are limited, and still others only know what that character within the story could possibly know. The moment the critic becomes aware of the narrator, much of the rhetoric, the how of the narrative, becomes transparent.

Norman Petersen has identified the salient characteristics of the narrator in Mark.[43] The narrator exists outside the story being told; speaks in the third person; is an implied invisible presence in every scene, is capable of being anywhere--alone with Jesus or with his opponents--to "report" the action; displays full omniscience by narrating the thoughts, feelings, or sensory experiences of many characters; often turns away from the story to give direct "asides" to the reader, explaining a custom or translating a word or commenting on the story; and narrates the story from one overarching ideological point of view. Regarding the persistence of these characteristics throughout the story, Petersen notes: "the rhetorical consistency of Mark's narrative is nothing short of remarkable."[44]

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[42] Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction; "Distance and Point of View: An essay in Classification," Essays in Criticism 11 (1961); 60-79.

[43] Norman Petersen, "'Point of View' in Mark's Narrative," Semeia 12 (1978); 97-121; hereafter, "Point of View."

Juel's observations regarding the knowledge of the reader versus that of the characters in the story is developed further by Petersen. The narrator gives information to the reader which is not available to the characters in the story.[45] This ironic distance between the reader--what will later be called the ideal reader--and the characters in the play initiates the playful dynamic that leads to the merging of the actual interpreter's and audience's horizons with that of the text. As Frank Kermode highlights, the Markan text creates insiders and outsiders: a fact that has been known since Wrede's Messianic Secret.[46]

David Rhoads compares hearing Mark's story for the first time to "watching a Hitchcock movie in which the viewers become aware of a threatening situation at the opening of the film, then nervously watch the poor unsuspecting characters in the story find out for themselves."[47] Since the narrator is "the reader's guide through the imaginative world of the story," paying careful attention to the narrator's presence will illumine every episode of this story.[48]

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[44] Ibid., pp. 21-22.

[45] The omniscent narrator tells the reader in the first line--an 'aside' to the reader--that Jesus is the Christ, while the characters in the story must yet discover this for themselves.

[46] Kermode, Genesis of Secrecy, p. 61.

[47] Rhoads, "Literary Criticism," p. 9; Rhoads performs the text of Mark, by memory and in his own translation.

## Rhetoric: Point of View

Narrators have a point of view and a voice. This voice or point of view is evident, according to Boris Uspensky, in his Poetics of Composition, on four different planes: 1) the ideological (the general evaluative system of viewing the world conceptually; 2) the phraseological (the choice of words which introduce or identify point of view in dialogue); 3) the spatial and temporal (the physical place or the point in time from which someone views something); and 4) the psychological (states of the characters' minds, such as thinking, feeling, or experiencing).[49]

David Rhoads notes how the narrator of Mark guides the reader through the narrative, "showing us what the opponents think about Jesus or how Jesus sees the faith of a cripple or that the disciples are too afraid to ask questions or why Herod protected John."[50] A careful analysis of the point of view intensifies the critics' understanding of the important dynamics that are taking place between reader and text.[51]

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[48] Ibid., p. 10.

[49] Boris Uspensky, Poetics of Composition: The Structure of the Artistic Text and Typology of a Compositional Form (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

[50] Rhoads, "Literary Criticism," p.10.

[51] Ibid. Perhaps most fascinating is the reconstructing of ideological points of view. Every one of the ideological points of view in a text, according to Rhoads, "claims to be the truth and each struggles to assert itself against the opposing ones." Among the characters of the Markan story world, there consistently seem to be only two basic ideological points of view, two mentalities, represented: "thinking the things of God," evident in Jesus and most minor characters, and "think-

## Rhetoric: The Implied Author and the Ideal Reader

The analysis of rhetoric requires a more sophisticated understanding of the implied author and the reader. Even as there were multiple senses for the term "author" in the second model, an equally complicated set of senses for the term "reader" must be developed. These are similar but not exactly parallel to the senses of the word "author."

As you recall, the implied author is reconstructed from a narrative by uncovering the "core of norms and choices (standards of judgment) implicit in a work." That is, the implied author is equivalent to the overarching beliefs and values of the story along with the choices implicitly involved in "what" story is told and "how" it is told. As the implied author is distinct from the biographical, career, public, or traditional author, so the implied or ideal reader is different from the real reader, either original or present.

Every text projects an ideal reader by implying certain appropriate responses on behalf of the reader. Robert Scholes defines the "ideal reader" as a "property of the text itself, each text implying a particular ideal reader, equipped with certain kinds of knowledge and experience, and capable of being manipulated in certain ways."[52] In a sense, the ideal reader is "the image in the literary text of the reader as the implied author desires him."[53] Wayne C. Booth has argued that

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ing the things of men," reflected by the opponents of Jesus. The disciples vacillate between the two points of view. The tightness and consistency of the Markan narrative in this regard is really quite extraordinary; Jesus' teaching establishes the values, attitudes, and actions involved in thinking the things of God, and the characters either exemplify that teaching or they illustrate the contrary.

[52] Robert Scholes, "Cognition and the Implied Reader," Diacritics 5 (1975); 14.

[53] Ibid.

the aim of literature is to make the actual reader conform to the image of the fictional ideal reader implied by the text. As the actual author creates a "second self" in writing, so also the reader, by entering a fictional world through reading, becomes "the self whose beliefs must coincide with the (implied) author's" if the work is to have its full effect.[54]

No scholars have done extensive reconstruction of the ideal reader in Mark's narrative. Mary Ann Tolbert, in a paper to the Markan Seminar of the SBL, shows how Mark's story "creates its 'ideal reader' as it proceeds.[55] She argues that the story leads the ideal reader to identify with the hero, Jesus. When the disciples betray Jesus, they also betray the ideal reader.[56] Unlike the disciples, the ideal reader stays with Jesus from the trial, through the crucifixion, and to the tomb. By staying to the end, the reader is more faithful than the disciples or the women at the tomb. Thus, the implied author has made of the ideal reader a faithful disciple.[57] Joanna Dewey complicates this characterization of the relationship between the ideal reader and the implied author's depiction of the disciples.[58] She argues that the text alternately gives favorable and then unfavorable depictions of the disciples. Thus, the ideal reader is led to retain interest in the fate of the disciples to the end, when their fate is still left somewhat in doubt.[59]

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[54] Booth, Rhetoric, p. 138.

[55] Tolbert, "Response," p. 6. [56] Ibid. [57] Ibid.

[58] Dewey, "Device," p. 8; Dewey uses the term "implied reader" in a way which is equivalent to my use here of "ideal reader."

[59] Ibid., p. 8

Robert Tannehill works with Wolfgang Iser's model of the "implied reader," a concept somewhat different from the ideal reader.[60] The implied reader incorporates not only "the prestructuring of the potential meaning by the text" but also a real reader's "actualization of this potential through the reading process."[61] Tannehill argues that the text leads the reader initially to respond favorably to the disciples and to identify with them, but then to reject them along with their values. Through the negation of these accepted values of the disciples, the text leaves a gap for the actual reader to fill by seeking "a positive counter-balance elsewhere in the world familiar to him," which in this story world is the value system of Jesus.[62] The negation of the expected thus encourages the reader to take an active part in producing the meaning of the text by embracing the values of Jesus and deciding to follow his way.

## Summary

The present discussion among the members of the SBL Markan Seminar has generated a significant set of developments in explaining Markan verisimilitude. In particular, the use of the "ideal reader" and "implied reader" as models for interpreting Mark has intensified the movement towards the contemporary audience. It is precisely the interplay between the text and the contemporary audience that is rendered explicit by this discussion. The turn to the rhetoric of the text heightens the place of the rhetorical within the entire interpretive process, especially the rhetorical task of the interpreter with respect to the contemporary audience. Before exploring the rhetorical task of the interpreter in greater detail, a summary of this part of the model is in order.

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[60] Tannehill, "Mark as Narrative Christology," p. 57; note that Tannehill, in contrast to Tolbert and Dewey, argues that the reader identifies with the disciples. Identification or alignment with characters in a story is a complex matter. See, for example, Hans Robert Jones, "Levels of Identification of Hero and Audience," *New Literary History*, 5 (1974), 283-317.

[61] Ibid., p. 59.

[62] Ibid., p. 67.

This section began by taking seriously the peculiar characteristics of written discourse outlined in the prologue. This analysis lead to the examination of the internal meaning or sense in front of the text that creates a second order of referentiality. The world-in-front-of-the-text becomes a major concern for the interpreter.

Donald Juel's interpretation of Mark as a literary whole illustrated the beginnings of the discovery of the world-in-front-of-the-text of Mark. He thought of the text as a whole cloth within which inconsistencies might be resolved before turning to possible external explanations "behind the text." Explanations based upon previous tradition and redactions were underplayed as a result. Historical data played a significant but secondary role in the interpretive process; it corroborated the literary interpretation which was seen to be primary. Juel's work initiated exploration of the chief rhetorical device of the passion narrative: irony. Further inquiry into the Markan rhetoric discovered the interaction between the implied author and ideal reader through the narrator, who, in the case of Mark is nearly identical with the implied author. By means of a series of asides, the implied author moves the ideal reader through the Gospel. The important dynamic between ideal reader and actual reader placed the contemporary audience within the interpretive process. What follows is a development of this insight. The contemporary audience in this model will be a positive crucial point in understanding.

The move from ideal reader to contemporary audience also reintroduces referential claims. To this point in the model the text has been interpreted as a whole, but its range of referentiality has not been explored. The exploration of referentiality consistent with this model begins with the place of the contemporary reader within the model.

## The Fusion of Horizons

The contemporary reader will initially experience the distanciation of text from oral discourse and begin by means of the imagination to reconstruct the world-in-front-of-the-text. At the same time the reader will experience the distance between the world-in-front-of-the-text and the reader's own world. This is most intense when the ideal reader is significantly different from the contemporary audience. In some texts the ideal reader will be so easily fusible to the actual reader that the actual reader will not experience any intense sense of distanciation. In the case of Mark, however, most people experience, to a significant degree, this distanciation between ideal and actual reader. It is from this primary experience of distanciation that much questioning arises regarding the verisimilitude of Mark.

This initial experience of distance from the text's ideal reader, by the actual reader, feeds the interpretive process. The imagination engages in a series of playful reconstructions of the text's sense in an attempt to establish a meaning. The possible constructs are supplied by the reader's own past experience and encounters with world. The imaginative constructs already present within the reader are the beginning point for the interpretive process.

In this way, the interpretive process might be described, as Gadamer suggests, as imaginative play based upon prejudice.[63] Prejudice, in this sense, refers to the previous constructs supplied by the imagination of the reader and the reader's own horizon. A fusion of the text's horizon and the reader's takes place, if any understanding takes place. The merging of horizons (Horizonverschmelzung) is Gadamer's alternative to the psychologistic account of historical understanding.[64] Gadamer's appeal to the visual metaphor of horizon seeks to reset the issue in several crucial ways. A horizon represents the open, flexible, expanding character of an individual's context.[65] Each person has such a horizon. No person comes to a text neutral. Prejudices abound. However, the interpreter is not bound by this context; it is not a fixed world view, but an expanding horizon. It is subject to change, to unexpected occurrences.

This section of the third chapter explores the interpretive process under three topics: interpretation as play, prejudice and the encounter of the text's history of effects, and finally, the community of discourse within which the interpretation takes place.

## Interpretation as Play

To play is not to toy with an object but rather to enter into the game as a full participant.[66] The full participant recognizes and agrees to the rules of the game as the boundaries of interaction. Juel, when he took seriously the text of Mark as a whole cloth, adopted the rules of the text as his. He moved towards full participation in the text. The world-in-front-of-the-text became the boundary of his primary interpretation. The interior logic or rule of irony established a crucial ingredient in understanding the manner of play within the text. As a reader moving toward full participation in the text, he was like an athlete playing in a game that was encompassing him. Such play takes the text and interpretive process seriously; it does not toy with the text.

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[63] Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 245-47.

[64] Ibid., p. 345; David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle: Literature, History, and Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 95-96.

[65] Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 397-98; Wahrheit und Methode, p. 288.

This is a play, argues Gadamer, that is "freed from the subjective meaning" which often dominates the whole of modern aesthetics and the philosophy of man since Kant and Schiller.[67] Play in this sense is to fulfill the "mode of being of the work of art itself."[68] Rather than treat Mark as an object to be manipulated for purposes external to the world-in-front-of-the-text, this model would ask the interpreter to enter into the horizon of the text. The text then ceases to be the object and becomes the full fledged horizon in which the interpreter seeks to participate. With the professional athlete, the game cannot become the object, but rather the game "holds the player in its spell, draws him into play, and keeps him there"; so it is with the experience of the reader of the text.[69]

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[66] Does speaking of the interpretive process as imaginative play trivialize the text? Or does it suggest that we toy with the text as if it were a ball? Neither case is my point in using the language of play. Quite to the contrary, I borrow this language of play, in part, to underscore the serious intensity of the interpretive process. Rather than suggest that we toy with the text, I use the metaphor of play to describe the interpreter's full participation within the interpretive process; cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 91-97.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

The interpretation of a text is similar to the performance of a drama. In a drama, it is not "the absence of a fourth wall"[70] alone that turns the play into a show. It requires the openness towards the spectator and the spectator's participation. The spectator's participation encloses the play. "The audience only completes what the play as such is."[71] Once the audience has entered into the play, the experience of the play is as a reality that surpasses the audience.

Thus the interpretation of Mark might better be compared to the performance of a text. In particular, the interpretation of the biblical text might be compared to the conductor's interpretation of a Mozart symphony as it is performed by a chamber orchestra. We have a group of people who may be playing the piece incorrectly, or at best, poorly. The score may include misprints, or the orchestra may simply misunderstand the signs on the score. Even if the orchestra is quite technically capable of performing the score, critics might conclude that it is unfaithful to the score; the performance lacks a certain truthfulness. Though all of these faults might be present, the score could be to some degree faithfully enacted or performed.[72]

A model of the interpretation and of the interpreter based on this analogy of the performance of a musical score would not exclude the important work of the historical critic. The corruption of the score would require careful textual criticism. The range of possibilities for the particular form of symphony, its Sitz im Leben, and the editorial developments of the form in the hand of the master, would certainly require the work of the form and redaction critic. But these would not be the focus; nor would the problems raised by them be the primary concern of the performance. Any model based on this analogy between the performance of a symphony and the performance of the biblical text would focus on the performance itself as the crucial context and norm for the interpretation. This shift in focus, though not rejecting the historical-critical method, places the conclusions and the significance of those conclusions in a completely different order of value.

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[69] Ibid., p. 96.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid., p. 97.

[72] Cf. Patrick R. Keifert, "Mind Reader and Maestro: Models for Understanding Biblical Interpreters," Word and World I, No. 2 (Spring 1981): 153-68.

Underlying this model is a rejection of any suggestion that explication [explicatio] must be separated from application [applicatio] in the interpretive process. The interpreter, on the contrary, must enter into the interpretive play. In this model, interpretation is not completed until it is performed by the contemporary audience.

The traditional sense of appropriation sees it as a separate act wherein the text is made "relevant" to the present interests of the interpreter. Gadamer does not intend appropriation or application [applicatio] in this sense. Anwendung (application) is not to be confused with Aneignung (appropriation). The danger of appropriation, as developed in the second model, lies in the system of psychologism and subjectivism it implies. So often the move to make a text "relevant" or appropriate is equated with a capricious whim on the part of the interpreter.[73]

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[73] In this chapter I have sought to avoid the psychologism with

This problem with traditional conceptions of application [applicatio] has been explored to some extent in the previous chapter. This traditional conception presumes a clear separation of meaning and significance, to use Hirsch's vocabulary once again. This presumption makes the "fundamental mistake of a linear objectivism. . ."[74] This tradition appears to be unaware of what mediates and makes possible understanding. It presumes that the text has a meaning-in-itself "which only needs to be unfolded."[75] "Hermeneutics," Gadamer holds, "has to see through the dogmatism of a 'meaning-in-itself' just as much as critical philosophy had to see through the dogmatism of experience."[76] It is precisely this "seeing through dogmatism" that is the next consideration.

## History and Story

Within this model interpretation has been described as the fusion of the text's and reader's horizons. This process of fusion was first understood as play. Under that topic interpretation required a full participation in the world-in-front-of-the-text. If this is the case,

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which the last chapter wrestled. I have shifted the focus from the mind of the author to the text as a literary whole. I have taken seriously the distanciation of the text from its various contexts. In the following chapter another tack will be taken to accomplish this same goal: to avoid the notion that applicatio implies whimsical subjectivism. In effect, both this chapter and the next represent two responses to the suggestion that linguistic based interpretive models necessarily lead to a capricious appropriation of the text in the contemporary situation. Cf. Hoy, pp. 85ff. Hoy effectively describes and defends Gadamer's position regarding appropriation; however, Hoy fails to understand Ricoeur's presentation of the same topic.

[74] Hoy, The Critical Circle, p. 93.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 395 (WM 448).

the next step is to ask, "What enables this participation?" "What makes possible the merging of the reader's horizon with that of the text?" The answer to these questions lies with the second topic: prejudice and the encounter with the text's history-of-effects.

A reader projects "a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text."[77] The first words in a novel begin the projections; the reader creates a whole that accommodates this line and the reader's expectations.[78] The projecting depends upon a set of particular expectations that the reader has of the text. These expectations arise from what Martin Heidegger called "fore-conceptions."[79] Fore-conceptions are the underlying presuppositions that enable understanding. They are the source of the imaginative possibilities that shape the projections of possible meanings of the text. Such presuppositions can be as obvious and formal as the lexical possibilities for any particular word before it is understood in any particular setting.[80] Mark begins by announcing, "This is the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God." The reader has a complex set of terms--gospel, Christ, Son of God--from which to project a possible set of meanings. As the last chapter argued, words take on their meaning only when they are established within a particular context. The interpreter, in conjunction with the text's and contemporary audience's horizons, provides that crucial context under this model. These presuppositions are the first mediation between text and reader.

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[77] Ibid., p. 236.

[78] Cf. Hirsch, Validity, p. 170.

[79] Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 150.

[80] Cf. Chapter II above where Hirsch's discussion of lexical possibilities is developed in detail.

That we have fore-conceptions and that they affect our projections of the text's meaning does not imply that we are unable to "discover that there is a difference between our own customary usage and that of the text."[81] Upon first consideration, the notion of fore-conceptions might appear to legitimize an uncritical interpretation. As if we could say, "Since the only way I can understand the text is through my own fore-conceptions, I can only understand the text insofar as it meets my expectations." This is not necessarily the case. Presuppositions can and must be critically examined.[82]

This critical examination of presuppositions takes place most clearly when the interpreter is pulled up short by the text. When the text does not mean what we expected, we are forced to examine our fore-conceptions. We ask, "What in our pre-understanding prevents us from understanding the text?" Such a question opens our pre-understandings to examination. Often such a question uncovers hidden and unknown pre-understandings.

In this sense interpretive experience is refractory[83] or negative.[84] The negative experience of failing to understand a text leads to productive interpretation. We do not experience the text as we expected. Examination of our prejudices leads to new projections and intensified self-knowledge. Interpretive experience has this refractory character. The encounter with the text usually does not confirm our prejudices but requires us to examine them and search for more appropriate interpretations. We add possible meanings and increase our ability to understand.

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[81] Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 237.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Edward Schillebeeckx, Interim Report on the books Jesus and Christ (New York: Crossroads, 1981); hereafter, Interim Report.

[84] Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 317.

Prejudices enable projections of possible meanings of the text. Combined fore-conceptions and projections are pre-judgments of the text's meaning. Pre-judgment--or as Gadamer terms it--prejudice is a judgment that is given before all the elements that determine a situation have been examined. Prejudices provide the material for the projections of possible meanings of the whole. Effective interpretation, therefore, does not entail neutrality nor extinction of one's self "but the conscious assimilation of one's own fore-meanings and prejudices."[85] We are not to be neutral--if such a position is humanly possible; rather, we are to be aware of our own bias.

Gadamer distinguishes between unfruitful and fruitful prejudices. All prejudice makes it possible to engage in and achieve understanding. Some prejudice proves fruitful in understanding a text. The problem that arises with prejudice is the problem of "hidden prejudices," unexamined and unknown.[86] Such prejudices create a "tyranny . . . that makes us deaf to the language that speaks to us in tradition." Gadamer, in a crucial addition to the development of post-Enlightenment philosophy, analyzes the prejudice of the Enlightenment as a major example of a tyranny of hidden prejudice.

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[85] Ibid., p. 238.

[86] Ibid., p. 239.

The Enlightenment's attempt to set humankind free to use reason also brought with it the prejudice that all authority and tradition are wrong. According to the Enlightenment, all prejudice prevents human understanding. According to Gadamer, the Enlightenment neglected to see that authority "rests on recognition and hence an act of reason itself, which aware of its own limitations, accepts that others have better understanding."[87] Rather than understanding authority as coercive power over human reason, it is possible to understand authority as the exercise of reason.

Descartes' method of radical doubt leads to a dead end in interpretation. Common sense demands that we learn to trust certain witnesses, since we have reason to believe they know more than we do regarding a particular issue. Methodological doubt in these instances would represent a dead end for practical living. Initially willingness to trust authority represents a growing ability to understand and adapt to life.

Wayne C. Booth has described this post-Enlightenment perspective on prejudice and authority as a return to the classical conception of a rhetoric of assent over against a methodological doubt.[88] A rhetoric of assent requires a graduated assent to truth claims. This graduated assent does not depend upon methodological doubt but upon trusting in previous experience until there is reason to do otherwise.

The major bearer of prejudices and authority is, of course, tradition. Those prejudices that have survived the passage of time are tradition. Temporal distance helps the interpreter to distinguish between fruitful and unfruitful prejudice. However, tradition must not be understood as some coercive determinism from the past that dominates and imprisons the free and rational person. Quite to the contrary, "tradition is constantly an element of freedom and of history itself. Even the most genuine and solid tradition does not persist by nature because of the inertia of what once existed."[89] Tradition must be "affirmed, embraced, cultivated."[90] Tradition is that part of historical change that acts to preserve. It is, however, not the act of the past to bind the present, but the act of the present to preserve the past.

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[87] Ibid.

[88] Booth, Dogma.

Since tradition is such an active, free and responsible action, it is quite inappropriate to create an abstract antithesis "between tradition and historical research, between history and knowledge."[91] The effect of living tradition and the effect of historical study must constitute a unity. Historical study selects and creates tradition. Historical study is, then, an essential part of creating a living tradition.

Tradition and prejudice provide the mediation between the text and the reader. The process of merging text and reader leads the reader to explore the tradition, or the history-of-effects of the text and the reader's own tradition.

The circle that moves from tradition to interpreter and back again is not a methodological circle. It is not best described in terms of subjective and objective moments. The circle is primarily ontological; it grows out of the life situation of the text and the reader.

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[89] Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 250.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid., p. 251.

The mediation between text and interpreter has been explored. Appropriation of the text takes place by the aid of prejudices that have been tested by the passage of time. Tradition represents, not the coercion of the past upon the present, but the choice of the present to appropriate the past. Each appropriation makes its own claims to truth. No one "appropriation can claim to be the only objective and correct one; it can only be useful for a particular time and purpose."[92] Applicatio (Anwendung) is not merely a later, "explicit effort; it is already implicitly operant in the very beginnings of the encounter with the literary text and the historical past."[93]

Gadamer's insistence that each appropriation is conditioned by and relative to its historical setting does not answer all the questions raised by the problem of making the text one's own. Even though we have recognized the problems in an understanding of appropriation as a separate and explicit effort, we have not answered all questions regarding the acquisition of the text for one's own purposes. In highlighting the context of the interpretation of the text as the interpreter's context, especially the contemporary audience, some might conclude we have forsaken stability in interpretation. Hirsch might suggest that this conception of applicatio is capricious relevance. This need not be the case for two reasons: The first was developed in the prologue to this part of the inquiry, namely, the autonomy of the text over against the interpreter. The second lies in realization that the interpreter's own context is not sui generis. It is itself shaped by the tradition in which the interpreter stands and the text is part of this tradition. David Couzens Hoy summarizes Gadamer's response accurately when he asserts that for Gadamer, "the immanent text is both context-free and context-bound. It is context-free in the sense that the text is its own reference, and context-bound in that the text appears to readers in a horizon of interest, in a context implicitly brought to the text by the reader."[94]

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[92] Hoy, Critical Circle, p. 94.

[93] Ibid.

The image of horizon expresses this context-bound character; it also expresses the gradation by importance of evidence in any judgments which the interpreter makes. Some evidence is near and some far; most is in between. The interpreter can discern different degrees of plausibility within the moving limits of the interpreter's horizon. It moves with the interpreter, and the interpreter moves within it. For Gadamer, knowledge of the text in-itself is not possible, but it is possible to understand the horizon of the text by the expansion of the contemporary horizon.

The horizon of the past that enables the text and the horizon of the contemporary reader can be fused. This does not mean, however, that the interpreter can completely appropriate the text's horizon; that would be equivalent to knowing the past as it was for itself.[95] As I noted earlier, the interpretation of a text causes the interpreter's horizon to broaden and expand. The refractory character of interpretation comes into play and tolerance is induced.[96]

Somewhere in the process of understanding, the interpreter's and text's horizons take on the to and fro playful characteristic, described above.[97] In this process, one becomes aware of the difference between the present horizon and past horizons.[98] This intensifies the sense of the effects of tradition on the present moment of interpretation. This focuses on the provisional character of any one interpretation. The double awareness of previous horizons and the provisional character of the present horizon is what Gadamer calls wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein (consciousness of the history-of-effects hermeneutic consciousness or hermeneutic awareness).[99] Thus, Gadamer argues that "[a] truly historical thinking must also think its own historicity."[100]

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[94] Ibid., p. 95.
[95] Ibid., p. 96.
[96] Ibid.

Thus, the fusing of horizons is not the reconciliation of horizons: "a flattening out of the historical and perspectival difference."[101] A single horizon may result,[102] but the horizon remains in flux. Hermeneutic consciousness maintains a tension between historical consciousness of the past and the strictly present horizon (Gegenwartshorizont). This tension is precisely what allows the interpreter to become aware of his pre-understandings.

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[97] Gadamer compares this process as analogous to understanding another person (as a Thou) insofar as placing oneself in the other's place (Sichversetzen) is never disregarding oneself (Von-sich-absehen). In this matter I prefer to speak of a You-You discussion rather than the I-Thou since the goal of the conversation is not to merge persons but to have the subject matter take over. Cf. Hoy, p. 97 and Marvin Brown, "The Interpreter's Audience: A Study of Rhetoric and Hermeneutics." (Unpublished Dissertation, Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, California, 1980), p. 65; hereafter, Audience.

[98] Hoy, Critical Circle, p. 97.

[99] Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 310-11.(WM 282).

[100] Ibid., p. 345; Hoy, Critical Circle, p. 97.

[101] Hoy, Critical Circle, p.97.

[102] Ibid.

Though Gadamer's notion of hermeneutical consciousness refers to the interpretation of all historical artifacts, it is centrally true in regard to texts. The past is often and primarily available to us through texts. The past is in this sense a story and is understood primarily then as literary text. For Gadamer, literary writing becomes paradigmatic for the character of all interpretation.[103]

Writing preserves the connection of the past with the present tradition. A text, such as Mark, represents a continuing bridge with the past. The mediation of prejudices and tradition is primarily linguistic. Language or linguisticality (Sprachlichkeit) is the medium and setting for the interpretive process.[104]

If we are to take seriously this linguistic character of understanding and textual interpretation, then the analogy of question and answer can be useful. Gadamer imagines the interpretation of the text as the playful to and fro interaction between two speakers. The interpreter attempts to understand the question to which the text is answer. This is, of course, devoid of the psychologistic tendencies of interpretive systems that focus on a reference to the original reader or author's meaning.

The two speakers participate in a conversation that eventually merges or fuses the two horizons. The linguistic tradition that mediates the conversation will be brought to consciousness in the process of the conversation. The subject matter of the conversation will--and here I part company with Gadamer--take over the conversation. The two speakers will lose self-conscious interest and allow the mutual subject matter to become the central consciousness.[105]

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[103] Ibid., p. 397f.

[104] Ibid.

## The Community of Discourse

The discussion to this point has focused on the to and fro interaction between the interpreter and the text. The interpreter's calling[106] is more than a private event or a looking back. It is a public work that looks to the future as well. The character of interpretation as a public work[107] moves the focus to the contemporary audience, the silent partner up to this point. However, this partner's role has been present and presumed since the beginning of the discussion of this model.

Marvin Brown, in his attempt to find the audience in modern hermeneutics, has argued that "[i]nterpretation is both a process of integration [Gadamer's merging of horizons] *for* someone else, and a demand of acknowledgement which is a speaking *to* someone."[108] Interpretation involves the speaking to someone; one does not interpret merely for oneself but for someone else.[109]

"[T]he interpreter, if he or she wants to be understood, can only be understood by a listener, and can only come to a self-understanding through the mediation of communal understanding," Brown argues.[110] The contemporary audience is "a co-constituent" of interpretation, "and the problems which the inclusion of the audience presents are problems which should be faced by a theory of interpretation."[111]

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[105] David Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination* (New York: Crossroads, 1981), p. 136, n. 8; hereafter, *Imagination*.

[106] Brown, *Audience*, p. 61; Booth, *Dogma*, p.210.

[107] Brown, *Audience*, p. 66. For example, one does not write a commentary on Mark for private purposes alone but has a particular audience and future use for one's labors.

[108] Ibid., p. 175.

[109] Gadamer has underscored how important it is to see the place of tradition standing behind the interpreter, as it were. What I am suggesting is that the community and tradition also stand in front of the interpreter as the task of interpreting the text for and with the community or contemporary audience takes place.

The possible audiences available for the interpreter are a large though finite number. David Tracy has most recently spoken of three basic publics for the theologian; these three publics serve well for the possible interpreter of Mark: the academy, the church, and the general society or popular culture.[112]

In each of these cases the interpretive act recognizes its public character and "the public self of the individual."[113] This recognition is the ownership of the public responsibility to be intelligible and credible in one's interpretation of the text. As a result of this recognition, it becomes clear, once again, that the task of interpretation involves the traditional task of rhetoric.

Early rhetoricians distinguished five elements of rhetoric which together comprised rhetorical method: invention, arrangement, style, delivery, and memory. The first element, invention, was concerned with the process of finding what could be effectively said in particular situations or cases. For Aristotle, it was the real basis of rhetoric, as an "art."[114]

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[110] Brown, Audience, p. 189.

[111] Ibid. The purpose of this inquiry is not to develop and follow out these problems but to include them in the rough sketch each of these models of interpretation require.

[112] Tracy, Imagination, pp. 3-4.

[113] Brown, Audience, p. 208.

Invention best describes the basic task of the interpreter within this model. The interpreter discovers the rhetoric of the text, as did the Markan interpreters discussed in this chapter, and discovers the possible ways of effectively presenting and speaking within their community of discourse. In the case of Juel and company, this is the community of the academy.

The task of invention is the development of "proofs." In Greek, the word for "proof" is derived from the same term as the active verb "to persuade" and the passive verb "to believe." Pistis means all three of these things.[115] Within the task of interpretation, then, is this task of invention or development of "proofs" in relation to the audience for which the interpretation is given. The argument of the text and of the interpretation will have proofs which can only be completed within the community for which the interpretation is given. Within the interpretive task the discovery of the arguments completed within the community may not be immediately available in the interpretation. Seldom does a speech partly expose its enthymemes, "performative voice," or many of the other rhetorical inventions necessary to complete a persuasive speech. They are, nonetheless, essential to the interpretive task.[116]

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[114] Aristotle, Rhetoric, III,ii.

[115] William M. A. Grimaldi, S. J., "Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric," Hermes: Zeitschrift für Klassiche Philologie, Heft 25 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, GMBH, 1972), pp. 58-59 where Grimaldi discusses the three senses of pistis in Aristotle's work and their place in rhetorical invention.

[116] For a discussion of the issues regarding the role of proofs especially enthymemes in rhetorical theory and method, see Brown, pp. 69ff. For a particularly helpful summary, see Richard McKeon, "Aristotle's Conception of Language, and the Arts of Language," Classical Philology 41 (January 1947):43.

Terms of comparison both within the text to be interpreted and the interpreter's interpretation also can be completed by the audience. Such terms as comparison, illustration, analogy, simile, parable, paradigm, model, and metaphor, all refer to the act of establishing relationships between things, events, and words, in terms of similarities and differences.[117]

In the discovery of such arguments by means of example that are completed within the audience, the importance of referential claims through these examples is seen. For, as the interpreter discovers these connections between the horizon of the audience and that of the text, the interpreter moves beyond claims to an explication of the meaning of the text, the internal system of meaning, and takes up the task of indicating where the text proposes what is the case in the audience's horizon. This insight is crucial to the relationship between meaning and reference within this model for explaining Markan verisimilitude. The interpreters of Mark in the Markan Seminar, by examining the rhetoric of Mark, also began in their interpretation to point to the arguments that needed completion. The audience to which they were writing, the academy, would necessarily have different standards and criteria of credibility and intelligiblity than the church, for example. Therefore, the truth claims of Mark cannot be exhausted either by reference to the meaning system of the text itself, nor the events behind the text, but only through the completion of the text's argument through the merging of the contemporary audience's horizon with that of the text.

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[117] Marvin Brown places these on a continuum, with the simple comparison on one end, and the metaphor on the other. It is possible to see the continuum move from a strong emphasis upon the similarity between the terms with a corresponding weak emphasis upon the difference to a weak emphasis upon the similarity, and a corresponding strong emphasis upon the difference; "this describes the breadth of arguments by example:"

comparison-----------------------------------------------------metaphor

(strong similarity--
weak difference)

(weak similarity--
strong difference)

When Robert Tannehill began to discover how the text of Mark demanded a change in the implied reader, he was, in effect, highlighting the incompleteness of any interpretation that did not take into account the contemporary audience. The text does more than propose an alternative way-of-being-in-the-world; it requires the contemporary audience to complete many of its arguments in their own experience. The interpreter, such as Tannehill, aids this process by discovering possible ways of completing the examples in the contemporary horizon. Tannehill discovers what will make the text plausible to the audience that he addresses. The character of that plausibility does and should take the shape of the community of discourse, the Society of Biblical Literature, within which he works. He does more than make the text meaningful; he extends its referential claims by completing them in the contemporary audience.

## Summary and Critique of the Model

This model successfully explains the text as a whole without losing important referential claims of the text. Although it does not engage in a search behind-the-text for the events in the life of Jesus, it does not discount the place of the first model in the interpretive enterprise. Nor has the historical character of the text been lost. The proposed interpretation of the text involves historical corroboration. In this case, the historical moment is understood as a negative check on the interpreter's discovery of possible ways to join the horizon of the text with the horizon of the contemporary audience. As in the case of Donald Juel's interpretation of the trial narrative, the ever growing knowledge of Jewish and Hellenistic materials plays an important role in corroborating Juel's proposed interpretation. Indeed, one suspects that part of the argument that makes Juel's interpretation as persuasive as it is, is that appeal to corroborative evidence. Therefore, in this model, the historical has an important but limited place in the interpretive task.

The historical character has not been ignored in this model in one other important manner: the mediation of the two horizons is dependent upon the history-of-effects of the text. What makes this conception of tradition and history more appropriate for this paradigm of the inquiry is equally clear. This mediation through history takes place through the media of language.

The importance of the linguisticality of historical mediation necessitates the place of the contemporary audience in the interpretive process. The advantages of this inclusion are considerable. Most important for the purposes of this inquiry is the recognition of important referential claims that can only be understood in light of the relationship between the audience, the interpreter, and the text.

The most significant advantage of this model lies in its overcoming the seeming impasse between the linguistic and the historical, between meaning and significance, and between the ancient audience and the contemporary audience.[118] The discovery of the interpreter as rhetor returns balance to the relationship between explicatio and applicatio.[119] It furthermore lessens the difference between theory and praxis in the interpretation of the Biblical text within the contemporary audiences that now interpret it.[120]

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[118] Cf. Marvin Brown's discussion of what separates the original audience and contemporary audience. He argues that the exegencies of the two situations separate them; Brown, Audience, p. 196.

This model can, however, lend itself to an "escape into meaning" whereby questions of reference, of both first and second order, become superfluous. In the case in which first order reference is ignored, the historical claims of the text can be lost. Second order referential claims might be ignored in favor of some supposed power of the word to transform the audience without making persuasive claims to grasp reality.

This possible misuse of the model will be discussed in some detail when, in chapter five, the implications of these models for a narrative theology will be discussed.

This model does not take into account the internal structures of the text; structures which have in the modern period become apparent and the object of considerable interpretation. It is to this concern that chapter four turns.

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[119] Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana; this is an excellent example of hermeneutic integrated with rhetoric.

[120] Johannes-Baptist Metz, "Relationship of Church and World in the Light of Political Theology," Theology and Renewal 2, Renewal of Religious Structures, L. K. Shook (New York, 1968), p. 260. Metz observes that "the fundamental hermeneutical problem of theology is not the problem of how systematic theology stands in relation to history, but what is the relation between theory and practice." Though I do not develop this sentiment in this inquiry, this model could support such a program of theological revision.

# CHAPTER FOUR

## NARRATIVE CODES AND STRUCTURES:
## IRONY AND THE DEPTH OF TRUTH

This chapter continues this inquiry's exploration of the relationship between text and reality within contemporary general theories of hermeneutics and develops the topics of former chapters. The first chapter ended by observing the importance of rhetorical shape and shaping of historical narrative but did not examine it in detail. The third chapter pursued this line of inquiry as does this chapter. This chapter's model of structuralist interpretation begins with the rhetorical shape of the text. Unlike the third model, this model's focus is on more and different data within the text itself. The text's context, culture and nature as mediated through language, informs the text's production and interpretation. The author, the central factor of the second chapter, is seen in this chapter as the nexus between these possibilities given by culture and nature and the specific text which is produced. The contemporary reader and audience, major concerns of the third chapter, are subordinate to the text itself. In short, all four foci of interpretation in this chapter's model are subservient to the text.

The chapter is divided into five sections: The first section gives a preliminary definition of structure, structuralism, and structural exegesis and warrants for a structuralist method. The second section extends the inquiry's concern for how written narratives record truth.

The examination of the "how" of narrative focuses on the narrative's rhetorical shape. This section uses the work of Hayden White[1] to focus on a structuralist examination of historical narrative. His work takes as its beginning point the work of structuralist literary criticism and applies it to nineteenth century historiography. White concludes that the deep structures of historical narrative involve an ironic character. This conclusion parallels Juel's analysis regarding Mark's surface structures and leads in the third section to a recent structuralist interpretation of Mark 15 and 16 by Daniel and Aline Patte.[2] The Pattes' method of structural exegesis, which is dependent upon the work of Algirdas Julien Greimas,[3] is for this inquiry's purposes sufficiently compatible with White's method. In light of the Pattes' analysis, Mark 15 and 16 is seen as an ironic structure dominated by the values expressed in the interpretation of Jesus' death. These values uncovered by the structuralist are the second order of referentiality of great interest to this inquiry. The fourth section is an example of theological reflection appropriate to this model. It examines these second order referents of irony and cross in Mark by developing Robert Scharlemann's general discussion of these same referents.[4] Evaluation of the fourth model is the last section of the chapter.

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[1] Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); hereafter cited as White, Metahistory.

[2] Daniel and Aline Patte, Structural Exegesis: From Theory to Practice: Exegesis of Mark 15 and 16 Hermeneutical Implications (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978); hereafter cited as Patte, Structural Exegesis.

[3] Algirdas Julien Greimas, Sémiotique et Sciences Sociales (Paris: Seuil, 1976); Maupassant: La Sémiotique du Texte (Paris: Seuil, 1976); "Elements of a Narrative Grammar," Diacritics, (March 1977), pp. 23-40; Sémantique Structurale (Paris: Larousse, 1966); with F. Rastier, "The Interactions of Semiotic Constraints," Yale French Studies 41 (1968):68-95.

## Definition of Terms

The terms "structure" and "structuralism" are relatively new and fashionable in the United States[5] and subject to considerable confusion and varied use. Structuralist narrative interpretation extends the general meaning of the word which usually raises the image of the way in which a building is framed, or the way the parts of any whole are arranged among themselves. The structure of a narrative is what an internal analysis of the whole narrative reveals. All of the elements and the relationships between those elements are taken into account in a structuralist analysis of narrative. Each arrangement of these elements or system of these relationships are evaluated as either fundamental or subordinate to the text's meaning effect. According to A. J. Greimas, a text has such an integrated effect upon the interpreter or reader.[6] The meaning effect then is the point back from which the interpreter works to understand the various elements and arrangement of those elements that produce this effect.

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[4] Scharlemann, The Being of God, pp. 153-83.

[5] Alfred M. Johnson, Jr., Structuralism and Biblical Hermeneutics: A collection of Essays in The Pittsburgh Theological Monograph Series, No. 22, General Editor, Dikran Y. Hadidian (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: The Pickwick Press, 1979), p. 30; Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1980), p. 428; hereafter cited as Thiselton, Two Horizons; cf., Anthony C. Thiselton, "Structuralism and Biblical Studies; Method or Ideology?" Expository Times, 89 (1978), pp. 329-35; Edgar V. McKnight, Meaning in Texts: The Historical Shaping of a Narrative Hermeneutics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), esp. pp. ix-x.

[6] Greimas, Sémantique structurale and Du Sens (Paris: Seuil, 1970); "effect de sense," that is, an "effect" offered to our perception, e.g., comparable to a "sound effect."

Early structuralism developed out of a concern for the "literariness" of the text.[7] This concern for "literariness" turned the interpreter's eyes and ears to sound, rhythm, and rhyme even where they might not be intended by the author but still produced a specific meaning effect. The work among Russian Formalists and the Prague Literary Circle[8] had its parallel in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure.[9] He examined the character of language apart from its referentiality. The basis of this theory was laid in his Course in General Linguistics.[10] He distinguished between speech (parole), which is the language as used by an individual speaker in order to convey a specific message, and language (langue), which is "the sum of word-images stored in the minds of all individuals." According to Saussure, language (langue) is social, a function of the culture, "assimilated by the individual."[11] It is not merely a list of learned words, but an organized system--a complex relationship of "word-images." The arrangement of language (its "deep structures") occurs below the level of the observed, empirical reality, in the unconscious or unreflective level of the human mind.[12]

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[7] Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), especially Boris Eichenbaum, "The Theory of the 'Formal Method'," pp. 99-143; J. Vachek (ed.), A Prague School in Linguistics (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1964).

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ferdinand de Saussure. Course in General Linguistics, ed. C. Bally and A. Séchehaye, tr. Wade Baskin. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959). This is not to suggest a genetic relationship between Saussure and the Russian Formalists or Prague Literary Circle. To trace linguistic structuralism back to Saussure is to take structuralism in a narrow sense; McKnight, Meaning in Texts, pp. 104-07.

[10] Saussure, Course; Saussure "showed that diachronic development is not the only process to be taken notice of in the study of a language, and that in fact the history of a word may give a seriously inadequate account of its meaning. In addition to its historical aspect language has a 'systematic' aspect (Saussure did not use the term 'structure'); it embodies laws of equilibrium which operate on its elements and which, at any given point in its history, yield a synchronic system. Since the basic relation in language is that between the sign and its meaning, and since meanings are relative to one another, the system is one of oppositions and differences; while it is synchronic because the meaning-relations are interdependent," Jean Piaget, Structuralism, tr. and ed. by Chaninah Machler (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 76.

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[11] Saussure, Course, p. 140: "What diachronic linguistics studies is not relations between coexisting terms of a language-state but relations between successive terms that are substituted for each other in time"; cf. pp. 99-101.

[12] Language, according to Saussure, is not merely a list of words, but an organized whole: a system of words which are related to each other in specific ways.

Furthermore, words are not the basic unit of the system of language. They are, in the language of structural linguistics, signs. Each sign has two components: a sound-image (a sound when it is articulated, a graphical image when written), and a concept. Saussure distinguished the sound-image, the signifiant (commonly translated as "signifier"), and the concept, the signifié (translated as "signified"). Their relation to one another is the signification. A sign is commonly represented as follows:

$$\frac{\text{signifier}}{\text{signified}}$$

Thus the sign "tree" has for a signifier the sound-image "tree" and for the signified the concept "tree." The signifier and signified are in an arbitrary relationship. This is made most clear by the fact that various successions of phonetic (or graphic) elements are related to similar concepts. Nonetheless, the relationship between signifier and signified is necessary. The signifier without a signified would be a sound or graphic without signification. Similarly a concept, or signified, cannot signify anything without some expression or signifier.

Each sign is within a system of other signs that establish the value of any particular sign. By value Saussure meant the system of relationships between one sign and several others closely related to it. Patte gives the example at the level of signifieds: the English word "education." This signified is related to "school," "teacher," "books," and other related signifieds. Together these other signifieds create the system within which the value of the word "education" is set.

Each side of a sign, its signifier and signified, has its own set of relationships, structure and system of value with respect to other terms

Drawing by analogy on the work of de Saussure, contemporary structuralism seeks to understand the deep structures or those arrangements, codes, or rules for arrangement of elements in any particular cultural artifact, myth, or speech act. These codes or structures are not on the surface, at the level of the observed, but below empirical reality. This does not exclude the possibility that the persons who

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of language. Thus, the system of signs has two separate systems of value and each sitn is a complex linguistic entity; Saussure, Course, pp. 13-14.

Each signifier has a form and substance. The form of a signifier (or formal internal organization of the signifier) is determined by its position in a system of signifiers. The form of the signifier organizes a "substance" (for instance, one or more phonemes, that is, one or several phonetic units) which can be apprehended independently of its form. The same is true of the signified: it has a form (a specific manifestation of the structure of a system of signifieds) and a substance (one or several "semes," that is, one or several semantic units).

The value of any one sign then has two important components: the form of its signifier (its "value" in a system of signifiers" and the form of its signified (its "value" in a system of signifieds). Two structural systems establish the value of anyone sign: the structure of the system of signifiers and the structure of the system of signifieds.

Louis Hjelmslev in his Prolegomena (Copenhagen, 1957) and with J. Uldall in Outline of Glossematics (Copenhagen, 1957) have developed a theory "which demonstrated that the sign was not the basic linguistic unity." For instance, the sign, "veau" (French for "calf") has as its signifier two phonemes (/v/ and /o/). These two phonemes are the substance of the signifier. The form of the signifier is established by the French phonetic system and its structure which oppose this specific combination of phonemes to other phonetic units. In a parallel manner, Hjelmslev and Greimas note that the same is true for signifieds. Once again, as in the case for the French word "veau," the word is constituted by three semes: /male/young/cattle. These three semes are the substance of the signified; Daniel Patte, What Is Structural Exegesis? (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), pp. 21-30; cf. p. 30 actually reads "signifier" for "signified." I believe this to be a typographical error.

As semantic system for Saussure determines the signified's form and structure which opposes this combination of semes to other semantic units. Each of the components of a sign, the signifier and the signified, have systems or structures which combine to produce the meaning effect that the speaker and listener experience. The two components of the sign have their respective systems or structures, the phonetic system and the semantic structure, and relate them in various manners.

pass on, for example, myths are completely unaware of their structure, "though this would not be usual, but rather partial and intermittent."[13] A person who speaks is not always aware of the rules or code of grammar or phonology but nonetheless uses them. Nor, if asked, could such a person be able to supply all of these laws. What the observer sees on the surface is only the "evidence and product of the structure."[14] It is precisely this structure that is the deep structure of the text. Compare the following figure:[15]



Figure 6.--Deep Structures

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[13] Claude Levi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked (New York: Harper & Row, 1969(, English trans. of Mythologuiques I: Le cru et le cuit (Paris: Plon, 1964); for example, Levi-Strauss claims that "behind what seemed to be the superficial contingency and incoherent diversity of the law governing marriage I discerned a small number of simple principles, thanks to which a very complex mass of customs and practices, at first sight absurd (and generally held to be so) could be reduced to a meaningful system," p. 10.

[14] Michael Lane, "Introduction," in Introduction to Structuralism, ed. Michael Lane (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1970), p. 15.

[15] Ibid; this is only a portion of Lane's figure.

A second analogy drawn from structural linguistics implies a preference for a synchronic approach over a diachronic one. A diachronic approach, which dominates the first two models explored in the inquiry, is a methodological approach characterized "by its treatment of a phenomenon in terms of temporal process."[16] In the first model, Mark's verisimilitude was traced to referents in the life of Jesus which chronologically preceded Mark's writing of the text. The author's consciousness chronologically preceded and explained Markan verisimilitude in the second model. These diachronic approaches, which focused on a search for the sources and/or historical development of the text as clues to its meaning, are set aside in a structuralist synchronic approach. This setting aside is a temporary rather than permanent bracketing of these approaches; this bracketing allows the inquiry to isolate the second order of referentiality available in the biblical narrative and thus further the inquiry's goal.

The synchronic approach, when transferred from the level of the sign to the level of the text, refers to the consideration of the arrangement of the constitutive, deep structural elements of the text.[17] The structuralist first makes a segmentation of the text by looking for changes of place, time, or the arrivals and departures of characters, or groups of characters, and sentences which are more or less repeated in the same terms.[18] For example, when examining historical narrative the interpreter looks for standard features of this particular form of discourse. For example Roland Barthes observes that "historical discourse seems to have two standard types of shifter."[19] The first lets the reader know the evidence (the event reported), where it came from (the informer's contribution) and what the author's evaluation of the source of the evidence is to be presented. The second type of shifter covers "all those devices by which the writer declares a departure from or return to his itinerary, any explicit signpost to the organization of his own discourse."[20] Another major synchronic structure of historical discourse has been discussed in chapter three, namely the difference between plotted time and story time, the time the narrative takes to record plotted time.[21] These standard features, rather than being asides in the interpretive process, are center stage in the structuralist analysis. As a result more of them appear to the interpreter and are accounted for.

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[16] Patte, Structural Exegesis, p. 130.

[17] Ricoeur, "La structure," p. 82, and his "New Developments in Phenomenology in France: The Phenomenology of Language," Social Research, 34 (1981):1-30, esp. p. 16.

[18] Corina Galland, "Suggestions for a Structural Approach to the Narrative," in Johnson, Structuralism, p. 189.

A third parallel is drawn between the phenomena of phonemes, semes, and mythemes[22] in linguistic structuralism and that of texts. The meaning of a linguistic sign was determined by the relationship between the two value systems that are the component parts of the sign. The phonemes and the semes relate two structural value systems. Similarly, Levi-Strauss' notion of mytheme is the result of comparing the difference between the deep structures of one text with another by which means the basic relations can be isolated.[23] These basic relations are not in themselves the myth underlying a particular narrative but are a constitutive element of the myth or a mytheme.[24] By analogy, the text is to be understood not by what it refers to, but by this internal value system.[25]

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[19] Roland Barthes, "Historical Discourse," in Lane, Structuralism, p. 146.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Cf. n. 20 in chapter three.

[22] E. Guttgemanns, "Introductory Remarks Concerning the Structural Study of Narrative," Semeia 6 (1976): 23-125, esp., p. 54.

Finally, the restriction of the meaning of a text to the arrangement of interrelations among its elements implies the further methodological choice of structural analysis: the closure of the text.[26] The internal system of the text has no immediate relationship to the signs outside the system. Much like a dictionary, in which the signs refer only to other signs within the text, all texts are to be understood as such closed systems.

In extreme forms, this principle of closure implies that there is no extra-textual reference. "Language was viewed by de Saussure as a 'closed system of signs'. Similarly for us [structuralists] the text is a 'closed system' a 'structured space' to be distinguished from the manifestations."[27] To use the Fregian language of "sense" and "reference," the text has a "sense" but no "reference." In its extreme forms, the structuralist approach to texts becomes "the idssolution of all referential values in the interplay of correlations."[28]

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[23] It is precisely the differences that provide the clues for the various relations between cultures rather than their similarities. Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," in Structural Anthropology I, (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 211.

[24] Ibid. Levi-Strauss' analysis of mythemes assumes language's constitutive units: morphemes, lexemes, phonemes. Mythemes are found at "a higher more complex order," on the level of the sentence.

[25] Roland Barthes, "Introduction à l'analyse structurale des recita," Communications 8 (1966): 1-27, esp. pp. 26-27.

[26] Paul Ricoeur, "Qu'est-ce qu'un texte? Explication et interpréta-tion," Hermeneutik und Dialektik, II, Festschrift for Hans-Georg Gadamer. Ed. R. Bubner et al. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1977), p. 191; hereafter cited as Ricoeur, "Texte?"

Structural exegesis, however, need not accept the limits of structuralism.[29] The second prologue emphasized an alternative for understanding a text. This understanding of the text, which follows Ricoeur, identifies as a fundamental trait of a text, that it is *about* something. Structuralism would not recognize the predominance of discourse over *langue*. Structural exegesis, as developed in this chapter, is an explanatory moment in the process of understanding Markan verisimilitude, not the limits of such understanding. The text is distanced from the event of saying and has a certain semantic autonomy from the writer. But such semantic autonomy need not abolish the text's referential function. It does complicate it. It adds possible referential system.[30]

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[27] Jean Calloud, *Structural Analysis of Narrative*, tr. Daniel Patte (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p. 5; hereafter, *Narrative*.

[28] Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics," *Semeia* 5 (1978): 63; hereafter, "Biblical Hermeneutics."

[29] Paul Ricoeur, "Biblical Hermeneutics," pp. 27-148, esp. pp. 51 and 63. For Ricoeur, "structuralism as ideology starts with the reversal in the relation between the code and the message which makes the code essential and the message unessential," p. 65. Elsewhere Ricoeur writes: "Pour le structurlisme, il n'y a pas de message a délivrere, pas de sens à déchiffrer, pas d'intentions transcedetes à saisir existentillement; il n'y a que des éléments a distribuer selon des règles de classification," Ricoeur, "Contribution d'une réflexion sur le langage à une théologie de la parole," *Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie*, 16 (1980):323-8,esp. p. 338; Ricoeur points out that for Barthes and his followers, "the meaning of a narrative is nothing other than the integration of its elements within the closure of its form," "Biblical Hermeneutics," p. 51.

[30] For Ricoeur, "the distanciation which occurs between a text and the author, the initial situation and the primitive audience, cannot

As this chapter argues, at the root of the deep structures exposed by the structuralist are existential questions which give rise to these structures. These are the referents of structural exegesis.

Some structuralists who study myth and folk narratives claim to uncover more than the internal relationships of the values and constraints of the text. They claim to decode the roots of the myth or narrative that lie in existential questions concerning humanity's origin and destiny. The myth presents itself as a "recit des origines" or narrative of origins precisely in answer to such existential questions.[31] Myth and religious narratives are by means of structural exegesis revealed to deal with boundary situations or limit situations which, in Ricoeur's words, "constitute the ultimate 'referent' of the myth."[32]

By way of summary, the following warrants and backing for structuralist exegesis are implied in the above definition of terms. A structuralist analysis of the text is warranted by an analogy to Saussure's work in langue. First, it assumes that the structures and

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abolish the dimension of discourse which still holds texts within the sphere of language, "Biblical Hermeneutics," pp. 66-67; Ricoeur, in response to Levi-Strauss' structuralist analysis of myths and to that of narratives by the French structuralists, notes that though they claim to restrict their analyses of the particular texts to the internal arrangements of their elements, in fact, they point beyond those structures; cf. "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text," New Literary History 4 (1973-74), pp. 91-117; esp. p. 112; hereafter, "Model." Ricoeur argues that "[n]obody stops with a conception of myths and narratives as formal as this algebra of constitutive units." Thus Ricoeur holds that Levi-Strauss's evaluation of a myth involves an admission that at the roots of the myth lie existential questions concerning human origins and destiny, since there would be no need for such a logical tool if such questions did not exist.

[31] Ricoeur, "Texte?," p. 197 where he quotes Levi-Strauss.

[32] Ricoeur, "Model," p. 113. Same text in Interpretation Theory, p. 87.

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systems that can be uncovered through structural analysis of a text are the product of the unconscious and unreflective level of the human mind.[33] Second, these structures are best uncovered by a synchronic rather than diachronic approach. Third, the basic relationships that result from a comparison of differences between the deep structures of one narrative with another are not themselves the myth but are a constitutive element of the myth roughly analogous to a phoneme which Claude Levi-Strauss calls a mytheme. Fourth--and this is a break with Saussure's linguistic paradigm--the semantic autonomy of the text does not abolish the text's referential function; it complicates it by pointing to the narratives of origin which answer the basic existential questions of human origins and destiny.

These warrants presume two possible anthropologies as their backing. These anthropologies represent crucial pre-understandings of contemporary culture[34] which are in dialectical relationship. The first pre-understanding conceives humans as creators of "significations"; that is, of meaningful entities, cultural values, symbols, etc.[35] At the same time, contemporary culture understands humans to be conditioned, to have

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[33] Robert Everard C. Johnston, "From An Author-Oriented to a Text-Oriented Hermeneutics." Unpublished Dissertation (Catholic University of Leuven, 1977), p. 96.

[34] This crucial pre-understanding regarding contemporary anthropology is relatively recent; compare:Patte, What Is?, p. 2. Patte suggests that the debates with B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971) indicates how widespread this viewpoint is and how, although, few will grant Skinner's suggestion that humanity is totally conditioned--objections are raised from all sides--most are willing to grant that "significations are imposed upon man" (sic).

[35] This use of the term "signification" is not the limited definition that is used above; rather, it merely points to the ability of humans to attach values to particular signs.

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significations imposed upon them. Some theories of the social and psychological sciences point to humans as conditioned creatures.

This dialectical anthropology which understands humans both as signification bearers and creators has significant implications for the interpretation of a text. If the text is to be understood by the assumption that humans are only signification creators, then the appropriate concern might be to ground interpretation in the author's intention. However, if the interpreter takes seriously the meaning imposed upon the author, then a synchronic method of exegesis is appropriate. The meaning of the text must be an integration of diachronic and synchronic interpretation.

With this brief definition of structure, structuralism, and structural exegesis a general description according to the four foci of interpretation of this chapter's model is in order. The text in this model is "the manifestation which results from the interaction of various structures as some of their potentialities are actualized in the text."[36] The author is the nexus of the potential structures and the actualized text and the contemporary audience the nexus between those structures and an actualized interpretation.[37] The context to which the text refers is the narrative of origins and destiny of humanity of which the text is a part.

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[36] Patte, What Is?, pp. 21-22.

[37] Roland Barthes, "The Structuralist Activity," in The Structuralists From Marx to Levi-Strauss, ed. Richard and Fernande DeGeorge (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1972), pp. 147-54; esp. 151. Furthermore, the number of combinations and permutations of any set of constraints and structures is larger than that which any one meaning effect could enunciate. The author does choose to order the text according to certain of these constraints and structures. However, to a great extent these choices are made only with respect to the stylistic structure of the text. As noted in the second prologue, the author chooses certain genres. Each genre generates its own implicit meaning effect. Similarly, new instances or manifestations of the potentiality of the structures establish new genres. Thus, structural exegesis can uncover

The interpreter in this model might also be thought of as a decoder. As decoder, the interpreter deconstructs the structures that brought about the manifestation actualized in the text, especially the deep structures which represent those constraints of most interest to the structuralist exegete and theologian.

## Ironic Structure and Historical Narrative

In the first section a general definition and description of the structuralist activity is given. In this section a general structuralist model for understanding historical narrative is examined, then followed in the third section by a structuralist interpretation of Mark 15 and 16 which is compatible with this general model of historical narrative.

The general model for historical narrative depends upon Hayden White's work in Metahistory[38] where he outlines his own philosophy of history on the basis of an analysis of the rhetoric, the poetic "style," "emplotment," and "linguistic protocols" employed by a historian in the writing of history.[39] His conclusions, in the analysis of the rhetoric of historical narrative, corroborate Juel's observations and are af-

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the development of genre.

In contrast, therefore, to structuralist models which are thought to be ahistorical, this model recognizes the cultural and historical context and the place of historiography in the structuralist analysis. Michael Lane argues that "structuralism is rather atemporal than strictly ahistorical," Lane, Introduction, p.17.

[38] White, Metahistory, p. 7.

[39] Ibid., pp. 7-9.

firmed by the specific structural exegesis of Mark 15 and 16 in the following section.

White's rhetorical analytic philosophy of history seeks to overcome the characteristic distinction between history as a literally truthful account, on the one hand, and a purely imaginary one, on the other. This is a distinction that this study has attempted to redescribe as well. White argues for the place of governing metaphors in historical narrative.[40] This is part of his redefinition of the relationship between critical philosophy of history and speculative philosophy of history, a distinction presumed by many critical philosophers of history.[41]

In "The Burden of History" White argues that metaphors functioned as heuristic devices which the historian consciously uses to eliminate certain kinds of data from consideration as evidence. "The historian operating under such a conception would thus be viewed as one who, like the modern artist and scientist, seeks to exploit a certain perspective that does not pretend to exhaust description or analysis of all data in the entire phenomenal field but rather offers itself as one way among many of disclosing certain aspects of the field."[42]

In his major work, Metahistory, White develops and clarifies the concept of metaphor and literary style by discerning, on one level, four types or "modes of consciousness" that bear the names of the traditional terms of tropes: Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, and Irony.[43] The style of a given historiographer can be characterized in terms of "the linguistic protocol (level one) he used to prefigure the historical field prior to bringing to bear upon it the various 'explanatory' strategies he used to fashion a 'story' out of the 'chronicle' of events contained in the historical record."[44] Further, White distinguishes, on a second level, three sets of such "explanatory strategy" (level two): argument, emplotment, and ideological implication. In each of these sets of explanatory strategy, White proffers a four-fold distinction parallel to that among tropes on the linguistic level (level one).[45]

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[40] Hayden White, "The Burden of History," History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History, 5 (1966): 130; hereafter, "Burden."

[41] White, Metahistory, pp. 427-28.

[42] White, "Burden," p. 130; White develops this line of argument in Metahistory along significantly different lines and illustrates it by examining several nineteenth-century historians, Michelet, Ranke, de Tocqueville, Burckhardt, and several philosophers of history, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Croce.

White seeks to demonstrate by his analysis of nineteenth-century figures that "a given historian will be inclined to choose one or another of the different modes of explanation. . .in response to the imperatives of the trope which informs the linguistic protocol he has used to prefigure the field of historical occurrence singled out by him for investigation. . .in short, [there is] an elective affinity between the act of prefiguration of the historical field and the explanatory strategies used by the historian in a given work."[46]

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[43] White, Metahistory, pp. 31-33. [44] Ibid., p. 426.

[45] As strategies of argument he adapts from Stephen Pepper's four "theories of truth"--White's term; Pepper himself called them 'world hypotheses'--Formism, Mechanism, Organicism, and Contextualism. Stephen C. Pepper, World Hypotheses (Berkeley: University of California--Berkeley, 1942). His four strategies of emplotment are borrowed from Northrop Frye: Romance, Tragedy, Comedy, and Satire. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957). And four strategies of ideological implication come by courtesy of Karl Mannheim: Anarchism, Radicalism, Conservatism, and Liberalism. Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946).

It is significant not to limit White's argument to a discussion of the conditions under which historical investigation takes place. This would be to miss at least half of his argument. He analyzes not only the process of investigation and the preconcepts involved in that process, but the linguistic structure of the final expression of the historian's truth claims themselves.[47] The concepts that are to be put to the test are themselves in historical narratives. Not only do the tropes inform the process of prefiguring the historical field, but they also provide "the linguistic ground on which the theoretical concepts that make up the conclusions of the historian are based."[48] "The historian shapes his materials, if not in accordance with what Popper calls (and criticizes as) a 'framework of preconceived ideas,' then in response to the imperatives of narrative discourse in general."[49] Within the discourse that "the historian uses to describe his object of study" he must subject "that object of study to the kind of distortion that 'historicists' impose upon their materials in a more explicit and formal way."[50]

White cites the work of Levi-Strauss in support of his claim that the "impulse to mythologize" lies "not in the real or imagined interests

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[46] White, Metahistory, p. 427. [47] Ibid. [48] Ibid.

[49] Hayden White, "Historicism, History, and the Figurative Imagination," History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History 14 (1975): 49; hereafter, "Historicism."

[50] Ibid., p. 49.

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of the social groups for which different kinds of historiography might be written, as Mannheim argues, but rather in the very nature of language itself."[51] Therefore, in order to understand any particular historical account, it is as important to ascertain "the *rhetoric* of the description of the field as it is the *logic* of whatever argument may be offered as its explanation."[52] White goes so far as to say that the rhetorical analysis is primary, because it is by "figuration that the historian virtually *constitutes* the subject of the discourse.[53] The historical account is not a "mirror image of the set of events that it claims simply to describe."[54] "On the contrary, the historical discourse would be viewed as a sign-system which points in two directions simultaneously: first, toward the set of events it purports to describe and, second, toward the generic story form, to which it tacitly likens the set in order to disclose its formal coherence considered as either a structure or a process."[55]

In stark contrast to a single leveled historical narrative consisting of two components, the fact and the interpretation, White speaks of a double level of structure. He asserts, "the fact is presented where and how it is in the discourse in order to sanction the interpretation to which it is meant to contribute."[56] This interpretation in turn receives its "force of plausibility" from the ordered facts within the discourse. But, this formal explanation made up of facts and interpretation appear on the "literal surface" of the discourse, while the figurative language used to characterize the facts points to a deep-structure meaning.[57] The deep-structure meaning by means of "the generic story--type serves as a conceptual model to which the events are to be likened in order to permit their encodation as elements of a recognizable structure."[58]

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[51] Ibid., p. 52. [52] Ibid. [53] Ibid., p. 54.

[54] Hayden White, "Metahistory: The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," *Clio* 27 (June 1974): 267-93.

[55] White, "Historicism," p. 54.

[56] Ibid., p. 58.

White, then, directs his analysis on the text of the historian, the finished product of historiography. He found his arguments about the linguistic ground and the place of linguistic protocols both in the process of producing the theoretical concepts and in the narrative structure in which they are presented or represented.[59]

White, in choosing this object of his analysis, avoids a psychological analysis of the historian in the form of a search for the psychological causes of the precritical positions of the historian.[60] Indeed, along with Mandelbaum, White would perceive such a study of little significance to the objectivity of the historical narrative. It could provide very interesting information about the author, but would not bring into question the objectivity of the historical text. White emphasizes the inherent need for any historian to choose certain linguistic protocols in order to isolate facts, interpret chronicles, and to emplot them within a historical narrative. White needs only the text to defend his analysis and its conclusions, not any analysis of the historian's either conscious or unconscious intent.[61]

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[57] Ibid. [58] Ibid.

[59] White describes the methodological limits of his study: "I have therefore limited the present study to an analysis of the relation between the manifest level of historical narratives, where the theoretical concepts that have been used to explain the data are deployed, and the latent level, considered as the linguistic ground on which these concepts are precritically constituted, in what I take to be a value neutral and purely formal way, the different interpretative strategies that were elaborated by nineteenth-century historians and philosophers of history," White, Metahistory, p. 431.

[60] Ibid., p. 429f.

White observes that the underlying linguistic protocol for historical narrative is irony. As he notes, "[t]he aim of the Ironic statement is to affirm tacitly the negative of what is on the literal level affirmed positively, or the reverse."[62] Juel's analysis of the surface structure of the trial narrative is confirmed in the underlying semantic universe. Jesus is accused of being the Messiah, found guilty, and executed. While the witnesses fail to corroborate each other, and the charges appear to fail, the ideal reader already knows, or is capable of recognizing, the truth of the statements made. In Patte's structural analysis in the following section, the underlying conviction of the narrative requires an ironical view of life and death.

This ironic view or blik on reality "presupposes the occupation of a 'realistic' perspective on reality, from which a nonfigurative representation of the world of experience might be provided."[63] The ironic stage of consciousness underlines the problematic nature of language itself and points to "the potential foolishness of all linguistic characterizations of reality."

Irony, then, is inherently dialectical. It focuses on the ability of language "to obscure more than it clarifies in any act of verbal figuration."[64] Characterizations of the world "cast in the Ironic mode are often regarded as *intrinsically* sophisticated and realistic."[65] It is this realistic character born out of the ironic perception of the events told in Mark that we have been exploring. The ironic consciousness, then, might be said to be a crucial ingredient in the verisimilitude of Mark, or at least, for our historically conscious time, the crucial ingredient for the sense of verisimilitude perceived by nineteenth and twentieth century exegetes.

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[61] White then addresses the issue of linguistic protocols at the same level as Patte in the next section addresses the issue of semantic universe. Though Patte's methodological model is more detailed, their conclusions are surprisingly similar.

[62] White, Metahistory, p. 429f.

[63] Ibid., p. 37.

These judgments regarding the relationship between the ironic consciousness and the verisimilitude in Mark must be qualified for two major reasons. White's observations are made on the basis of an extensive analysis of nineteenth century figures rather than on historiography written during the first century. Secondly, we have been investigating the "sense of verisimilitude" that contemporary interpreters of Mark have understood and attempted to explain. These contemporary interpreters are a part of the historical consciousness that White argues depends upon the linguistic protocol: irony.

According to White, "[t]he trope of irony. . .provides a linguistic paradigm of a mode of thought which is radically self-critical with respect not only to a given characterization of the world of experience but also to the very effort to capture adequately the truth of things in language."[66] It is this radically self-critical character of the ironic linguistic protocol that made it the dominant mode "of historical thinking which took shape in Europe in the nineteenth century."[67] Then, he extends his theory to an analysis of major historiographers and philosophers of history in the nineteenth century. This analysis leads to his conclusion regarding the "deep structure of the historical imagination of that period . . ."[68]

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[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid., emphasis in text.

[66] Ibid.

Therefore, White's proposal cannot explain either the intention or the success of the biographical author of Mark. Whether that author intended to write history in the sense we might mean history is not demonstrated by White's proposal. The proposal does provide an interesting setting for Patte's structural analysis and Juel's conclusions regarding both the surface and deep structure of Mark. Furthermore, it affirms their conclusions while still taking seriously Mark as historical narrative.

## Interpretation of Mark 15 and 16

Daniel Patte has developed a model, proposed a method for moving from surface to deep structures in a narrative and along with Aline Patte interpreted Mark 15 and 16 according to this method. As with White, Patte follows Claude Levi-Strauss, in presuming an underlying mythical system of which the narrative is one adumbration.[69] Patte, however, has used A. J. Greimas' development of Levi-Strauss' basic method where Greimas renders explicit several more steps in moving from the surface to the deep structures of a particular narrative. The process can be reduced and simplified into three steps. First, the interpreter examines the surface structure or narrative manifestation.[70] From this examination the fundamental structure or narrative system of the text is deduced. Second, the narrative system is examined as to which part of the general mythical system it belongs. In the final step, the mythical system is examined for the underlying value system or semantic universe which grounds it.

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[67] Ibid., p. 38.

[68] Ibid.

[69] This is not a peculiar position. Aristotle saw plot ("mythos" is his word) as the soul of any literary work that was an imitation of an action. Scholes and Kellogg speak of the "traditional story" and "mythos" in the rehearsal of the development of narrative. They argue that the great creations of the epic storyteller, for example, The Illiad, represent the adumbration of a traditional story or mythos that was an amalgam of myth, history, and fiction, Nature of Narrative, p. 12.

This is the rough outline of the procedure for narrative structural exegesis. Patte claims that "by employing this method we should be able to describe the system of convictions presupposed by the text with such rigor that two exegetes working independently of each other should reach very similar conclusions."[71] Patte's program proposal is compared to Claude Levi-Strauss' in the following illustration to show the developments Greimas and Patte have made. (See Figure 7.)

As the figure on the following page indicates, Levi-Strauss analyzes a set of narratives of a given society, establishes that society's mythical system which in turn points to the sociolectal semantic universe of that society. The revised model by Greimas and Patte suggests several intermediary steps. In effect, Patte and Greimas argue that

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[70] This model presumes the primary referential system that is described under the historical paradigm. In order to understand the narrative surface structure, it is necessary to know the historical situation that gives meaning to terms like "crowd," "palace," etc. In addition, this model isolates only broad values that inform and "transform unreality to reality," cf. Frederick Streng, Understanding Religious Life, (Encino, California: Dickenson, 1976), p. 8.

[71] Patte, Structural Exegesis, p. 8.


Level Ia
The set of narratives of a given society
Level Ib
Narrative manifestation (one complex narrative as network of elementary narratives)
Level II
An elementary narrative
Level III
Narrative system (of narrative programs)
Level IV
System of pertinent transformations
Level V
Symbolic system
Level VI
Mythical system
Level VII
Idiolectal semantic universe
Level VIII
Sociolectal semantic universe
Levi-Strauss
Greimas--Patte

Figure 7.--Levi-Strauss/Greimas-Patte

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Levi-Strauss has the appropriate outline for the task but takes too many methodological shortcuts.

The Greimas-Patte model adds several discreet steps which represent significant progress in a structural model of narrative exegesis. Levi-Strauss' model left the analysts without the criteria for choosing "with all necessary rigor the pertinent categories which serve as a basis for the semantic analysis."[72] With the Greimas-Patte model added criteria for deciding which structures or codes are more significant than others in a particular narrative. This responds to the oft heard complaint about structural exegesis: it establishes categories for deciding structural hierarchies in an arbitrary manner. The Greimas-Patte model represents a step forward in establishing more publically available categories and reasons for the choices made within these categories. This is evident in the interpretation of Mark 15 and 16 which follows. What is also evident, is the continued sense of arbitrary choices which this inquiry considers indications of the relative infancy of contemporary structuralist narrative interpretation.

It is important to remember that the interpretation of Mark 15 and 16 cannot yield a mythical system, nor the narratives of human origins which are the ultimate referent of structuralist analysis. The analysis of Mark 15 and 16 can yield only certain elements of such a mythical system, since a mythical system is adumbrated by several narratives.[73] Between narrative and myth systems is the symbolic system of a particular narrative which Greimas refers to as the mythical micro-system. It is a micro-system since it does not reveal the entire mythical system of which it is a part. Since only the interpretation of one narrative is involved, and then only part of that narrative, only the movement from textual manifestation or surface structure to the semantic level is possible. In other words, only part of the model can be put to use.

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[72] Ibid., p. 12.

[73] A. J. Greimas, "Pour une theorie de l'interpretation du recit mythique," Du sens, pp. 185-230; also published in Communications 1 (1968): 345-90; Levi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," pp. 202-28.

Patte's model expresses the relations between eight structural levels described in Figure D. Though this brief characterization is not a full apology and explanation of the Greimas-Patte model, the basic outline should be clear enough to examine a specific example of each step of the model as Aline Patte uses it to interpret Mark 15 and 16. Furthermore, this section summarizes the interpretation of Mark 15 and 16 rather than reproducing every step and analytical conclusion of Aline Patte's work; only arguments and conclusions which pertain to the concerns of this study are included in the following summary.

## Summary of Patte's Interpretation

Patte chooses to interpret the last two chapters of Mark "because a study of the end of a text allows the exegete to identify without ambiguity the ultimate program of the text and therefore its narrative axes (the principal and polemical axes)."[74] The short ending of the text is taken as the original which reflects the presumption of traditional exegesis. The willingness to accept the break between the end of chapter 14 (14:72) and the latter two chapters also presumes traditional exegesis.

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[74] Patte, Structural Exegesis, p. 39.

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The Greimas-Patte model involves six discreet steps between the textual manifestation (surface structure) and the semantic level.

Step 1. Identification of the elementary narratives.

Any narrative as complex as Mark has more than one narrative involved in the surface manifestation. Each of the interacting narratives Patte calls an elementary narrative. An elementary narrative can stand on its own; a reader can understand the important changes in the narrative without referring to an alternative narrative, even though the narrative [in terms of its pertinent transformation] participates in the building of the complex manifestation of the surface narrative. Patte develops an extensive method for distinguishing the main narrative, converging, diverging, and parallel narratives.[75] He divides these different types of narratives into two groups: primary and interpretive.[76]

In the case of Mark, Patte identifies the main narrative as beginning with the polemical narrative describing the interactions among the chief priests, Jesus, and Pilate in 15:1-5.[77] Once the main narrative is established, the hierarchy of other elementary narratives can be established. The interruptions of the formal hierarchical pattern and the breaks in the logical development of the narrative can be noted. The parallel narratives are bracketed out until a later time: in par-

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[75] Ibid., pp. 23-25.

[76] Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[77] The main narrative continues with the conflict among Pilate, Jesus, the chief priests, the crowd, and Barabbas through the soldiers' mocking of Jesus in the palace (15:16-20); the soldiers and Jesus' crucifixion (15:21-26); Jesus' cry (15:34a); Jesus' death (15:37); Pilate's remarks which follow the crucifixion; the centurion's words at the same time; and finally Joseph burying Jesus (15:44-46); Ibid., pp. 42-45.

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ticular the sixth step. This bracketing allows for the consideration of the other narrative units.[78]

Step 2. Identification of the principal and polemical axes.

The interpreter works backwards through the text beginning with the ultimate or final elementary narrative. Usually the ultimate elementary narrative concludes the text. The exception would be when a parallel narrative, like a subplot, does. The ultimate narrative in Mark 15-16 follows the rule since the message to the women (15:47-16:5a) brings the primary narrative to an ultimate position.[79] The young man's speech, which Patte identifies as the principal narrative axis (the line along which the central action takes place), moves the reader into the second step of the exegesis: identification of the principal and polemical axes.

The principal narrative axis has as its polemical axis the womens' fear and flight. Their visit to the tomb manifests the principal axis. Since these are all part of the secondary diverging narrative, they will be examined in greater detail under interpretive levels. These first two steps have in effect isolated the main story line from the secondary and interpretive story lines. A complete structural analysis of the passage would proceed on each of these elementary narratives. However, for the purposes of this inquiry only one example of the following steps is discussed.

Step 3. Establishment of the system of pertinent transformations.

This third step requires the interpreter to establish the actions of the chief subject that significantly move or transform the story line. The key actions are called the pertinent transformations by Patte. Three operations make up this step.

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[78] Ibid., p. 24. [79] Ibid., p. 45.

(a) Identify the axis with the fewer programs, that is the fewer number of pertinent transformations. To clarify these transformations Patte uses a formula for codifying this listing or programs: S(O---R). This formula reduces the narrative program to a series of exchanges which Greimas[80] has shown to be a SUBJECT transferring an OBJECT to a RECEIVER. The transformation (O---R) is the performance of the narrative program which is also the RECEIVER'S state. The other elements in a narrative program qualify the SUBJECT'S (S) state.

An example of the narrative manifestation translated into this code follows:

| | Narrative Manifestations | Narrative Programs (NP) |
|---|---|---|
| 46e: | he rolled a stone against the door of the tomb | NP 46e Joseph (stone--door of the tomb) |

(b) Once the principal and polemical programs have been established and listed according to the formula, the other axis manifesting functions which are opposed to those programs need to be identified.

(c) The next stage is to compare the programs (NP) of the principal and polemical programs. Those programs in the principal narrative that do not have an opposite are considered impertinent.[81] They are eliminated. The remaining transformations are considered the pertinent transformations and represent functions of the principal and polemical programs that have opposites.

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[80] Patte modifies Greimas' formula (canonical form of the schema of communication) in order to make clear the link between this model and Greimas' actantial model. He emphasizes that this model represents primarily a performance, that is, a process (the transmission of an object) and not its result. It remains that the various actantial positions are semantically invested and thus represent specific states. Greimas, "Elements of a Narrative Grammar," pp. 29-32 and Patte, Structural Exegesis, p. 117, n. 24.

Step 4. Establishment of the symbolic system.[82]

The establishment of the symbolic system from an elementary narrative would be quite simple, since the system of pertinent transformations would project the symbolic system directly. However, the establishment of a symbolic system from a complex narrative, like Mark, requires two separate stages:

(a) In the first three steps Patte has isolated the principal and polemical axis of the primary narrative. He has developed them into a series of pertinent transformations and is now prepared to lay them alongside one another and attach their interpretive narratives. See the figure below illustrating the relationship between the primary narrative, with its principal and polemical axis and the development of an interpretive program at point D in the primary narrative.[83]


Figure 8.--Primary and Interpretive Narratives

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[81] Patte, Structural Exegesis, p. 48.

[82] Ibid., p. 37.

[83] Ibid., p. 17.

(b) The next moves put the SUBJECTS of opposite programs (e.g., -A and -B) in direct relationship to each other, thus creating a semiotic square[84] out of two consecutive programs.

The semiotic square is a device for describing the three basic types of relations among the values of the states of a mythical system. These three types of relations are:

(1) The relations of contrariety which are basic oppositions within the mythical system. In the illustration below the relations of contrariety are those of "life vs. death."

(2) The relations of contradiction which begin with the two sides of the opposition of contrariety and project the contradictory opposition of that pole of the opposition. Once again, in the illustration below of a semiotic square, the relations of contradiction are "life vs. non-life," and "death vs. non-death."

(3) The relations of implication which project by implication the extension of the value system implied by the major terms of the relations of contrariety. In the illustration the relations of implication are "non-death" which is the extension of the value system implied by "life," and "non-life" which is the extension of the value system implied by "death." In this example, then, there are two relations of implication, which Greimas calls a "deixis." These two relations of implication are: the relation between "life" and "non-death" and the relation between "death" and "non-life." Greimas argues that each of these "deixes" "corresponds to a correlation of (macro)-mythemes in the mythical

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[84] Greimas and Rastier, "Interactions," and "Elements of a Narrative Grammar," p. 25.

structure.[85]

Each semiotic square has a positive and negative axis. By convention the positive deixis is found on the left and the negative deixis on the right.



Figure 9.--Semiotic Square

The mythical system, or in the case of the analysis of a single narrative like Mark 15-16, the symbolic system, can be understood as a "series of interrelated oppositions."[86] The semantic universe which corresponds to this symbolic system can then be represented by "a series of semiotic squares."[87] As the various pairs of oppositions of the mythical (symbolic) system are realized, they become the sides of a semiotic square. As Patte's interpretation of Mark 15-16 shows, the semiotic square represents the "relations among the values symbolized by the states of two oppositions of the mythical system."[88] Patte's interpretation illustrates how the semantic universe of the narrative and its mythical system are quasi-isomorphic. They correspond insofar as they share the same topic; they are isotopic. The structure of the relations of the states of the mythical system corresponds to the oppositions of a mythical system. The same is true for the symbolic system.

The semiotic square, then, is the means for representing the relationship between the functions or pertinent transformations of the narrative program and the states of the narrative program. It is also the means of analyzing the states of the symbolic system and projecting the idiolectal semantic universe of any particular narrative. Greimas argues that a narrative manifests a micro-semantic universe that can be represented by a semiotic square. The square which represents the fundamental opposition that is shared by the symbolic and semantic universe will be homological with a series of semiotic squares.

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[85] Patte, Structural Exegesis, p. 19.

[86] Ibid. [87] Ibid. [88] Ibid.

This fundamental semiotic square is the ultimate or axiologic value of the idiolectal semantic universe. It represents the fundamental existential opposition constraining the narrative. Claude Levi-Strauss argues that such fundamental semiotic squares include the opposition "life vs. death." Others include "God vs. man."[89]

The process of isolating these fundamental semiotic squares requires the bracketing out of the functions and leaving the system of states. The system of states, which is the symbolic manifestation of a semantic universe, has for its structure a series of semiotic squares. By the study of the relations among a series of semiotic squares, it is possible to "bring to light the pertinent values of these terms over and beyond their symbolic manifestation." In the language of this inquiry, to find their fundamental semiotic square is to discover the second order existential reference in a narrative. It is precisely this discovery that makes this model crucial to the general goal of this inquiry, namely, another order of referentiality. Before examining specific semiotic squares which Patte isolates in her interpretation of Mark 15 and 16 the last two steps of her procedure needs to be described.

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[89] Ibid., p. 21.

### Step 5. Study the semantic universe.[90]

Before examining the individual semiotic squares the interpreter returns to the narrative manifestations of the symbolic values of the SUBJECT of each of the narrative programs. How is the SUBJECT qualified in each program: "its various HELPERS" (those concrete objects, locations, temporal notations, some type of knowledge or feeling that enable the SUBJECT to act), its OPPONENTS, and its SENDER.

Once the interpreter has a sense of the symbolic values associated with the subject of each narrative program she can turn to the semantic squares paying attention to the three types of relations: relations of contrariety, contradiction, and implication. She should ask:[91] What are the pertinent semantic features that compose the symbolic values? It is important to remember that "values" here means the system of ordering that enables the semantic system.

### Step 6. Study of the parallel narratives.[92]

The interpretation to this point should establish the semantic universe presupposed or constraining the production of the primary and secondary levels. The parallel narratives are then studied in the same manner.

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[90] Ibid., pp. 37-38.

[91] Patte notes that the "system of transformations at the first interpretive level interprets and prolongs NP 46c (Joseph's action); the second prolongs NP 24a, 25 (the soldier's action); and the third prolongs NP 34a (Jesus' cry); Ibid., p. 61.

The symbolic system is actualized by sliding upward the fourfold polemical axis. The programs NP 17a, NP 24a, 25, and NP 37a of the primary level participate both in the symbolic system of the primary level and in one of the symbolic systems of the interpretive levels. The shifting upwards both in the primary narrative level and the relevant interpretive level places them "in a contradictory relation with the program with which they are narratively opposed; Ibid.

[92] Ibid., p. 38.

Patte examines all the squares within the primary and three interpretive levels of the text. It would be redundant to repeat this process. However, an examination of one square in some detail allows for a correlation with the conclusions found in the theoretical section of this chapter. The fifth square of the primary narrative is closely related to the central and fundamental existential question of the text. When it is correlated with the others, especially that of the symbolic system of Interpretive level III, its central importance can be seen.

The fifth square of the primary level is concerned about knowledge about death and deliverance. Patte's analysis of the states of this semiotic square follows. Remember the state of the narrative is the qualifications or qualifiers of the SUBJECT in the formula S(O---R). For example, the HELPERS(H) or OPPONENTS(OP). The fifth square is summarized by Patte under these categories in the following manner:[93]

FIFTH SQUARE

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | NP 45b Pilate | | NP 13a Crowd |
| H: | knowledge about Jesus' death, centurion | H: | excitement produced by the chief priests, prisoner released at the feast, shouts |
| S. | Joseph | S: | chief priests |
| | NP 43e Joseph | | NP 37a Jesus |

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[93] Ibid., p. 70.

H. day of Preparation, day before the sabbath, respected member of the council, Pilate, courage, expectation of the kingdom of God

H: submission, loud cry, non-knowledge about why God abandoned him

OP: chief priests, Pilate, crowd, soldiers, robbers, cross with inscription, passersby, bystanders, abandoned by God

Pilate (NP 45b) in this square has a /knowledge about the death of Jesus/. When the centurion has informed Pilate of Jesus' death, he gives Joseph permission to take Jesus' body. This, Patte argues, is in contradictory relation with /non-knowledge/(absence of knowledge) of Jesus about his own death (NP 37a).[94]

Patte argues for a second relation of contradiction between Joseph's /non-knowledge/, since he did not know when the kingdom of God will come, that is, when the deliverance will be given, and the /knowledge/ of the crowd about the deliverance of a prisoner; it takes place at each (Passover) feast.[95] Thus the two contradictory relations of the semiotic square for this micro-symbol system are established and take the following form:


/knowledge/
/about death/
/knowledge/ about deliverance/(about what Pilate does at each feast)
/non-knowledge/ about deliverance/ (hope about the kingdom of God)
/non-knowledge/ /about death/

Figure 10.--Square Five

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[94] Ibid., p. 71.

[95] Ibid.

Previous to the investigation of this square, Patte had isolated an ongoing concern regarding volition (or will). Volition had usually been on the positive side of the semiotic square (left) as an important "positive semantic feature."[96] In this and other squares volition is correlated with "the hope concerning the kingdom of God."[97] The same is true for this square, except the definition of this hope is quite surprising. This process of surprise regarding fundamental values is the pattern throughout the study of the semiotic squares in the semantic universe of Mark 15-16. The value given "to this hope contradicts the expected system of values."[98] Rather than the true believer being the one who has a /knowledge about deliverance/, this knowledge is actually seen as false knowledge. Apparently, such knowledge is concerned with human deliverance.[99]

Implied in this surprise contradiction of expected values is the deep conviction or deep structural value that the "true believer accepts the fact of death."[100] The fact of death, Jesus' death in particular, but also death as a fundamental existential experience, is part of "true deliverance (the deliverance that comes from God)."[101]

It is important to note two discoveries made by Patte in this analysis of square five in relationship to the entire primary level of the narrative of Mark 15-16. First, the juxtaposition and surprise when basic expected values are overturned by this narrative's deep structure is the rule rather than the exception in Mark 15-16. Patte prefers to call this a paradoxical square.[102] I will later argue that it fits the basic format of the deep structures of irony, which as you recall, Don Juel argued was the basic and primary literary device of the surface structure of Mark's Passion narrative.[103] Second, one of the fundamental oppositions and existential references of the text is that of death and deliverance.[104] This second fundamental opposition, death and deliverance, is adumbranted and developed in the symbolic system of Interpretative Level III.[105] This symbolic system can be represented in the following manner:[106]

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[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Ibid., p. 72.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

| | |
|---|---|
| | NP 36g Elijah |
| NP 34e God | NP 36d a bystander |
| NP 34c Jesus | NP 37a Jesus |

The primary relationship of contradiction is the relationship between NP 34e and NP 37a. Jesus is abandoned by God, he dies. He is, therefore, both /without God/ and /non-God/.[107]

Another relationship of contradiction highlights the ironic character of this interpretative level. Jesus calls upon God's presence in his prayer (Ps. 22:2, in Aramaic). He sets himself /in relation with God/. The bystander, in contradiction, (NP 36d) misinterprets what Jesus says. He does not understand that Jesus is addressing God. Patte argues this manifests the crucial representation of /man not in relation with God/.[108] On the basis of these two major relations of contradiction, Patte realizes the following semiotic square:

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[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Ibid., p. 78.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid., p. 79.

[108] Ibid.



Figure 11.--Square, Level Three

This semiotic square represents a fundamental opposition "God vs. man." This opposition is of the type that Levi-Strauss predicted would underlie the symbolic system of a narrative.[109] This fundamental opposition provides a key interpretive moment within the text. "Jesus crucified" is the semantic mediation of this opposition. However, as Patte observes, it is "not the negative symbol, 'Jesus crucified not in relation with God,' but the positive symbol, 'Jesus crucified in relation with God,' that provides this mediation."[110] The ironic character of the text is revealed, once again. Jesus dying on the cross is viewed by the opponents as a demonstration that he lacks a relationship with God. If the square were to affirm this perception the fundamental opposition would be resolved in favor of man. On the contrary, the true mediation is Jesus in relationship with God by means of his crucifixion. The manifestation of this relationship comes through the prayer of abandonment. Jesus' rejection by humans underlines his relation with God. His prayer of abandonment manifests his relationship with God.[111]

This third interpretive level manifests this fundamental opposition which correlates with the major oppositions of the primary narrative level.[112] The mediation of this fundamental opposition takes place through the same ironic juxtaposition observed in all of the squares on the primary narrative level. If we follow Patte's analysis this ironic juxtaposition represents the major fundamental relationship and claim to truth in these chapters.

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[109] Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, pp. 222-25.

[110] Patte, Structural Exegesis, p. 79.

[111] Ibid.

## Truth Claims, Irony, and the Cross

One further path of reflection remains before turning to an evaluation of the model of this chapter. I was at first tempted to conclude that the structuralist model finally would provide no significant truth claims regarding the theological concerns of this study. How might a probing into the linguistic structure provide truth claims fruitful for theological reflection? Upon examination of Mark through this model, a most significant set of reflections has resulted.

These reflections grow out of the peculiar claims of this analysis which suggest that Mark implies regarding the depth of truth and the experience of truth. By focusing on the ironic mediation of the fundamental opposition between God and man through the event of Jesus' death, Mark has made a substantial claim regarding the depth of truth.[113]

Robert Scharlemann follows a substantial tradition regarding the interpretation of the death of Jesus that argues the cross symbolizes "the relativity of all symbolic expression . . . and the relativity of the material that makes up symbols."[114] The cross is, in the words of this investigation, the key ironic image which relativizes the experience of truth. "In short, if at any time the symbol of the cross has been experienced as true, then this truth anticipates and allows all other experiences of the true and the false. The depth of truth is experienced by way of the true, but it is capable of including its opposite within itself."[115]

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[112] Ibid.

[113] This inquiry follows Robert Scharlemann's language here, when it speaks of "the depth of truth"; The Being of God, pp. 153-83.

Scharlemann's insight provides a most appropriate structure within which to integrate the chapter's sections. The structuralist model has turned the critical faculties of the interpreter on language itself. It has bracketed the pursuit of language referring to subjects or objects external to language itself.[116] As a result of this bracketing, the internal structure of language as language is seen to point beyond itself and depend upon external referentiality. However, the experience of truth by means of this reflexive examination of language has been broadened, a moment which supports the basic warrant of this inquiry: the importance of a full range of referentiality.[117]

The first step in the linguistic paradigm was the analysis of the surface structure of Mark. That model was developed through the work of Donald Juel and Hans-Georg Gadamer. The structuralist model sought to relate the various levels of linguistic signs to this surface structure. The Greimas-Patte model significantly modified the process of moving

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[114] Ibid., p. 180.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Cf. Scharlemann's discussion of the word "God," Ibid., p. 166.

[117] Ibid., p. 175, where Scharlemann speaks of moving beyond hermeneutical reflection.

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from the surface structure--what they call the narrative manifestation--through the analysis of the elementary narrative, the narrative system, the system of pertinent transformations, and the symbolic system that points toward the idiolectal semantic universe underlying the text.

Through a series of six discreet steps this reflection on the language of Mark 15-16 was accomplished. In my summary of Pattes' analysis of Mark 15-16 I underlined the paradoxical--what I called ironic--mediation of both the chief semiotic squares of the primary narrative and of the interpretive levels of the text. This ironic linguistic protocol, to use Hayden White's terminology, is at its greatest intensity in the mediation of the fundamental opposition of the Markan Passion Narrative, the mediation of God and man through the death of Jesus. In short, the study of the language of Mark 15-16 led in and of itself to an experience of truth by means of the linguistic sign system, the semantic universe, manifested in the narrative of the cross. The claim of the cross regarding the experience of truth points to the inability of language to encompass all of reality. The relativity of all language and symbolic expression and "the relativity of the material that makes up symbols"[118] is asserted. The experience of truth as experienced in the depth structure of the narrative in Mark is precisely this anticipation of "all other experiences of the true and the false."[119]

It is this claim to manifest the depth of the experience of truth that surpasses Hayden White's suggestion that all ironic modes are in-

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[118] Ibid., p. 180.

[119] Ibid.

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herently skeptical. The Markan text represents a historical narrative that has as its deep structural linguistic protocol irony without the presumption of skepticism. Rather, there is the recognition of the character of the experience of truth as encompassing both the possibilities of the true and the false.

## Evaluation of the Model

The major strength of this model lies more in its promise than in its success. Contemporary anthropology clearly provides sufficient rationale for examining what this model has called deep structural constraints and convictions. Texts are produced by meaning bearers and cannot successfully be reduced to the products of meaning makers. Since this basic dialectical conception of anthropology has such widespread acceptance, the search for these deep structural constraints should follow.

The Greimas-Patte model that has been followed in this chapter has taken several significant steps beyond Levi-Strauss' attempts to move from surface structure to depth structure. The six discrete steps outlined in this chapter provide a sufficient beginning for relating structuralist theory to structuralists' practice. However, this model's conclusions are not easily reproducible. Patte claims that "by employing this method we should be able to describe the system of convictions presupposed by the text with such rigor that two exegetes working independently of each other should reach very similar conclusions."[120] This promise was not completely realized in this inquiry's analysis. Some of the decisions made by Patte in interpreting Mark were less than obvious. Nonetheless, the basic outline of the model is publically available and promises to be fruitful.

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[120] Patte, Structural Exegesis, p. 11.

Due to the less than obvious character of some of the judgments made in the interpretive process, this model cannot function as the primary moment of interpretation of the Markan narrative. It does function, however, quite well as corroboration of the conclusions made by other models, especially the third model. Ideally, structural exegesis could become this type of corroboration for conclusions made using the third model as the predominant moment in the interpretive process.

One other major drawback for this model of interpretation is the wide variance in methodological systems generally associated with structuralist exegesis. Each system brings with it a wide variation of idiosyncratic terminology which presents a major barrier for public acceptance. However, with the work of Patte, and others, the public status of this work in the American environment has been significantly enhanced.

In short, this model's strength lies in its promise and its present ability to corroborate other moments of the interpretive process. Furthermore, it makes available at least potentially, the deep structural convictions of texts which could lead to significant conclusions for theological use. By exposing one further level of referentiality, this model furthers the purpose of this inquiry and enhances the place of narrative in the theological task. It is to this subject that the next and last chapter turns.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## NARRATIVE, TRUTH and the THEOLOGICAL TASK

As a study in fundamental theology, this inquiry articulates the possibilities and conditions for understanding some of the truth and meaning claims of a text and specifically, Mark. It does so by exploring four models of explanation for verisimilitude, each of which develops the inquiry's warrant that a relatively adequate general theory of hermeneutics interprets a text as a whole without losing a full range of referentiality. Though the inquiry takes into account the conflict of interpretations by allowing for more than one model, it proposes, with each model, a possible way of comprehending a text as a whole without losing referential claims. Realizing that "critical truth can never be exhausted in any one mode,"[1] it remains the task of this chapter to order the models to the service of theology.

The first section of the chapter underscores how the church's images, mainly in the form of doctrine, mediate between contemporary human experience and language and the Christian texts. In the case of Mark these images must take seriously the narrative shape of the text. On the one hand, the narrative quality gives rise to the Markan sense of verisimilitude and the need to provide a critical explanation for this sense. On the other hand, attention to this narrative character makes possible the movement from the four moments of critical explanation (each of the four models) that arose from the initial experience of verisimilitude to the post-critical experience of Markan verisimilitude. Therefore, narrative at two junctures is a crucial ingredient in a post-critical theology. The importance of narrative to theology is precisely in attending to and rendering explicit the meaning and truth claims of these accounts in order to propose and provisionally appropriate them in poesis and praxis.

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[1] Booth, Critical Understanding, p. 198.

The second section of the chapter explores and contrasts several options of using narrative as a major category for ordering the theological task. This inquiry's arguments regarding referentiality differ from several contemporary "narrative theologies" which, in one way or another, avoid arguments regarding the truth claims of the biblical narrative; either they reduce biblical claims to meaning claims exclusively or, at best, include only historical referentiality. This section highlights the significance of this study's proposal of narrative as the mediation between historical and linguistic paradigms. Both first order (historical) and second order (ontological) referential claims in Mark are affirmed.

The final section of the chapter summarizes the ordering of the four models that is appropriate to the discoveries made by the inquiry and the goals of a post-critical theology that appreciates Mark as a whole without losing a full range of referentiality.

## Narrative and the Theological Task

Theology is to seek a merging of two horizons, the Christian texts and common human experience and language. This is accomplished by a mutually critical correlation[2] which ideally ends in such a merging of horizons.[3] This correlation implies an understanding of hermeneutical consciousness [*wirkungsgeschichtliche Bewusstsein*][4] which takes into account the role of pre-understanding, explanation (in this inquiry, the four models of explanation of verisimilitude), and a post-critical understanding.[5] The merging of these two horizons, common human experience and language and the Christian texts, includes a critical moment and a moment of appropriation. Any ordering of such a disparate and complex set of possibilities for use in the theological task must be ordered so that the text's full extent of truth and meaning claims are taken into account. Such an ordering best begins with this inquiry's third model.

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[2] Edward Schillebeeckx, Interim Report on the Books Jesus & Christ

The third model is the best entrance point for appreciating narrative's necessary but not sufficient role in both the critical moment and the moment of appropriation. The most effective manner to appreciate the text's full extent of truth and meaning claims is first to examine the narrative as a whole, as containing a closed and self-sufficient world, with its own integrity, its own past and future, its own set of values, and its own universe of meaning. This is a temporary but necessary bracketing. Without bracketing external considerations, the

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(New York: Crossroads, 1981), p. 62; hereafter, *Interim*. This conception of the theological task follows from the third model.

[3] A complete merging of horizons does not take place.

[4] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 305; *Wahrheit und Methode*, p. 367.

[5] Ricoeur, "Explanation and Understanding," in *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978); Compare this with a major discussion of this topic that underlies the basic three moments of understanding see Georg von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971); for a discussion of this topic by a theologian who takes a similar position see Wolfhardt Pannenberg, *Theology and the Philosophy of Science*, trans. Francis McDonagh (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), pp. 135-55.

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temptation is to explain away the text before understanding it within its own integrity. For example, Donald Juel's analysis of previous interpretations of the Sanhedrin trial confirms this temptation of explaining away the text by appeals to tradition.[6] When Juel turned his concern to the text itself, rather than a redaction critical approach that would necessitate distinguishing tradition from redaction, he was able to propose a critical interpretation of the trial narrative that did not need recourse to typical explanation of crude Markan redaction.

The brackets remain in place long enough to explore not only the story but also the rhetoric of the narrative. Having explored the narrative's events and the role of the characters in those events, the interpreter examines how the implied author appeals to an implied audience. In this analysis the place of the narrator becomes extremely important, for the narrator is the persona that holds together the various narrative devices and is the clue to the full range of arguments being made. This kind of rhetorical criticism distances the text from the interpreter without alienating him or her and makes possible the next critical moment.

In the next critical moment, it is possible to lift the brackets and evaluate the narrative's referential and meaning claims through other modes of explanation. For example, Juel appealed first to the Targum materials that could support his proposed interpretation of the trial narrative. These materials could not provide a positive test for his proposed interpretation of the narrative but did provide a negative test. If, for example, the language of "temple not made with hands," in its use in the Qumran material was not compatible with his proposed interpretation of Mark, he would have a good reason to believe his interpretation less likely. His historical research corroborates his interpretation and lessens the set of possibilities for interpreting Mark; it does not provide the single valid interpretation.

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[6] Juel, Messiah and Temple, pp. 1-39.

Two kinds of historical referential claims seem to be made by Mark. The first is to the events in the life of Jesus and the second is to the dynamic relationship between the author of Mark and the community to whom he addressed his historical narrative.[7]

Another bracketing can take place, in order to allow the historical setting of Jesus' life and ministry to take center stage in the interpretive enterprise. Mark can be understood primarily as historical narrative and related to the historical referents behind-the-text. Vincent Taylor brackets the author's intention and attempts to reconstruct the story of Jesus. The first chapter affirms this model of explanation for the historical claims implied by the narrative but qualifies the method and conclusions. The historical claims must be understood within the rhetorical shape of the narrative, or how the text "comprehends"[8] the world as a totality.[9] The historian's configurational mode of comprehension must inform and qualify the claims that the theologian makes regarding the truthfulness of the historical claims of Mark. This grasping together into a narrative whole, a characteristic of all history, including Mark, makes the story followable[10] and persuasive. So, as the inquiry concluded in its discussion of the first model, historical referentiality would remain possible, but the nature of the truth claims being made would be available only by considering the whole narrative.

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[7] This is not to deny the other possible life situations that may lie behind the text, but it is to suggest that these two represent the major historical claims.

[8] Louis O. Mink, "History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension," New Literary History 1 (1970): 548.

[9] Ibid. Mink argues that theology is this ultimate kind of grasping together.

Furthermore, these truth claims are subject to the dovetailing procedure that Mandelbaum outlines. The theologian, in this moment of critical explanation, would function as a historian engaging in research, weighing alternative possibilities, and marshaling evidence in favor of one rather than another of the possibilities.[11] Among these possibilities in the case of Mark are judgments and warrants regarding authentic Jesus' sayings which can and should play a critical role in the construction of theology. Once again, such assessments regarding Jesus' sayings cannot positively determine the meaning and truth of the text but they can function negatively to limit the set of possible meaning and truth claims a theologian might make on the basis of the historical narrative of Mark.[12] With the dovetailing procedure in place, this critical moment is a correlation of the text of Mark with the set of possible events in the life of Jesus, which can be persuasively argued before the community of historians in light of general histories of the same period.

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[10] This is to use the language Gallie uses in W. B. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding, pp. 12-13.

[11] Mandelbaum, "A Note," p. 414.

[12] The role of historical reconstruction of Jesus' life and ministry is significantly different in this proposal than in the work, for example, of Wolfhardt Pannenberg where historical reconstruction functions as the "ground" of a Christology; cf. Jesus-God and Man, trans. Duane Priebe and Lewis Wilkins (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968), p. 28. The German title underlines Pannenberg's point more clearly: Grundzüge der Christologie (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1964). The place of historical reconstruction in the theological argument, according to this proposal, is roughly parallel to Wilhelm Herrmann's response to Martin Kähler regard-

Another bracketing and refocusing of the interpretive eye can evaluate the truth claims regarding the author and audience to whom the text was originally addressed. This ordering of the models of critical explanation does not visualize the author's intention as the normative

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ing the role of the historical Jesus in Christian faith. Namely, Herrmann agreed with Kähler's judgment that one could not come to faith by means of such a historical reconstruction but that one could, once one had faith, use the New Testament documents historically reconstructed, for critiquing one's theology and faith. Later in this chapter, the significance of this choice of Herrmann over Kähler, or for that matter Harnack, will become evident in the criticism of Hans Frei. Cf. Carl E. Braaten, "Christ, Faith, and History: An Inquiry into the Meaning of Martin Kähler's Distinction between the Historical Jesus and Biblical Christ Developed in its Past and Present Contexts," (unpublished Th.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1959); Hans-Werner Bartsch, "The Historical Problem of the Life of Jesus," in *The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ: Essays on the New Quest of the Historical Jesus*, trans. and ed. by Carl Braaten and Roy A. Harrisville (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1964); Wilhelm Herrmann, "Der geschichtliche Christus der Grund unseres Glaubens," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 2 (1892), pp. 250-51; Charles E. Carston, "Biblicism or Historicism? Some Remarks on the Conflict Between Kähler and Herrmann on the Historical Jesus in *Biblical Research* XIII (1968):26; and Daniel L. Deegan, "Martin Kähler: Kerygma and Gospel History," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 16 (March, 1963), pp. 50-67, clearly distinguishes between historical Jesus and what he calls Kähler's gospel history; however, Deegan's gospel history provides little help in penetrating the complexities of Kähler's historic Christ by the use of the term gospel history; in fact, he avoids many crucial issues raised by Kähler's argumentation. This inquiry's focus on narrative, and particularly historical narrative, is an attempt to bring greater clarity to the middle ground between Kähler and Herrmann, as the introduction indicated. Kähler, this inquiry would suggest, limited the truth claims of the biblical narrative; Herrmann quite rightly did not wish to do so, but did not understand the relationship between meaning and referentiality in such a way as he could accomplish his desired merging of theology with the historical Jesus. By using Dilthey he essentially collapsed theology into understanding (*Verstehen*) leaving out the major critical moments this inquiry proposes. Cf. Herrmann's, *The Communion of the Christian with God*, ed. Robert T. Voelkel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971).

moment of the interpretation, for the reasons given in both chapters two and three and the prologue to the second part. However, the dynamics of the implied author and implied audience remain. Evidence for such figures in the time period most likely to have produced Mark is not precluded. This data, as with all historical evidence, can limit interpretations but cannot establish the single valid interpretation. It can, however, manifest the life and faith of the people who produced and preserved the text. This documentation is clearly of use to the theologian attempting to make an argument to the three contemporary communities of discourse, the academy, the church, and the popular culture.

Chapter two illustrates this use even though it significantly qualified Marxsen's claim to understand Mark as a sermon by affirming the historical narrative. It also qualified Hirsch's claim to stabilize meaning in an external appeal to authorial intention. It did not negate the place of the model of critical explanation as corroborative of the conclusions made by the third model.

For example, an interpretation of Mark which begins with the third model eventually weighs the evidence regarding the theological import of the geographical theme in Mark. If historians could produce corroborative evidence regarding the location of a Christian community in Galilee that had significant parallels to other aspects of the implied community of the Markan narrative, this evidence could be used to substantiate possible truth claims regarding the community that produced the text.

Short of such corroborative evidence regarding such a Galilean community, this model can help the theologian appreciate other kinds of truth claims; these can function as warrants for good reasons to believe Mark to be true. Chief among these good reasons for assenting to the truth of

Mark would be the presence of a community which did in fact write and preserve this text as a significant and truth revealing document. The argument would be something like the following, if addressed to the contemporary church: "Since these early Christians believed and taught in this manner, it is appropriate for contemporary Christians to so believe." If the audience were the general culture, the theologian might compare and contrast contemporary human experience with that depicted in Mark, encouraging the audience to perceive in the historical struggles of this community a reason to accept its truth claims. Without belaboring the point, this model, when placed within the basic format of the model of the theologian as rhetor, provides a limited but helpful set of warrants for arguments that lead to appropriation of the text by the contemporary audience.

The first two models, and that portion of the third model included up to this section do not exhaust the referential claims in the Markan narrative. Within the linguistic paradigm a second order of referentiality was explored. The rhetorical devices that make the argument of the narrative, imply far more than meaning claims; they suggest or propose comprehensive conceptions about the nature of reality. Some of the major rhetorical devices outlined under the third model were modes of comparison; these modes of comparison require the actual reader to complete the argument through some analogy with the reader's experience. These were characterized on a continuum between those modes of comparison which emphasized strong similarities and weak dissimilarities, on the one end of the continuum, to those modes of comparison which emphasized strong dissimilarities and weak similarities, for example, metaphors. The analysis of such arguments of comparison which are completed by the audience is a necessary part of the appraisal of the full range of meaning and truth claims available in the Markan narrative. The explication of metaphors such as the Kingdom of God requires considerable sophistication regarding the logic of metaphor. This is a subject only hinted at in this inquiry but a parallel and necessary component in the inquiry's conception of the role of narrative in the theological task.[13]

Irony is another type of narrative device which Hayden White calls a linguistic protocol and which the last two models suggestively explored. In the third model irony was seen as the chief rhetorical device of the passion narrative and perhaps the entire gospel, and in the fourth model irony was the underlying structure and fundamental conviction of the narrative as historical narrative. In terms of the surface structure, Juel's interpretation would suggest that a Markan conception of the world is intimately related to this ironic vision of reality. This surface analysis was corroborated by Pattes' interpretation of the passion narrative. Any theological use of the Markan narrative that does not take into account this corroborative evidence from a structural analysis has, in principle, limited the range of truth claims that require explication and development.

This inquiry did not affirm the reliability of the structural exegesis to the extent that it has approved the other three models. At this point it appears too arbitrary and, therefore, less persuasive. However, in principle, contemporary anthropology suggests that such deep structures do exist and are subject, in principle, to scientific investigation by methods both predictable and repeatable. Since the model in chapter four does not lend itself to such ready predictability and repeatability its persuasive power is lessened but this does not negate the necessity of the task. A method can and probably will be developed to uncover those deep structures of humanity as meaning bearers that will be useful in the same manner as the second and third models.

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[13] Sallie MacFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).

Within the third model critical explanation, and the appreciation of the text's meaning and truth claims, takes place within a set of theological purposes. These purposes necessitate a certain gathering up or grasping of the whole. What generalizations the historian, mind-reader, or decoder might find inappropriate for the purposes of their disciplines, the rhetor must make. The diversity in methods and content are no excuse for the rhetor to avoid making imaginative arguments. This crucial discipline of rhetorical invention has been rediscovered recently in several locations including the writings of David Kelsey and his use of Robert C. Johnson's notion of discrimen.[14]

The theologian, following the third model, is primarily the rhetor seeking to discover the place in which the two horizons of the text and the common human experience and language of the community to whom the theologian is speaking, merge. The theologian, then, must discover discrimen, imaginative norms or criteria, whereby the "theologian construes the mode of God's presence."[15] Kelsey, in Uses of the Scripture in Recent Theology, outlines seven case studies that illustrate three families of ways "to construe the mode in which God is present."[16] The language in this inquiry's third model suggests both an ideal possibility and a concrete actuality. The text projects a possible-mode-for-being-in-the-world but also realizes in an already/not yet manner the possibility by effecting a change in the community who experiences this possible-mode-of-being-in-the-world as true. Therefore, the imaginative discrimen grows out of critical reflection on the narrative, grasps together a theological proposal and focuses the community's appropriation of the proposal.

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[14] David Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), p. 160; Robert C. Johnson, Authority in Protestant Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), p. 15.

[15] Kelsey, Uses, p. 161.

In the case of this inquiry's analysis of Mark that imaginative discrimen most likely would be intimately related to the metaphor of cross and the linguistic protocol of irony in the Markan narrative. The cross and the ironic structure of God's presence in this manner can function as both the ideal possibility and the already/not yet concrete actualization of God's presence in the world. Out of this basic imaginative discrimen, perhaps, in a manner not unlike Robert Scharlemann's argument for the being of God,[17] the various theological loci can be developed.

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[16] Ibid. Kelsey lists the following three modes with examples: ideational mode, Warfield, Bartsch, Wright; concrete actuality: Barth, Thornton; ideal possibility: Bultmann, Tillich.

[17] Scharlemann, The Being of God, p. 182 where he writes: "That some assertions which one would like to see true turn out to be otherwise is a hazard that theology shares with other discourse. The risk neither can nor should be evaded by taking refuge in unchallengeable assertions of faith. Indeed, the experience of the truth of the symbol of the cross makes just the opposite so, inasmuch as the true and the false are incorporated into the depth of truth that this symbol expresses. If the depth of the true and the false are incorporated into the depth of truth that this symbol expresses. If the depth of the true and the false can also be experienced through the false, this does not alter the result . . ." I hesitate to take Scharlemann's position into this proposal as a whole is two fold: First, his appeal to a dialectical

The final shape of theology cannot be dogma, however. Johannes-Baptist Metz is quite correct when he suggests that "the fundamental hermeneutical problem of theology is not the problem of how systematic theology stands in relation to historical theology, how dogma stands in relation to history, but what is the relation between theory and practice."[18] Metz's insight is itself limited, since it downplays the importance of _poesis_; _poesis_ is a crucial moment in the appropriation of the imaginative _discrimen_. Therefore, theology takes its direction from and moves towards _poesis_ and _praxis_ as much as moving from the Christian texts, the history of interpretation, and history of imaginative _discrimens_ and theological loci, or dogma.

Theology is, then, reflection on and through the imaginative _discrimen_ of the Church; these _discrimen_ arise out of a critical appraisal of the biblical narrative and common human experience and language that eventually lead to _poesis_ and _praxis_, especially narrative witness. This narrative witness renders explicit, coherent, and intelligible the claims of the community to one of three audiences: academia, church, or popular culture. The theologian as rhetor must first understand the

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logic of this intense a sort is not entirely convincing. See my review of this book in _Word and World_, 2 (Spring, 1982):283-4. Second could not the category metaphor provide a more public category for discussing the experience and language of the experience of the logic Scharlemann proposes? The experience of is and is not drawn together in lively metaphors lessens the intense dialectical program which I believe Scharlemann inherents from Ebeling. See Paul Ricoeur, _The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language_ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) for further discussion; also _Metaphor_, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

[18] Johannes-Baptist Metz, "Relationship of Church and World in the Light of Political Theology," _Theology of Renewal_ 2. _Renewal of Religious Structures_, L. K. Shook (New York: 1968), p. 260.

narrative claims and use various forms of explanation to render explicit the truth and meaning claims of the text. Guiding the theologian in organizing these warrants and qualifications for the argument to be made is the imaginative discrimen which eventually norms the production of new narrative and communal action appropriate to that narrative. Narrative has two crucial moments in the theological task: one in the process of explanation and one in the post-critical appropriation of the text critically correlated with the common human experience. Theologians should (1) attend to narratives, (2) explicate their meaning and truth claims, and (3) create contemporary narratives that adumbrate those claims and lead to appropriate praxis by the contemporary community.

## Different Forms of Narrative Theology

Recently many scholars have found the category of narrative a powerful and necessary device for addressing perennial theological problems.[19] However, George Stroup notes, "there is nothing close to a consensus on precisely what the term means."[20] This section intends to compare and contrast this study's proposal with contemporary options for using narrative in theology. To that end certain broad camps must be described; some set aside since their use of the term "narrative" does not apply at all to the concerns of this inquiry; and others critiqued in light of this inquiry's argument.

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[19] George W. Stroup, "A Bibliographical Critique," in Theology Today, 32, no. 2 (July 1975):133-34.

[20] George W. Stroup, The Promise of Narrative Theology (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981), p. 71; hereafter, Promise.

## Introduction to Religion

The first group is described by Stroup as "employ[ing] story or narrative as an introduction to the study of religion in general and perhaps Christianity in particular."[21] Sam Keen's To a Dancing God, Harvey Cox's The Seduction of the Spirit, Michael Novak's Ascent of the Mountain, Flight of the Dove, Robert Roth's Story and Reality, John Shea's Stories of God, and a collection of essays edited by James B. Wiggins, Religion as Story, are recent examples of this type of use of narrative.[22]

The meaning of the category "story" in each of these instances is not clear. Nor do they clarify the discussion of religious experience. Often the category "story" covers many different genres, from poems to novels. Other times it is used only to refer to a particular literary form, such as a parable. Stroup suggests that "[a] reader often gets the impression that although the announced theme is narrative or story, that category is not the author's real concern and in fact is peripheral to the author's real agenda."[23] These are harsh words but on the whole accurate.[24] This inquiry's examination of the place of narrative as a critical category in the interpretation of Markan verisimilitude has little to do with the interests and claims of this group.[25]

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[21] Ibid., pp. 71-72.

[22] Sam Keen, To a Dancing God (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Harvey Cox, The Seduction of the Spirit (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973); Michael Novak, Ascent of the Mountain, Flight of the Dove (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Robert P. Roth, Story and Reality (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973); John Shea, Stories of God (Chicago: Thomas More Press, 1978); James B. Wiggins, ed., Religion as Story (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

[23] Stroup, Promise, p. 72.

[24] Gabriel Facre, The Christian Story (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), fails to develop in any significant manner the basic issues surrounding the narrative character of scripture, which he holds to be normative, nor the role of narrative in the writing of theology.

## The Life-Story and Lived Convictions

A second group of theologians has taken up the question of the experiential roots of narrative. Articles by Stephen Crites and books by James William McClendon, Jr., Stanley Hauerwas, and John Dunne offer discussions of the meaning of narrative and its relation to human experience. Stephen Crites' article, "The Narrative Quality of Experience," is most interesting.[26] He argues that one of the conditions for being human is the possession of the capacity for having a history, and "that the formal quality of experience through time is inherently narrative."[27] That is, the form which active consciousness assumes in its experience of the world is narrative form, which suitably expresses "the tensed unity" of the three modalities of past, present, and future.[28]

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[25] However, certain other discussions within this first type of using narrative do touch on the concerns and proposals of this inquiry. The German discussion, like the one taking place in the United States, has focused on two major issues: the relationship between narrative and doctrinal theology and the reinterpretation of traditional doctrines by means of the category of narrative. Each of the models in this inquiry take into account the role of narrative in interpreting Mark. These issues are an essential consideration in any discussion of the role of narrative in doctrinal theology and the reinterpretation of traditional doctrines. Before discussing these issues, two other types of narrative theologies need to be described. Examples of the German discussion include: Herald Weinrich, "Narrative Theology," and Johannes-Baptist Metz, "A Short Apology of Narrative," in *The Crisis of Religious Language*, eds. Johannes-Baptist Metz and Jean-Pierre Jossua (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973): 46-56 and 84-96. Also Josef-Meyer zu Schlochtern, *Glaube-Sprache-Erfahrung* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1978); Eberhard Jüngel *Gott als Geheimnis der Welt* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1977).

[26] Stephen Crites, "The Narrative Quality of Experience," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 39, no. 3. (September 1971), 291-311.

[27] Ibid., p. 291.

Crites' lead has been followed by James William McClendon, Jr. and John S. Dunne who have concentrated on the relation between narrative and experience. McClendon calls upon the tradition of biographies of certain "singular or striking lives" in the Christian community.[29] He proposes a "biographical theology" that is intimately related to ethics. John S. Dunne, in A Search for God in Time and Memory, works the category of "life-story" to "pass over" into the lives of major figures, Paul, Augustine, and Kierkegaard.

Neither McClendon nor Dunne attend to their implied romantic hermeneutic, with its psychological presuppositions and the problem of and need for distanciation, or the character of rhetorical forms, all of which have been major considerations in this inquiry. Their conclusions, though interesting, are not argued along these critical lines and leave little to which this inquiry can respond.

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[28] Ibid., p. 301. In a subsequent article, "Angels We Have Heard," Crites appears to qualify his argument by insisting, "I do not mean to imply that this convergence of art and experience occurs in narrative form alone." Cf. Religion as Story, ed. James B. Wiggins, p. 57 and Mink's argument in this inquiry's first chapter. In order to understand the primordial status of narrative in human experience (and in that sense its 'religious significance'), we must concentrate not simply on the 'mundane stories' which people recite, stories which are set within a determinate world (mundus) and frame of consciousness and by which people explain 'where they have been, why things are as they are, and so on,'" Stroup, Promise, p. 76; Crites, "Narrative Quality." Rather we must also attend to what Crites calls 'sacred stories', 'not so much because gods are commonly celebrated in them but because men's sense of self and world is created through them,'" Crites, p. 295. These powerful stories which are never directly told because they shape consciousness rather than being an object to consciousness. Sacred stories provide consciousness with a sense of orientation in life and a pre-conscious apprehension of reality. Hence, the "narrative quality of experience" as Crites describes it, has three dimensions: 'the sacred story, the mundane stories, and the temporal form of experience itself: three narrative tracks, each constantly reflecting and affecting the course of the others,'" Crites, p. 305.

[29] Dag Hammarskjöld, Martin Luther King, Jr., Clarence Jordan, and Charles Ives; James Wm. McClendon, Jr., Biography as Theology (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1974), p. 36.

Stanley Hauerwas' proposal regarding the role of story in the formation of Christian character is considerably more sophisticated in its understanding of human character formation and avoids the pitfalls of the romantic hermeneutic implied in McClendon and Dunne.[30] Hauerwas, like McClendon, believes that the meaning of character is to be found in narratives and that these narratives are a form of explanation. A story "is a narrative account that binds events and agents together in an intelligible pattern," and in so doing offers a description and explanation of why things are the way they are.[31] Most importantly for Hauerwas' argument, narrative is "a necessary form" for describing the intentionality of human action."[32]

Hauerwas is quite correct on the necessity of the narrative form in the move from theory to praxis. He is quite wrong when he considers narrative as sufficient for the move from the biblical narrative to the ethical praxis. Narrative, this inquiry has argued, is necessary but not sufficient to move from pre-understanding through explanation to post-critical praxis. Hauerwas speaks of the moral authority of Scripture under the heading of the "Morality of Remembering: the Scripture

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[30] Stanley Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1975).

[31] Stanley Hauerwas, with Richard Bondi and David B. Burrell, Truthfulness and Tragedy (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), pp. 8-76; cf. Hauerwas' other book, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides, 1974).

[32] Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy, p. 75.

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as Narrative."[33] The "narrative of Scripture not only 'renders a character'[34] but renders a community capable of ordering its existence appropriate to such stories."[35] Thus, Hauerwas argues, "Scripture need not be ordered by a dogmatic canon within a canon, but one can understand the whole of Scripture as "one long 'loosely structured non-fiction novel' that has sub-plots that at some points appear minor but later turn out to be central."[36] In moving from the narrative of scripture to the narrative which "renders a community capable of ordering its existence appropriate to such stories" Hauerwas rejects Kelsey's appeal to an "imaginative discrimen"[37] and, in effect, all four moments of critical explanation that this inquiry has proposed. Not only are the truth claims of scripture excluded from public discourse but even the meaning claims are held ransom to the Christian community as sect. Hauerwas' proposal, though far more sophisticated in its understanding of the formation of human character and the pitfalls of the romantic hermeneutic, short-circuits the interpretive enterprise by excluding critical discourse in the exegesis and explanation of the biblical narrative and its appropriation in praxis.

### Biblical Narrative

This inquiry most properly falls within this category: the attention to and use of the biblical narrative in theology. The concern has been to attend to the narrative of Mark, with all of its various genres, including varieties of narrative. Several theologians, biblical, historical, and systematic, have turned to this approach to the place of narrative in theology.

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[33] Stanley Hauerwas, "The Moral Authority of Scripture: The Politics and Ethics of Remembering," Interpretation 34 (1980): 364.

[34] Kelsey, Uses, p. 39 where Kelsey interprets Karl Barth in this manner.

[35] Hauerwas, "The Morality of Scripture," p. 366.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Kelsey, Uses, p. 160.

Biblical theologians such as Gerhard von Rad, Oscar Cullmann, and G. Ernest Wright examined the place of Heilsgeschichte, salvation history, in the scripture.[38] This work has suffered considerable criticism. Only recently have the genres of narrative and question about their function in the context of the whole of scripture received concerted attention.[39]

In New Testament criticism questions about the very nature of "gospel" as a literary genre, and the structure of Mark in particular, have generated a considerable body of literature. Some, like Amos Niven Wilder, argue that "[t]he narrative mode is uniquely important to Christianity."[40] This inquiry has avoided the question of determining the genre of Mark, but assents to Wilder's concern for the form of narrative whether or not "it is the proper form of the Gospel"[41] in all of its practical forms.

In Old Testament criticism some have proposed a "canonical criticism." Torah, as James Sanders interprets it, is not just a law code but "essentially a story."[42] It is in the context of the narrative structure of the Pentateuch that Israel's ordinances, commandments, and statutes have their meaning. Interpreting any piece of scripture requires an examination of its location and function in the canon as a whole. This canonical approach, Brevard Childs insists, does not imply a "non-historical reading of the Bible."[43] To focus on the canon "is an attempt to do justice to the nature of Israel's unique history." Canonical criticism, therefore, "seeks to understand the peculiar shape and special function of these texts which comprise the Hebrew canon."[44] In order to do so, it concentrates on the final form of the biblical text rather than on the history of its formation.

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[38] Cf. Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962, 1965); Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964); G. Ernest Wright, God Who Acts (London: SCM Press, 1952).

[39] Brevard Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970).

[40] Amos N. Wilder, The Language of the Gospel: Early Christian Rhetoric (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 64.

[41] Ibid.

Systematic and historical theologians have followed a similar line of thought and, in the case of Childs, may have contributed to the biblical critics' proposals. Chief among these latter theologians is Hans W. Frei, who finds Auerbach's description of realistic narrative[45] as a clue to the development of theological and biblical hermeneutics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[46] Examined from the perspective of realism, biblical narrative is not so much history as it is what Frei calls "history-like." The "pre-critical" manner of reading scripture began to disappear when distinctions were drawn between the text's literal sense--the world it depicted--and its historical referent. Once meaning was separated from reference it was no longer possible to read the text realistically.[47] The modern question became, "I understand what it means, but is it true?" In a more recent book, The Identity of Jesus Christ, Frei extends his claims regarding realistic narrative by arguing that the New Testament not only depicts a world but it also renders the identity of an agent.[48] The Gospel narratives render the identity of Jesus Christ by means of their descriptions of him. He is who he truly and universally is in these narratives which record the intention-action sequence of his life and his self-manifestation in his Passion. Frei, in all of this, is concerned with the straight-forward "sense of the story."[49]

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[42] James A. Sanders, Torah and Canon (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p. 4. See also Sanders' article, "Torah and Christ," in Interpretation, 29, no. 4 (October 1975), pp. 372-90.

[43] Brevard Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), p. 71. See also Childs' article, "The Old Testament as Scripture of the Church," in Concordia Theological Monthly, 43, no. 11 (December 1972): 709-22. Compare some of Childs' friendly critics: Ralph W. Klein, "The Childs' Proposal," Word and World I, n. 2 (Spring 1981): 108-9 where Klein writes: "Despite his own excellent credentials as an historical critic,. . .he does not specify how--if at all--historical criticism contributes to an understanding of the canonical text" or Gary Stansell, p. 111, notes that "the result of the canonical analysis is to subordinate the historical to the theological."

[44] Childs, Introduction, p. 72.

[45] Auerbach, Mimesis, p. 45.

Frei's concern for the "sense of a story"[50] is in concert with one of the more explicit concerns of this inquiry. Rather than dissecting the text in an attempt to ascertain what took place behind-the-text, this inquiry's proposal suggests the interpreter begin with the text as a whole.[51]

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[46] Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of the Biblical Narrative (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 28-30.

[47] This same development is traced in this inquiry's development; while Frei's tone implies a negative judgment on this development and wishes to reverse it, this inquiry sees it as irreversible and potentially helpful. Although, to this point, it has not been so.

[48] Hans W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), pp. 263-306; hereafter, Identity.

[49] Frei, Identity, p. xv.

[50] Ibid.

Frei, however, is exceptionally concerned to separate his definition of hermeneutics from other forms:

> Hermeneutics I define in the old-fashioned, rather narrow, and low-keyed manner as the rules and principles for determining the sense of written texts, or the rules and principles governing exegesis. This is in contrast to the more recent, ambitious, indeed all-encompassing view of hermeneutics as inquiry into the process that goes into understanding or interpreting linguistic phenomena.[52]

In this concern he clearly differs from this inquiry's proposal. For such a general theory of hermeneutics lies at the center of the inquiry. Frei's demurring implies a very significant criticism of this inquiry's thesis and proposal for the place of narrative in a post-critical theology. This criticism is worthy of further explication and a preliminary reply.

Why does Frei demur from the broader construction of the hermeneutical task? He states two reasons in The Identity of Jesus Christ: First, "[such a hermeneutical program] seems to me to be one more version of religious apologetics."[53] Second, "general theory here dictates to, not to say overwhelms, exegesis and subject matter in the case of at least one kind of text" [realistic narrative].[54] These reasons need to clarified and developed before a response is made, beginning with the second reason.

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[51] Ibid. Frei argues: "[t]he aim of exegesis which simply looks for the sense of a story (but does not identify sense with religious significance for the reader) is in the final analysis that of reading the story itself. . . . And therefore the theoretical devices we use to make our reading more alert, appropriate, and intelligent ought to be designed to leave the story itself as unencumbered as possible. This is additionally true because realistic stories . . . are directly accessible."

[52] Ibid., p. xvi. [53] Ibid. [54] Ibid.

In his discussion of his second reason Frei notes how often the "new hermeneutic" overwhelms the simple rendering of the text with theory.[55] He further argues that it is possible for a reader, "no matter how he disposes himself toward the story on a personal level" to render it, to make sense of the text. The new hermeneutic, with its position regarding the "hermeneutical circle" cannot account for this phenomenon Frei asserts.[56] The hermeneutical circle presumes that the reader must have a certain disposition in order to render the text in this simple manner. "And if a general theory of interpretation cannot explain how an exegesis that can actually be done is possible, just how general is it?"[57]

By way of response, it is possible to construe the "hermeneutical circle" in such a way that the reader's dispositions, or what Heidegger calls "pre-understandings," must be an uncritical part of the interpretation of the text. Those who would so understand Gadamer's use of the hermeneutical circle would also find his general theory of interpretation unable to account for the phenomenon to which Frei points.[58] However, this inquiry's proposal has two major check points to avoid this criticism. In the second prologue the concept of distanciation responds to this criticism. This conception is elaborated in the rhetorical critique in the third chapter where the insistence upon the text as a whole cloth protects the text's integrity. Finally Gadamer's critical awareness of "pre-understandings" lessens the effect of Frei's criticism.

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[55] After three hundred pages of theory, the reader of this inquiry might well agree.

[56] Frei, Identity, p. xvii.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Mark Ellingsen, "Gadamer's Hermeneutics: What It Cannot Do For Theology," (unpublished paper delivered at Annual Meeting, November 1980, American Academy of Religion) where Ellingsen discusses the difference between Hans Frei's hermeneutics and Gadamer's, especially pp. 3-4.

In part, Ricoeur's theory of distanciation is in response to precisely this criticism of Gadamer and Heidegger. It is helpful to recall that Ricoeur has chosen to take the long way around from preunderstanding to appropriation of the text. He has inserted a critical moment on the level of epistemology while Heidegger, at least, and Gadamer, according to some interpretation, remain at the level of ontology.[59] Ricoeur's theory of distanciation allows for the interpretation of the text without an immediate move to appropriation. Therefore, it calls for and not only accounts for the rendering of the sense of the text. In response to Frei, this proposal quite agrees with Frei's concern to understand the text as a literary whole and meets his concern to avoid immediate appropriation. But, then, one might legitimately ask, why go through all the general theory, if this proposal and Frei agree upon the importance of such a rendering of the text? The answer lies in the major warrant of the inquiry: Frei recovers the sense of the text as a whole but he loses the full range of referentiality.

This contrast is best seen by Frei's appeal to the "New Critics" for interpreting the realistic or history-like narrative of the Gospels. In the prologue to the second part, the section entitled "Against the 'New Criticism'," the New Critics were set aside because of, among other reasons, their epistemological skepticism. It was argued that the referential ambiguity and, in some cases abolition, of ostensive referentiality, "does not totally abolish the fundamental characteristic of discourse: to be about something."[60] The New Critics quite literally cut off all referentiality, setting the text adrift in a sea of meaning, but abandoning the question of truth.

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[59] Hoy, The Critical Circle, pp. 51-52 where Hoy discusses various misinterpretations of Gadamer on this issue.

For the theologian this is a great price to pay simply to limit the hermeneutical task. Frei, by his appeal to "realistic" and "history-like" narrative and the New Critics, has effectively eliminated both first and second order referentiality. Neither remains within the purview of the theological interpreter's task. Frei admits that the narrative will effect the identity of the people who read it, but declares he has no interest in how or why that takes place.[61] This escape from the truth claims of the biblical narrative requires a more sufficient reason than the second one given in Identity.

His first reason is more substantial. He objects to a broader definition of the hermeneutical task, because "it seems to [him] to be one more version of religious apologetics."[62] This somewhat cryptic comment is clarified when, elsewhere, Frei characterizes post-Enlightenment theology as Christologically-centered and heavily apologetic in its aims.[63] Christological inquiry has centered upon the work of the kerygmatic Christ rather than His person. Its apologetic interest has posited a correlation between Christo-centric Christian revelation and ontological reality. As a result, ontology is called upon to relate the content and the contemporary believer's experience of this revelation. In so doing, most modern theologians have implied that the revelation of Jesus has its meaning and possibility grounded in human experience. Frei, following Karl Barth, has then concluded that these theologians fall prey to Feuerbach's critique of religion: a fact which severely negates the value of these theologians to Christian theology.[64]

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[60] Cf. Prologue Two.

[61] Hans W. Frei, "Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal," (lecture delivered at Harvard University, 7 December, 1969, p. 20); hereafter, "Remarks."

[62] Frei, Identity, p. xvi.

[63] Frei, "Remarks," p. 8.

George Lindbeck makes this tie explicit in his response to Edward Schillebeeckx' and Hans Küng's method of interpreting scripture. He credits Frei's turn to an "aesthetic model or approach" as a way of escaping historical analysis which falls prey to Feuerbach's criticism of religion.[65] Lindbeck argues, following Frei, that the Bible should be understood as "a vast loosely-structured, non-fictional novel."[66]

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[64] "Remarks," p. 5; cf. Karl Barth, "An Introductory Essay," in Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), pp.xix-xxi.

[65] Lindbeck following Frei's lead, tends to use the literary analytic work of older American New Critics like William Wimsatt, I. A. Richards, and the literary historian Erich Auerbach. Cf. Hans W. Frei, "Remarks," pp. 9-11; *Eclipse*; I. A. Richards, *Practical Criticism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1929), p. 183; W. K. Wimsatt, *The Verbal Icon* (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1954), xvi., p. 250. Lindbeck, "Theologische Methode und Wissenschaftstheorie," *Theologische Revue* 74 (1978): 266-79; cf.also George Lindbeck, "The Bible as Realistic Narrative," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 17 (Winter, 1980), pp. 1-83. Lindbeck argues, following Frei and Kelsey, that the Bible should be understood as "a vast loosely-structured, non-fictional novel." David Kelsey applies this phrase to Karl Barth's view of Scripture in *Uses*, p. 48. Furthermore, Lindbeck asks that we set aside the historical questions for a moment, stop worrying about pre-understanding, and tend to the text. Otherwise, pluralistic conversation will have insufficient authority so that everyone will find what they want, and we will have no conversation," Lindbeck, "The Bible," p. 83.

[66] Kelsey, *Uses*, p. 48.

He continues by arguing that we set aside the historical questions for a moment, stop worrying about pre-understanding, and tend to the text. Otherwise, pluralistic conversation will have insufficient authority so that everyone will find what they want, and we will have no conversation.[67]

There are, then, three interrelated points in Frei's first reason for limiting the scope of hermeneutics. First, the apologetic task implied in the general theory of hermeneutics; second, the susceptibility of this method to Feuerbach's critique of religion because of the ontological link between reader and text; and third, the possibility of chaos in the theological community of discourse, since the text will simply become a reflection of whomever reads it. These issues are far more formidable than the second set of reasons given by Frei. But do they apply to this inquiry's proposal? If they do, are they sufficient go give up the full range of referential claims? Before answering those two questions, it is necessary to clarify the concern over apologetics which is the primary objection.

Apologetics, for Frei, is concerned with the logic of coming to belief: how it is that the unbeliever comes to affirm the truth, value, or significance of the faith. In its most practical form, of course, it attempts to argue concretely for the faith's acceptance. Apologetics, for Frei, is contrasted with dogmatics which is the attempt to order the logic of the faith, without necessarily arguing for its truth, value, or significance. It may show where the faith makes truth claims, but it does not argue them. Its operation is strictly internal to the faith.

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[67] Lindbeck, "The Bible,":83.

Frei would argue that there is a correlation between apologetics and dogmatics. The faith which is being argued for is the same faith with which dogmatics wrestles. If dogmatic theology should come to the conclusion that Jesus saves by instituting a community in which existential authenticity is realized, then the way in which one might argue for the faith would be much different than if it was concluded that Jesus saves by ransoming our souls from the devil. One should not, however, expand this connection any further at this point. All that can be said is that there is most likely some relation between dogmatics and apologetics. What that relation might be depends on the sorts of conclusions reached about the logic of faith and of coming to faith. In other words, one might say that it depends on what one concludes to be "the essence of Christianity." This distinction allows Frei to claim, in _The Identity of Jesus Christ_, that he can outline "the hermeneutical bases of dogmatic theology" without ever invoking the history behind the text to clarify meaning.

Frei's separation of explication and application and definition of the dogmatic task makes historical referentiality unnecessary. Since Frei argues he does not confuse apologetics with dogmatics, he is not required to search behind the text to establish meaning.

By way of response, Frei's separation of explication and application, dogmatics and apologetics is unnecessarily rigid. One can indeed, one needs to distinguish grammar, logic, and rhetoric, but one cannot separate them if one is going to offer an argument to a community regarding one's conclusions on any one of the three. To explicate the world-in-front-of-the-text, without reference to historical events behind-the-text, is possible according to this inquiry's proposal. It is not possible, however,--and the third chapter demonstrated this point--to explicate the meaning of Mark without completing the implied arguments. One need not accept the argument the text makes in order to hear the argument. However, the interpreter cannot help but make an argument for the text, even if the interpreter merely performs the text out loud before an audience.

Frei correctly argues that appeals to explicit arguments for the truth of the text may not be the most effective means of understanding it. However, he incorrectly suggests that explication is not also an argument for its truth. He tempers this judgment when he admits that the text does demand of its readers complex assent to certain truths in the gospels as a result of reading them. This admission is most clear in Frei's argument regarding the resurrection.

His interpretation of the passion-resurrection sequences concludes that, with regard to the Jesus of the text, "to know who he is in connection with what took place is to know that he is. This is the climax of the story and its claim. What the accounts are saying, in effect, is that the being and identity of Jesus in the resurrection are such that his non-resurrection is inconceivable."[68] Jesus, in his death and resurrection, is simply the One Who Lives. To think of him as not living, as remaining in the tomb, is simply not to understand that in this one unique case, identity and presence are not distinct, but logically inseparable.[69]

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[68] Frei, Identity, p. 198.

[69] How Frei arrives at these conclusions through his use of self-manifestation and intention-action descriptions is not our concern. Of present interest is merely what he states about Jesus.

These claims are about the meaning of the text, without reference to any possible history which it might report. But Frei admits that precisely at the point of the resurrection, the text itself forces the question of whether the event actually occurred; whether Jesus 'historically' rose from the dead. In regard to this, Frei states,

> Having directed attention all along to the descriptive structure of the accounts and not to the factual historicity of their contents, we must say that belief in Jesus' resurrection is more nearly a belief in something like the inspired quality of the accounts than in the theory that they reflect what 'actually took place'. But at one point a judgment of faith concerning the inspiration of the descriptive contents and a judgment of faith affirming their central factual claim would have to coincide for the believer. He would have to affirm that the New Testament authors were right in insisting that it is more nearly correct to think of Jesus as factually raised, bodily if you will, than not to think of him in this manner.[70]

Frei's central point is that a real, bodily resurrection is the most adequate way we have of talking about Easter. Coming to faith involves coming to affirm the historical accuracy of the claim that Jesus rose from the dead.

Frei's appreciation of the complex relationship between historical claims and value claims in the apologetic task is commendable and confirms this inquiry's use of Wayne C. Booth's argument regarding good reasons for assent. In particular, Frei notes the inseparability for the believer of the historical affirmation and the existential commitment.[71] This inquiry's proposal takes into account the complex kinds of reasons that move persons from unbelief to belief without forsaking its basic commitment to seeing the theologian as rhetor.

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[70] Frei, Identity, p. 205.

[71] Though this inquiry might not state it in this manner, Frei states that one affirms the reality of the resurrection "presumably by a kind of thought movement similar to and reinterative of that of the original authors, in which grateful discipleship and factual acknowledgement seem to have been--mysteriously--one and the same act," Frei, Identity, p. 200. The "mysteriously" adds little clarity and, in light

Furthermore, this proposal agrees that one would not insist (though it is a possibility) that an honest movement from unbelief to belief involves an independent historical certainty that Jesus rose. Even the first model, proposed in this inquiry, would not want to isolate events from the narrative whole or from the general histories of the period. However, if one were given incontrovertible historical proof that Jesus did not rise from the dead, then the theological discrimen chosen for forming doctrinal loci would be significantly affected. In short, historical referentiality is not, as is the case with Wolfhardt Pannenberg,[72] the ground of theological construction.[73] This, of course, is in keeping with the role of historical reference throughout the proposal. In this Frei and the proposal are in agreement; the apologetic significance of confirming evidence is slight, the significance of possible disconfirming evidence is central.

The second, but related, part of Frei's first reason for limiting his definition of hermeneutics, is related to the ontological link proposed between the interpreter and the text. This concerns Frei primarily because of its susceptibility to Feuerbach's critique of religion that held religion to be a projection of humanities' hopes and needs onto a transcendent screen. To avoid this criticism Frei, following Barth, must make scriptures ontologically unique, even and especially at the

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of this proposal's argument, need not be asserted.

[72] Wolfhardt Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, p. 28.

[73] Cf., n. 12 above.

point of Jesus' resurrection. Frei wishes to rule out any possibility of historical proof. At times, the grounds for this judgment seem to be the simple lack of positive evidence. "There appears to be no independent historical or other evidence that lends strong or conclusive support to the likelihood that this event took place or that it belongs to a credible type of occurrence."[74] However, more often, the impossibility of proof is seen to lie in the ontologically unique character of the resurrection.

> The resurrection must, in the eyes of those who believe, be a factual occurrence of a wholly unique kind, the conceptual content of which is the climactic establishment of Jesus' identity . . . The resurrection cannot be reduced to a kind of occurrence for the credibility of which historical evidence from the New Testament and from the experience of historical life in general would be pertinent. And, therefore, the character of the resurrection appearances cannot be compared and contrasted speculatively to that of other occurrences; e.g., we cannot say that they are more like visions than like experiences of a physical miracle, or vice versa.[75]

According to Frei, any ontological tie between divine revelation and common human experience and language will be subject to Feuerbach's critique. This is true. The question remains: are the lengths to which Frei goes responsible in respect to the price he pays? It is, of course, outside the scope of this inquiry to respond to Feuerbach's critique of religion. Nonetheless, it is possible to suggest an argument that Feuerbach's explication of religious experience, though of considerable merit, cannot explain definitively all religious experience. In short, there are relatively adequate arguments to limit the extent of Feuerbach's critique without Frei's extreme moves. In principle, this inquiry's proposal is subject to rebuttal precisely at this point in the proposal by similar hermeneutics of suspicion.[76] Therefore, any theological position taken as a result of this proposal must take into account a response to such a rebuttal.

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[74] Frei, Identity, pp. 206-07.

[75] Hans W. Frei, "Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus' Death and Resurrection," The Christian Scholar 49 (1966):264.

Be that as it may, Frei's proposal implies a sharp dichotomy between the natural order and some other-worldly supernatural sphere. The result is that scripture, like a creature from some other world, occasionally intrudes into the natural order and revelation and interpretation become supernatural events. Gerhard Ebeling, in response to Karl Barth's doctrine of revelation, argues that the Word of God is not an appendage or something other than what we call the natural order of reality. It is a fundamental misunderstanding, Ebeling insists, to describe God's Word as "so to speak a separate class of word alongside the word spoken between men, which is otherwise the only thing we usually call word."[77] Frei's hermeneutical proposal comes very close to reducing the biblical narrative to a formal concept and in so doing separating the world from the domain of the Word with the inevitable but unfortunate result that revelation becomes a supernatural, other-worldly event.[78] What the Bible describes as God's Word is not some other-worldly reality which from time to time intrudes into the natural order, but simply "word as word--word that as far as its word-character is concerned is completely normal, let us not hesitate to say: natural, oral word taking place between man and man."[79]

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[76] All the classical hermeneutics of suspicion could function as a course of rebuttal and thereby be encompassed within this argument, if it were to be developed. The work of Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, could be added to that of Feuerbach.

[77] Gerhard Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutics," Word and Faith (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 325. Here once again is the classic dispute over the *finitum capax infiniti*.

[78] In his essay "Reflections on the Doctrine of the Law," Ebeling discusses Barth's "formalism." Cf. *Word and Faith*, pp. 247-81, esp. 267-68, and "Word of God and Hermeneutics," pp. 325-28.

The third implied concern, articulated by Frei's colleague Lindbeck, needs to be addressed, namely, the possibility of chaos in the theological community of discourse, since the text will simply become a reflection of whomever reads it. It is precisely to this concern that this inquiry has addressed itself by proposing four moments of explanation that appeal to the community of public discourse. Frei only proposes one, the literary-aesthetic model by which he really means one variety of that model, the New Critics. Contemporary interpretation is unavoidably pluralistic but it has been the conviction of this inquiry to avoid monism, eclecticism, or relativism and to engender critical pluralism. Not all options are equally acceptable, and the text is not the occasion for creative misinterpretation. The possibility of multiple interpretations does not render a community of discourse untenable. Shared public values are possible.[80]

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[79] Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutics," p. 325; this discussion also indicates some reason to question Scharlemann's recent arguments regarding the ontological uniqueness of the word "God," but, that argument is not as severe as the one Frei is making; Cf. The Being of God, pp. 160ff. Implied as well in this discussion is the entire relationship between creation and redemption; for, if there is an utter discontinuity between the creation and redemption, then Frei's argument might be more appropriate but if some continuity exists between creation and redemption--no matter how severe the distortion of the imago Dei, then Ebeling's understanding of word as word might, with the implied corrections of this proposal, stand. The issues lie at the difference between Luther and Calvin on creation and, I suspect, between Frei and the proposals of this inquiry.

[80] Cf. Booth, Critical Understanding.

By way of reply, Frei's proposal could lend itself to an exclusivistic appeal regarding the communities which might rightly interpret the biblical narrative. Stanley Hauerwas' sectarian approach to the use of the biblical narrative, discussed above, draws substantially on Frei's proposal. In principle, Hauerwas' use of Frei is consistent with Frei's proposal. For this reason, Frei's project does not unify Christians, much less include others, in a successful pluralist conversation regarding the meaning of the biblical narrative or the truth of it.

In summary, Frei's reasons for limiting the definition and scope of hermeneutics are considerable and substantial. They do not represent sufficient reasons for rejecting this inquiry's proposal for understanding the role of narrative in the theological task. His concerns should be kept in mind, since they represent realistic pitfalls of a general theory of hermeneutics approach to the theological task. They should especially be taken seriously by a proposal that has the theologian's self-understanding primarily under the image of rhetor. This proposal, however, considers that image as useful for understanding the role of the theologian in the church as well as within academy or popular culture. The theologian makes complex determinations of appropriate arguments--now broadly construed to include enthymemes, etc.--for various audiences. In light of this theological task, this proposal has evaluated Frei's limiting scope of hermeneutics as understandable, perhaps under certain circumstances as advisable, but not generally appropriate. Frei weighs too heavily the dangers from one source, namely Feuerbach, and not sufficiently others.

George Stroup is another systematic theologian who has approached the biblical narrative as the major issue in his approach to narrative theology. Before turning to the final section of this chapter, his misunderstanding of the relationship between meaning and reference in the biblical narrative needs to be noted.

In his book, The Promise of Narrative Theology: Recovering the Gospel in the Church, Stroup recognizes the importance of truth claims in the interpretation of the Biblical narrative. Though he does not specifically make the arguments offered above regarding Frei, he appears to have similar sentiments. He argues that the "center of the identity narratives of Christian faith are rooted firmly in history."[81] Furthermore, "the historical referent in Christian faith is important because it bears on a crucial hermeneutical issue in the understanding of Christian narrative."[82] To these sentiments, this proposal has already agreed.

However, Stroup misunderstands and omits the second order of reference discussed in this proposal. He suggests that David Tracy's categories of meaning, meaningfulness, and truth[83] exclude truth in Tracy's interpretation of narrative. It is true that Tracy is unwilling to allow ambiguity in first order referentiality even to the qualified degree of the first model, but Tracy does not reject truth claims by an escape into meaning and meaningfulness. Therefore Stroup is quite wrong when he suggests that "the difficulties with this 'revisionist model' of Christian theology are twofold. In the first place the truth of any interpretation of Christian narrative is not simply whether it is adequate to human experience and appropriate to the Christian tradition. . . .

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[81] Stroup, Promise, p. 233.

[82] Ibid., p. 234.

[83] Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, pp. 64-87.

It may well be that Christian narrative is not adequate to human experience, but it still may be true."[84] Stroup's second objection is equally off the mark when he suggests that "interpretations of Christian faith which stress the categories of adequacy and appropriateness run the risk of collapsing truth into meaning."[85]

In this accusation Stroup footnotes Tillich to support his comments regarding the revisionists. This footnote reveals a grave misunderstanding of the revisionist proposal, since it understands Tillich's one-way correlation method whereby culture and philosophy raise the questions to which the text and theology respond.[86] The revisionist model is substantially and crucially different. Edward Schillebeeckx's discussion of these matters in his Christological project[87] states the crucial difference between Stroup's understanding of the revisionist project and their actual model. This inquiry is an example of the latter.

Schillebeeckx describes his method as a "mutually critical correlation between what we find in the New Testament and our everyday lives."[88] This mutually critical correlation has three hinges. The first results from the relationship between experience and revelation. When we experience something, it is not simply a matter of our undergoing what we anticipated. Quite to the contrary, one might describe experiences as those movements when we "encounter the course of things that we did not anticipate, what our perspective would not account for."[89] Experience in this sense if refractory. Fully developed, this conception of experience as refractory provides a clear moment which allows for the critique of our common human experience.[90]

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[84] Stroup, Promise, p. 235; Tracy and other "revisionists" could not agree more. Clearly Tracy and others would allow for a correction of common human experience from the side of the Christian text.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

[87] Edward Schillebeeckx, Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord trans. John Bowden (New York: The Seabury Press, 1980), p. 36; hereafter, Christ.

[88] Schillebeeckx, Interim Report, p. 62.

The second hinge results from the relationship between experience and interpretation. Schillebeeckx emphasizes how "interpretative identification" first unexpressed and then deliberately reflected on is already an intrinsic element of the experience itself. This deliberate reflection takes the shape of second-order affirmation, and theories and models much like the models proposed in this inquiry.

The third hinge on which the revisionist model hangs, as Schillebeeckx articulates it, is connected with the critical correlation between the two sources of theology: the tradition of Christian experience and present-day experiences. This correlation therefore, requires: "first, an analysis of our present world or even worlds of experience; second, an analysis of the constant structures of the fundamental Christian experience about which the New Testament and the rest of Christian tradition of experience speak; and third, the critical correlation and *on occasion the critical confrontation of these two 'sources'*."[91]

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[89] Schillebeeckx, *Christ*, p. 36.

[90] Schillebeeckx, *Interim*, p. 62.

[91] Ibid., p. 51.

The difference between Stroup's proposal and this revisionist model is Stroup's presumption of "the critical confrontation" as normative, or what he calls the "collision" of one world with another.[92] This model makes violence the primary model of the encounter of biblical narrative and the reader. This need not be the only experience or the normative one for the encounter of the audience with the text. One would not want to ignore the sense in which the text must kill in order to bring life. Though this issue is crucial, it does not warrant Stroup's criticism of the revisionist, of which this proposal is a type.[93]

## The Models Revisited

This inquiry has developed four models for explaining the verisimilitude of the Markan narrative. Each model exemplifies a different relationship between the sense or meaning of the text and the reference. These four different arrangements have included the same four factors in interpreting a text: the historical context, the author/original audience, the reader/contemporary audience, and the text itself. These four models neither exhaust all the possibilities for ordering these factors nor describe all the possible relationships between meaning and reference. On the contrary, all four models seek to understand the text as a whole without losing a full range of referential claims.

In each model the narrative character of Mark is a necessary, though not sufficient, ingredient to understanding the text in the manner described above. The narrative of Mark provided the mediation of the two paradigms for understanding a text, the linguistic and historical. In each model the narrative allowed for a unity despite the diverse referential claims. Though each model, in effect, exposed another set of truth claims in the text, the narrative kept the text from being reduced to any one set of these claims. Thus, the narrative character of Mark is crucial in understanding Markan verisimilitude in each of these four models.

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[92] Stroup, Promise, pp. 171-72.

[93] The development of this theme might well take the shape of H. R. Niebuhr's discussion in Christ and Culture (New York: Harper & Row, 1956) and could also reflect an interpretation of Luther's 92 and 93 theses of the famous 95; 92: "Away, then, with those prophets who say to Christ's people, 'Peace, peace,' where there is no peace." 93: "Hail, hail to all those prophets who say to Christ's people, 'The cross, the cross,' where there is no cross."

For theological reasons these four models have been ordered in relationship to each other. The third model which understands the interpreter as rhetor and attends first to the text as a literary whole predominates. The three other models function as corroboration and checks of falsifiability. Against those who would want to move the text out of human reach, so to speak, this arrangement of the models insists that the end result of interpretation is appropriation. Nonetheless, the proposal allows for a moment of distanciation and critical explanation that prevents the text from simply reflecting the interpreter's prejudices. Each model contributes its critical moment.

The third model uses contemporary rhetorical criticism as a distancing, explanatory device which insists upon the text making sense as a whole before dissecting it or explaining it away by appeals to external sources. The fourth model turned to the text's internal and deep structures as a distancing device in which the unconscious, deep, structural convictions of the text are decoded and made public. Even though the present state of this method holds more promise than success, it is both theologically and anthropologically advisable to take into account how texts reflect the ways which humans are bearers as well as makers of meaning. The second model allowed for an appeal to a limited notion of authorial intention as a corroborative moment in the interpretive enterprise and uncovered one more way in which the text can be thought to be true. Finally, the first model both insisted upon the narrative character of Mark without ruling out the importance of historical references to the life and ministry of Jesus. Once again, this moment of critical explanation functions corroboratively and as a negative check on any theological proposals that might grow out of an interpretation of Mark following model three.

In this proposal Mark has neither been reduced to a series of individual propositions concerning historical events behind the text nor understood as an artfully crafted narrative bearing no direct reference to historical and ontological referents. The inquiry has explored the possibilities and conditions for understanding some of the truth and meaning claims for the critique of the place of narrative in contemporary theology. It has neither permitted one choice to be seen as the one true view (monism), nor suggested that all conflict about critical values are nonsense (skepticism), nor engaged in a scissors-and-paste method (eclecticism). In contrast to these options, this study has argued for one set and ordering of models over others (critical pluralism). This position is pluralistic in its recognition of many models which--though they could be seen as mutually exclusive--can be seen as complementary; this separates it from a monistic system. It is critical in its detailed argument for its warrant: a relatively adequate general theory of hermeneutics interprets a text as a whole without losing its full range of referentiality. This separates it from both skepticism or the convenient pragmatism of eclecticism.

Throughout this discussion contemporary hermeneutical philosophy clarifies the biblical narrative without destroying it. The final result is both a better understanding of the Bible as narrative and its place in theology.

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